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DRAMA AS WAGNER SAW IT: THE UNIVERSAL ART

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MUSIC and drama sprang from the same source and were integral parts of one expression. In ancient ritual, in Greek tragedy, in the Catholic liturgy, which was the probable cradle of modern drama, they were together. Or if we trace the theatre as a continuous development from earliest time, the music of the mimes and troubadours kept alight the waning spark of drama through the dark centuries between Euripides and Shakespeare. Recent theatre practice is tending to reestablish the original relation between music and drama, although it is not likely that music will ever again enter the theatre proper, that is, will appear on the so-called "legitimate stage" on an approximately equal footing with drama. If it did so, with the present development of music and the modern aims of the drama, it would be rather like equating a part of a thing to the whole. But that music will become more definitely and integrally a contributory art in the theatre does seem likely.

All unconsciously Wagner made this mistake of equating the part to the whole, for although in his theories he spoke of music as but one of the many arts contributory to a great art of drama, in practice he made music equal to, if not indeed greater than the dramatic art it purported to support. Nevertheless, it was his lifelong conviction that drama was to be the great "Universal Art" of the future, and fired by this belief he wrote voluminously on his theories of this universal art and its relation to the other arts, or "art-varieties" as he called them.[1] While his

[1] All quotations not otherwise designated are from *Richard Wagner's Prose Works*, translated by William Ashton Ellis; Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner, and Co., London, 1892-95.

great music-dramas are not the product of these theories, but are rather the results of Wagner's native bent for music, it is of interest to consider his aesthetic ideals and at the same time to note what Wagner actually accomplished in his highly original combinations of music and drama as regards dramatic production.

As an artist Wagner was a musician,—a musician, it is true, with a distinctly dramatic bias which deceived even himself, but still, fundamentally a musician and no more, so that when drawn into theoretical controversy he soon became hopelessly involved. He believed in the truth of his own expressions, those combinations of drama and music so unique for his time, and advanced arguments to prove to others the truth of his own convictions. Being a musician he could conceive no artistic work save in terms of music. As he said of himself, by the time he had completed the plot scheme of an opera the themes of the musical scores were also completed in his mind. He could not write a verse, could hardly imagine an emotion or particular situation without also imagining appropriate music. He did not write words for his music, or indeed, music for his words but rather his peculiar genius composed them together and so produced "music drama" as has none other before or since. He is perhaps comparable to the bards of the Middle Ages who improvised to the lute a tale of glory. It is not only their art refined and complicated but also their story of gods and heroes that he presents for us on the stage. Those who have seen Wagner's productions at Bayreuth were impressed with their nobility and truth. Nietzsche himself was moved by them, hypnotized, even though at heart opposed to the theory of art and life they exemplified,—a theory that involved the salvation of the masses and was, as we shall see, actually communistic in principle.

It is not strange that Nietzsche, derider of the masses, exalter of the individual, and champion of the superman, stood aghast at the insidious power he felt Wagner possessed to move and to hypnotize, and that once away from its influence he should turn ferociously and attack Wagner. Nietzsche's very ferocity is a tribute, however, to the power of Wagner's productions. Praise also comes from Arthur Symons[2] who commends not only Wag-

[2] ARTHUR SYMONS, *Plays, Acting, and Music.* Constable and Co. Ltd., London, 1909. See also his *Studies in Seven Arts.* Dutton, 1906.

ner's productions as a whole but the acting of the singers in particular. In writing in the early nineteen hundreds of productions not only at Bayreuth but also at the new Wagner theatre in Munich, Symons' high commendation would tend to show that the Wagner tradition has been well kept. The substance of his criticism of the acting is that it admirably fitted the music, and, of course, to interpret Wagner nothing could be better. Wagner himself said in directions written for the acting of the role of Tannhäuser that if the singer would but let himself go the music would do all for him. Thus in Wagnerian acting we find music the controlling factor, as it was in the creation of the opera itself.

However, despite his flair for the dramatic and his passion for the union of all the arts in the one art, drama, Wagner was peculiarly unsuccessful in any art but his own, music. We are told that he was inspiring as a director and he appreciated good acting when he saw it, but in practice he made that art, as all others, conform to the musical idea. As it happened, it was well that he let nothing interfere with his music, for in this art he was far ahead of his time, and, unlike his mediocre librettos and poetry, which are only adequate in connection with the whole, his music can stand alone today. As a scenic artist he lacked sufficient creative imagination to transcend the conventionalities of that period and relied unquestioningly on realism in settings for dramas that were highly idealized. Contemporary comment shows that this realism of scene was gigantically thorough.[3] That it was not

[3] In the *Anthenaeum* for August 5, 1882, we read:

> As a marvel of stage management may be especially mentioned the moving scene in the first act, in which Parsifal and Gurnemanz appear to be walking through the forest to the Hall of the Grail. The stage directions in the libretto will give your readers an idea of the difficulties to be overcome in the presentation of this scene. "Gradually, while Parsifal and Gurnemanz appear to walk, the scene changes imperceptibly from left to right. The forest disappears; a door opens in rocky cliffs and conceals the two; they are then seen again in sloping passages which they appear to ascend. Long sustained trombone notes softly swell, approaching peals of bells are heard. At last they arrive at a mighty hall, which loses itself overhead in a high vaulted dome, down from which alone the light streams in." There is hardly another stage than that of the Wagner theatre on which such a scene could be represented; and

truly effective is probably certain. Could Appia and Wagner have cooperated it seems more than likely that the musician would have perceived the significance of applying his idealism to the designing of the scene as well of the opera and would have availed himself of the designs and theories of that great scenic artist. The Wagnerian tradition, then, would not now be stamped with realism as by the inviolable seal of the dead.

In order that his realism be effective Wagner saw that the audience must view the scene from an aesthetic distance so that the idealism of the operas should not be destroyed. To ensure the desired effect in his theatre in Bayreuth he introduced several innovations in theatre construction. Two of the most significant of them were bound up with his theories; a third was the fact that his stage was the largest in any theatre at the time. This stage was truly immense. From the description in the note on the realistic scenes that Wagner attempted to portray it is easily realized that he needed all the space he could get both on and off stage. The first two features, the sinking of the orchestra into a pit and the erection of a double proscenium arch,[4] were the results of his theory that the ideal world portrayed on the stage should be aesthetically as distant as possible from the real world in the audience, but that at the same time there should be nothing actually separating them. Wagner therefore had a pit built just in front of the stage in which he placed the orchestra so that it would not be observed by the audience and thus distract attention from the scene. This pit had an arched roof which deflected the sound diffusing and delocalizing it so that it became one with the action

when it is said that the directions quoted above are carried out to the letter it will be readily understood that no ordinary amount of ingenuity must have been exercised.

The Hall of the Grail, again, is a truly splendid scene. On most stages the impression of an enormous building is produced by a carefully painted perspective. The immense depth of the stage at Bayreuth allows the large hall itself to be presented as a reality; and it will be seen at once how much is gained by the long processions of knights and youths entering from the back and traversing the entire length of the hall. Wonderfully painted, down to the smallest detail, are the forest and meadow scenes of the first and third acts....

Daisies and all, no doubt.

[4] Proscenium: the arch between the stage and the audience.

it was to interpret. The second proscenium arch was built on the side of this pit toward the audience. Wagner felt that this would establish an aesthetic distance between the audience and actor, particularly if the space between the two arches was kept in shadow. As far as his own operas were concerned, says Huntley Carter,[5] he was opposed to the intimacy between audience and actor advocated by Goethe, and today even more strikingly by Reinhardt and Capeau, although he accepted this intimacy for drama. Wagner says of this "mystic gulf" and the second proscenium:

> My demand that the orchestra should be made invisible had at once inspired the genius of the famous architect[6] whom I was first privileged to consult in the matter with a scheme for the empty space between the proscenium and the front row of seats: this space—which we call the "mystic gulf" because it had to part reality from ideality—the master framed in a second, a wider proscenium, from whose relation to the narrower proscenium proper he anticipated the singular illusion of an apparent throwing back of the scene itself, making the spectator imagine it quite far away, though he still beholds it in all the clearness of its actual proximity; while this in turn gives rise to the illusion that the persons figuring upon the stage are of larger, superhuman stature.
>
> The success of this arrangement would alone suffice to give an idea of the spectator's completely changed relation to the scenic picture. His seat once taken, he finds himself in an actual "Theatron," i. e. a room made for no other purpose than his looking in, and that for looking straight in front of him. Between him and the picture to be looked at there is nothing plainly visible, merely a floating atmosphere of distance, resulting from the architectural adjustment of the two proscenia; whereby the scene is removed as it were to the unapproachable world of dreams. . . .

This insistence upon the complete separation of actor and audience is diametrically opposed to his conception of the actor-audience relation in the ideal drama of the future. This, however, should not be a surprise. The first steps of a reform often appear to go backwards. No one can expect to travel directly to his goal. Wagner felt a very real though vague dissatisfaction with the aesthetic ideal that he was setting up in practice. He felt that art, particularly dramatic art, should not stand aloof from life,

[5] *The New Spirit in Drama and Art.* Frank Palmer, London, 1912.
[6] GOTTFRIED SEMPER.

but should be a real and vital part of it, and in that case there would need be no sepearation of actor and audience. He could conceive no way to attain his ideal, however, save by the combination in a "brotherhood of artists" of the three elements, author, actor, and audience, so that each would partake of the function of the other two. Since it took the World War and the Russian Revolution to make possible even such approximation of this union and brotherhood as we find in the Russian theatre today, Wagner should rather be commended for having had the idea, than condemned for not having been able to carry it out. The form of drama that he originated and strove against great difficulties to perfect, while not representative of the ideal drama as he imagined it, was nevertheless more dramatic in conception than his contemporary critics, who persistently viewed his productions as music only, were willing to admit.[7] Besides undertaking tasks of scenery construction Wagner attempted to make his opera singers into actors,—actors moreover, not of an emotional school, governed by whim or impulse but ones disciplined to suit their motion and gesture to the music.

Due to Wagner's political exile from Germany he could not personally supervise his earlier productions and so wrote detailed instructions to the actors, the stage managers, the musical directors and musicians, who from all accounts, never read them, but

[7] It may be interesting to note that both today and in Wagner's time Music-Drama claimed its dramatic right in vain. In his translation of Glasenapp's *Life of Richard Wagner* Ellis says, "It was as opera, not drama, that *Tannhäuser* had made its first bow to the public. All its author's efforts to the contrary had proved in vain." In the review of the *Orchestra Dramas* given in the Metropolitan Opera House last May, the *Theatre Arts Monthly* (June 1928) says:

> Unfortunately, in spite of what the creators thought of their enterprise, the newspapers decided that anything that used as one of its major factors such an important body of musicians as the Cleveland Orchestra should come under the eye—no, no, the ear—of the music critic alone—who is not obliged today, in our bare concert halls, to remember that music began as the companion of poetry and the dance. So the official criticism is chiefly dull or confused or angered by the attempt to add anything to the purity of music or the work of the music critic.

This sort of criticism is indeed very like that which Wagner received over fifty years ago.

the directions show beyond doubt some of his theories of production. He says in one of these directions:

> So I beg the stage-director to pay special heed to the scenic action's synchronising in the precisest fashion with the various features of the orchestral accompaniment. Often it has happened to me, that a piece of by-play,—a gesture, significant glance—has escaped the attention of the spectator because it came too early or too late, and at any rate did not exactly correspond in *tempo* or duration with the correlated passage for the orchestra which was influencing that same spectator in his capacity of listener. Not only does this heedlessness damage the effect of the performer's acting, but this inconsequence in the features of the orchestra confuses the spectator to such a pitch that he can only deem them arbitrary caprices of the composer. What a chain of misunderstanding is hereby given rise to, it is easy enough to see.[8]

There were many of these "directions for the performing." Wagner had them printed and sent them in vast numbers to all those engaged in the production of his works whom he could not oversee; but if read, they were little heeded, and seem to have been seldom even read. After the master's death his wife and son appear to have had more success in having the directions carried out to the letter so that they became rather more of a curse than a blessing, since they helped to establish the "what the master wished" myth and so effectually prevented any advance or improvement in the production of Wagner. It was this myth, as has been pointed out, that prevented Appia's theories from having

[8] An amusingly similar difficulty in *The Road to Rome* is discussed by Douglas Moore in the August, 1928 *Theatre Arts Monthly*. He says:

> Just before the final curtain comes the one opportunity for the music to assert itself.... About this time, Amytis, a much admired star, makes a triumphant gesture.... During rehearsal it was apparent that Amytis did not hear the music and had no wish to cooperate with its climax by timing her gesture to it. The composer from the depths of the theatre sought out the director and requested permission to call the distinguished attention of the star to this possibility. Permission was refused on the ground of a probable affront to her dignity. It is also a fact that the play had been in performance several weeks before the star discovered that the music had been specially written for the production. "That's the kind of a manager I like," she jubilantly remarked. "One who gets music especially written for me."

any appreciable influence on Wagnerian production, although they did have a far reaching one on stage production in general.

Wagner attempted much that he could not do. His theories, though primarily written as a justification of his art, contained ideas which that art never could have expressed. He had ventured into an art of which he could never be more than half master, yet he gave to the world a mightier form of the new-old music-drama than it had ever seen before, the conception of drama as the universal art.

Indeed, it is a brave answer to those who question drama's right to be called an art at all to say to them, "What you call arts are but sterile art-varieties. The true and only art is born only when these are united, and we call this union *drama.*" Of course, such "blithe self-confidence," as Newman[9] with reason points out, rather indicated an "inability to appreciate the difficulties" of the problems with which Wagner was dealing. However, for the very reason that he did not solve them and that they are still problems today, his treatment of them, while not always instructive, is of interest. The problems are grouped here, more or less arbitrarily, under five heads. I. Presented drama the only true realization of the poetic idea. II. Drama the union of all the arts. III. The necessity for the artists as well as the arts to unite and cooperate. IV. The relation between artist, actor, and audience. V. The conception of drama as the expression of a community rather than an individual. This last as Wagner states it seems fantastically idealistic, but if half the accounts of the present Russian theatre be true, they have already reached in that country an approximation of this expression.[10]

First let us consider Wagner's discussion of drama as the expression of the poetic idea. "Art," he says, "is beauty energized." That is, it must make a direct appeal to the senses. This, literature does not do, but makes it appeal indirectly through the intermediary of mind, so that "the poet. . .thrusts toward the actuality of his artwork, in the sense of the actuality of plastic art, in the drama only,—in drama actually presented on the

[9] Ernest Newman, *A Study of Wagner.* Putnam, 1899.

[10] Huntly Carter, *The New Theatre and Cinema of Soviet Russia.* International Publishers, New York, 1925.

stage." Thus the presented drama is for the poet (or should be) what paint and marble are for the plastic artist.

"What would the painter or sculptor answer," says Wagner, "if we told him: content yourself with pencil and paper and forego all color and brush, all stone and chisel, for these belong not to the artist, but to public industry? He would reply that he is thereby robbed of all possibility of realizing his artistic thought and bound down to merely hinting but never carrying out that thought." And yet the literary poet seems satisfied with hardly more than such an indication and it is public industry that gives the final form to the dramatist's conception. It is just as sane, says Wagner, to ask him to be satisfied so to rely on public industry as to ask the artist to adapt his aim and means "to the painter of shop signs or the hewer of grave-stones." No artist save the dramatist is likely to be driven to such an extremity, however. The materials for expression in the plastic arts are comparatively easy to hand; not so that of the dramatist. Literature may seek refuge in the anaemic shell of the printed page but its true interpretation, the only way that it can appeal directly to either the aesthetic sense or the emotions, is through the drama. And, says Wagner, since the drama must use all the other arts in its expression of the poetic idea it is therefore the greatest of all the arts for it combines them all in its own form. He finds three arguments for this union, two from Greek precedent and one from an aesthetic theory. These arguments will be discussed shortly, but first let me say that he goes further still.

Having proved to his own satisfaction that drama is the union of all other arts and therefore the greatest art, Wagner attempts to prove that the other arts are inadequate in themselves and should not exist alone, but should exist only in their combination, the drama. In other words, that drama is not only the greatest art, but should be the only art. This theory that drama should be the only art is so extravagantly absurd that it is hardly worth considering. To confront Wagner with his own arguments by going back to Greek precedent and asking him to account for the excellence of Greek sculpture and architecture would be but one simple way of refuting the theory. His discussion of why drama should be considered the union of all the arts in one Great Art is somewhat more credible. He points to the example of Greek tragedy,

of which music and dancing formed a part, and finds as well an authority in Greek precept, which prescribed that an educated Greek must know music and gymnastic. Wagner considered dance, tone, and poetry the three basic arts and pointed out that, since music in Greece connoted all the arts of speech, hence of "tone and poetry," and since gymnastic connoted all the arts of bodily motion, hence of "dancing," the Greeks manifested that the uniting of these three arts was fundamental in their daily life as well as in their tragedy.

For this union of dance, tone, and poetry he also finds an aesthetic reason. He states that the separate faculties in man and the corresponding senses are limited (i. e. each has its own sphere and function) and that they can be freed from this limitation only through one another. In his words:

> Every artistic faculty of man has its natural bounds in the confines of its correlated sense. But the boundaries of the separate senses are also (only) their joint meeting point ... that point at which they melt into one another and each agrees with each. Their confines, therefore, are removed by this agreement. But only those that love each other can agree, and "to love" means to acknowledge the other and at like time to know oneself. Thus knowledge through love is freedom, and the freedom of man's faculties is All-faculty. Only the art which answers to this All-faculty of man is therefore free, and not the Art-variety which only issues from a single human faculty.

Could such an art answering "this All-faculty of man" come into existence, it seems obvious that it would come as some form of the drama, for this is the only art that could conceivably combine all the arts in the expression of a unified idea. Wagner saw this and yet failed to produce even an approximation of this form. He failed because he was an artist in our sense of the word, i. e. master of the single art of music, and not in his sense, which would have been some sort of universal artist. So it would seem,—in fact one gathers as much from Wagner's theories,—that in order to produce the Universal Art, Drama, (if we may so name it) the creative ability of not a single artist but of many is needed. Here distinctly is a difficulty, for of all people artists find it hardest to cooperate; but that this can and must be overcome if the drama is to continue to progress, we are proving (by hard labor) every day in our theatres.

Wagner did not sense the practical side of this difficulty so keenly, but he has left an intricate study of the aesthetic principles involved in the actor-author relationship. He observed the significant fact that from Aeschylus to Molière through Lope de Vega and Shakespeare the great dramatic poet has always been himself an actor or has written for a given company of actors, and points out how in Paris, "where alone the stage has a measure of natural life," every *genre* has its theatre and every play is written for a definite theatre. Here, then, is the very foundation of dramatic art, which is realized only by the complete interdependence of poet and actor, the poet "forgetting himself" as he creates his poetry in terms of living men and women and the actor divesting himself of self in carrying out the intentions of the poet. Wagner defines the Shakespearian drama as "a fixed mimetic improvisation of the highest poetic value," and he shows how, in order to rise to the drama, poetry must stoop to the stage and, ceasing to be an absolute thing, pure poetry, must accept aid from life itself,—from the actor who realizes it according to its intention. Improvisation is an indispensable tool of the dramatist.

This is strangely reminiscent of Gordon Craig. Both he and Wagner stress their conviction that in the actor lies the salvation of the theatre, and both put their faith in improvisation. This faith implies as well (necessarily if it is to be justified) an absolute mutual understanding and sympathy between actor and artist. In fact, carried by these two great theorists to its ultimate conclusion, it comes to an identification of the actor with the artist, for with Wagner all actors become artists or all artists become actors, while with Gordon Craig *the* artist becomes, or would attempt to become, the only actor, in the sense that his would be the only personality to be projected through that of the actors. Wagner would have the interpretation the sum of the actor and the artist; Gordon Craig would have it only the artist expressed through the actors.

For all thoughtful dramatic theorists this relation of actor and author and the rightly or wrongly called Art of Acting has been a serious problem. That Wagner prophesied the final union of the artist and the actor merely indicates that like Craig he despaired of any true art coming from the theatre until such a union is effected. It also implies that *artist* and *actor* are terms

distinct in meaning and application, as is shown by what Wagner says of the mimetic art and the relation of actor to directing artist:

> It is as absurd to ask a singer (or actor) to indue with dramatic truth and nature the fabrication of an affected literature-poet or musician, as it is foolish to expect from him *any productive power at all.* His whole essence is reproductiveness, whose root we find as the *bent to copy* with all possible deception the individuality of other persons and their demeanor in the incidents of daily life. When we add here to the dramatic poet's unique power of guiding this to the portrayal of an image above and beyond the experience of daily life, consequently of an ideal life, we have said everything there is to say about the *dignity* of mimetic art....[11]

The mimetic art—"a bent to copy"—not so much of an art after all perhaps. However, when Wagner analyzes the nature of the dramatic artist and that of the actor he finds a great similarity but only a slight difference. The key to the nature of the actor's "art" is the word *Selbstentausserung,* translated by Ellis as self-divestment. Wagner begins by saying, "Granted that a real putting off of self is possible," and in so saying makes an assumption that many would not grant. When an actor is portraying a character, can he, should he, forget himself completely? If the self-divestment is not to be complete where can the line be drawn? It has been an ever pregnant question since Diderot, which Wagner sidesteps, it seems, by his just quoted premise. He assumes that the greater the actor the more complete is this self-divestment. Some of the greatest, he says, may in fact never recover that self that they have exchanged for the self of the individual they impersonate. When there remains a consciousness of self we have not the great actor but the great artist. In speaking of self-consciousness versus self-divestment he says:

> Manifestly, we are standing before an excess of that mother-force from which springs all poetic and artistic faculty; whilst the latter's most beneficient products, the most fruitful for the weal of man, are due to well nigh nothing but a certain diminution, or at least a moderation in the violence of its expression. (i. e. moderation in the *self-divestment.)* Let us therefore conclude that we owe the highest of art-creations of the human mind to that rarest of intellectual

[11] Italics mine.

> gifts which endows this capability of *total self-divestment* with the clearest *perspicacity* to boot, in power whereof the stage of self-divestment is mirrored in that very consciousness which in case of the mime is *wholly dethroned*.[12]

In other words, although the artist's self-divestment is "total," his consciousness is not so "wholly dethroned" as that of the actor. Wagner has here expressed the Diderot paradox, although so obscurely that he may himself have been unaware of it, for he does so by confusing absolute and comparative terms, overlooking the fact that in our finite world there cannot be degrees of absoluteness. There is really no difference between a statement such as Diderot's that an actor must forget himself and at the same time not forget himself and the one of Wagner that the artist's complete self-forgetfullness is not quite complete, save that the second is not so frankly paradoxical. Wagner here, as often before, has become lost in a sea of words, confusing not only his reader but, no doubt, himself as well. He further clouds the question by considering the actor and the artist as distinct individuals, for since he considers that eventually everyone, including actors, of course, will be artists, the distinction theoretically is a false one. What he really is considering in the passages quoted above is not the difference between actor and artist and what their relation should be, but rather what qualities besides a bent for imitation an actor must have to become an artist. To sum up, it seems that the perfect actor-author relationship results in the identity of one with the other so that the actor will become artist. If one can imagine the group of artists already in the theatre learning to cooperate with each other, it will be just as possible to imagine the actors participating in such a cooperation as members of the group.

How a unified art-work can be conceived and executed by a *group* of artists working together is as yet unrevealed. One looks with interest, however, at the efforts of the new theatre in Russia, which is attempting such a unification, as this has a direct bearing on the last of Wagner's theories cited, i. e. that the drama will be a group expression, or in his words "the living utterance of a free, self-conscious community." In Russia almost every town has its theatre in which the people themselves produce plays which

[12] Italics mine.

are the expression of the community. The theatres are public institutions and are often operated exclusively by the workers, who act as scene designers, stage carpenters, directors, actors, etc. as the need arises.

In conclusion, a consideration of the five problems just discussed shows them to be different aspects of Wagner's struggle for unification of the parts of the drama into a whole which shall be an adequate, satisfactory expression of the Poetic Idea.

The poet must realize his Idea in terms of the drama; to do so he must have the cooperation of the actors and other artists in the theatre. They in turn must be in harmony with the Idea so that each can reexpress it in terms of his own art. As Wagner was not sure, nor are we today, whether it should be the arts or artists who ought to unite to form "the one great art-work, drama," he considered both possibilities, as indeed, we are prone to do today. If it is the arts that should so unite and merge their individualities in the one expression then we must consider this expression as the work of a single master artist. Such an artist can hardly be imagined, and besides, the nature of the drama is such as to make it necessary for him to accept aid from the actor at least. The second conception, that of the artists cooperating to create a group expression is the more acceptable,—though Gordon Craig has attempted to dispose of the difficulty of the actor by introducing what he called an "Übermarionette" to take his place.

Wagner would synchronize all the elements in the theatre which vie with each other for prominence and make of them a unified whole. While his theories are often obscure and unsound, and though he failed to carry them out in his own work, still his attempt is interesting. It is doubly so when we realize that in the half century or more since he first became conscious of this problem of unifying the arts involved in dramatic production the artists in the theatre have come more and more to recognize it and the necessity for solving it. Wagner groped to formulate the problem, but today it is clearly recognized and is being more squarely faced than ever before.

WOODROW WILSON: INTERNATIONAL RHETORICIAN

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TOO great a love or too great a hatred destroys the power of critical judgment. When we are overcome with admiration or scorn, we miss the essential element we should most have noted. Thus the over-eager golfer tops his drive; the too-earnest speaker stutters at his climax; the excited amateur actor shoots the villain five speeches too soon.

Altho over eight years have passed since he played the "lead" in the great international comedy at Versailles, few critics are able to consider the career of Woodrow Wilson with calm discernment. He still remains an autocrat, a czar, an egotist, a blunderer, an iceberg, an hypocrite; or, if you admire the man, the great internationalist, the height of our twentieth century civilization. Pro-Wilson foundations encourage extravagant eulogies; his enemies favor further attacks and advocate additional research into his many mistakes. The scene is a weird one. Unable to make any sense from the clashing reports, future generations may disregard the man altogether. Or he may become a myth, half god, half devil, a symbol of our "age of confusion."

Strange that so few critics have considered Wilson in his primary rôle! He was essentially a politician, a moulder of public opinion. Although not reared in the alleys of practical politics, he ever longed for a public career. The charm of Princeton could never quiet his mighty desire for a wider field of leadership. And even at Princeton his primary aim was to brand his mark on the university, on the students, faculty, and alumni alike.

Here, at last, is a phase of Wilsoniana, which may be studied with some degree of calmness. Although we may never agree on the political wisdom of his actions, we should be able to determine the persuasive methods which he used in influencing men to carry out his program. No one dares deny that for several years, at least, he dominated the stage of the world. It is my purpose here to examine some of the rhetorical devices which Wilson employed to gain international assent. The study is by no means complete, but perhaps it may be suggestive. Let others complete the picture.

As the readers of this Journal no doubt remember, Wilson has already been the subject of investigation. Mrs. Graham has found in Wilson's speeches three distinct characteristics: logical form; a flexible and effective literary style; and the expression of intense conviction.[1] Mrs. Graham's paper is both interesting and valuable, but it is not, and does not pretend to be, complete. She herself states that his "*Public Papers* . . . are, as few other works could be, a laboratory for speech research." Clearly, much is yet to be done before our analysis of this fascinating figure is complete.

Recently, another and far different evaluation of Wilson's rhetoric has appeared in this magazine. In an article entitled "Mere Rhetoric," Mr. V. E. Simrell used Wilson as an example of the evil resulting from too great a reliance upon persuasive methods.[2] "The habit of rhetorical thinking," writes Mr. Simrell of the rhetorician of which Wilson is the archetype, "largely incapacitates him for disinterested, impartial thought. And the grandiose and vague images with which he expresses his convictions in order to influence other men's minds exert the same power upon his own mind." Wilson, it appears, became the victim of his own rhetorical facility, thereby losing almost completely the power of clear expository speaking. Mr. Simrell maintains that in none of the speeches of Wilson's western tour was he able to explain the real nature of the Versailles treaty. And without going to the lengths which Mr. Simrell would wish to take us, most students of Wilson will be forced to admit that much of Mr. Simrell's indictment is true. As I shall show later in this paper, Wilson was often carried away by his persuasive technique. It is this characteristic of Wilson's speeches which has caused some of his critics to conclude, quite unjustly no doubt, that he plunged us into the World War for no purpose other than to make himself "the leader of humanity."

But Mr. Simrell advances an even more serious objection, an objection to rhetoric itself. It degrades public opinion. Men will never know the facts if public speakers use persuasive methods which appeal to the emotions and prejudices of their audiences. To offset this evil, the teachers of speech should train their stu-

[1] This Journal, XIII, 4, 412.
[2] This Journal, XIV, 3, 359.

dents in exposition and dialectic, instead of rhetoric. Gradually rhetoric will become less necessary and less influential. "Meanwhile," says Mr. Simrell, "the best method of suppressing the harmful power of rhetoric is the method the Spartans used to suppress their unfit population, the method of unexcited and uncompromising exposure."

Insufficient space prevents me at this time from pointing out the full implications of Mr. Simrell's attitude. Obviously, its widespread adoption would completely change our methods of teaching public speaking and persuasion. But we are not here concerned with what shall be done in the class-rooms with the finding of any investigation. Certainly it is not the duty of the researcher to act as nursemaid or moral policeman. At any event, I have endeavored to present the desired "uncompromising exposure" of Wilson's methods. And, in addition, all of us can agree that although his methods were unusually effective, they are sometimes dangerous and are therefore to be used with care.

I find that Wilson used at least eight major persuasive methods. I shall merely enumerate them one by one. The analysis is, of course, far from complete. You may fill in the picture at your leisure moments. You will find no study more fascinating or more exasperating.

(1) Wilson was a maker of easily remembered phrases. Few men in all history have used the slogan with equal effectiveness. Even today his phrases remain in the minds of millions of people long after the logic and evidence of his speeches have been forgotten. "Watchful waiting," "too proud to fight," "forward-looking men," "peace without victory," "make the world safe for democracy," "German autocracy," "we are not enemies of the German people," "the fourteen points," the "willful" senators who opposed the League—all became currency in our mental circulation. Many of his biographers have denied that he originated the faithful phrase, "he kept us out of war," but Wilson must have approved of its use as the campaign slogan. It carried out the Wilson tradition—the "maker of phrases."

Note that his very ability in phrase-making sometimes injured him. "Watchful waiting" and "too proud to fight" brought him the scorn of millions. But even when working to his disadvantage, his great talent as a maker of phrases could never be idle. And

in the long run his slogans contributed immeasurably to his political power.

(2) Wilson possessed an astonishing facility in phrasing the most optimistic hopes of mankind in organ-voiced English. With natural ease and confidence Wilson spoke for the highest hopes of humanity. Even as early as his first inaugural address as president, he said: "This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them if they will but counsel and sustain me."

Wilson had previously demonstrated the same persuasive use of hope-giving generalities at Princeton, and he was to continue in their use throughout the years in which he attempted to make the world safe for democracy and to establish a permanent peace. The campaign of 1912 was to introduce the New Freedom. Once elected his reform program in Congress was to aid social justice; it sought boldly to destroy the power of the invisible government of wealth. When war came to Europe, his peace plans offered the ideal peace without victory; he declared that "only a peace between equals can last." But when he finally decided to take us into the war, he discovered new hope-giving generalities. America entered to save mankind from autocracy, and to bring democracy and lasting peace to the weary but hopeful people of the world. Only a victory for the allies would save the civilization. In his War Message to Congress he said that the American people were privileged to fight "for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

But his astonishing optimism was also a source of weakness. Well-concealed behind the respect-producing dignity and sweep of his language, the speeches of Wilson combine the naïve anticipations of Pollyanna with the exaggerated claims of the patent-medicine man. In 1918 millions of people in every civilized nation of the world accepted his plans for the future with complete seriousness. They believed in Wilson. Then came Versailles. The con-

trast of what they expected and what they obtained caused universal disappointment and disillusionment. Wilson himself was partially crushed by the actualities of European politics. The moral for the student of persuasion is: "if you are thinking of the long time result, do not promise your audience more than you can reasonably hope to fulfill." How many of us, like Wilson, have not remembered that truth?

(3) Wilson not only expressed the noblest and most optimistic hopes of mankind—he spoke *for* mankind. He became the self-appointed leader of all liberal minded people everywhere. With ease, poise, and confidence, he offered to himself and then accepted this rôle of universal spokesman. This attitude is the outgrowth of his admiration for the cabinet form of government. Our president—or any leader anywhere—should assume the rôle of prime minister. The prime minister is the generalissimo of every important movement, and must accept the responsibility for that movement. Early in his academic career, Wilson praised the cabinet system of government, and his easy assumption of power was merely a practical application of that principle. Even to the last, when the darkness of defeat was closing in on his vain and futile western tour, at San Francisco, September 17, 1919, he said: "I can only claim the privilege of having been the obedient servant of the great ideals and purposes of beloved America." He took for granted the support of his audience; he did not struggle mightily to win them over—or, at least, he did not seem to struggle. Without strain, Wilson assumed his rôle. And millions accepted his assumption without question. "And all the while no effort—he seemed only breathing."

(4) Wilson used his idealistic generalities as a whip. If you were opposed to him, you were opposed to his far-reaching principles. The more glorious the plan the more unforgivable the opposition. His enemies on the faculty and the board of trustees at Princeton were enemies of democracy in education. Their opposition to Wilson's plan was no mere quarrel over academic and administrative details; it was a death blow to the democratic spirit in Princeton. In his speech to the Pittsburgh Alumni, he said: "The universities would make men forget their common origins, forget their universal sympathies, and join a class—and no class can ever serve America." Later, as governor of New Jersey,

as candidate for president, and as President of the United States, he became the leader of the New Freedom. He made it obvious that his political enemies were the enemies of Progress, the friends of a decaying order. And during the latter part of his first term, when the possibilities of our entrance into the war were increasing monthly, he became the great peace president. He opposed the rash and headstrong Americans who were trying to plunge us into the war. The war itself, he vigorously maintained, should be settled on terms of "peace without victory." Both England and Germany were violators of that great principle, Neutral Rights. In a war-mad world Wilson held to peace, and permitted democratic campaign strategists to picture him as a sane lover of Christian peacefulness opposing the war-obsessed statesmen of Europe. This strategy won his re-election and changed the history of the world.

But when Wilson did decide to take us into the war, there came a sudden change in his attitude—but not in his persuasive method. Both the German Government and most of the citizens in the United States who still desired peace became the enemies of democracy and civilization. The Central Powers were destroyed partly by the flaming words of Wilson. In the history of modern Europe few nations have ever been placed so hopelessly in the wrong as was Germany. Such historians, as Harry Elmer Barnes, have spent years in attempting to restore the picture to its just focus. But the task is a vain one. Wilson has forever marked the former German government as an enemy to mankind. Nor did only Germany feel the sting of Wilson's whip of principles. Those "willful" senators who opposed our entrance without reservations into the League of Nations were made the enemies of a lasting peace. America fought the war to insure universal peace by means of the American ideal of international arbitration. Thus the "headstrong" enemies of the league became the friends of the old order which inevitably produces war. Even France and Italy, the saviors of democracy in 1918, changed to "sinister forces" by 1923. In his radio speech of November 10, 1923, Wilson said: "France and Italy between them have made waste paper of the Treaty of Versailles, and the whole field of international relationship is in perilous confusion." Over a period of years, few escaped Wilson's whip of principles.

Let us not underestimate the effectiveness of Wilson's strategy. In 1919 only a handful of Senators dared oppose to any marked degree his plans for the League. Even the majority of Republicans offered only mild reservations. Now, Wilson is dead. There is no master to set a Republican senator against some great principle. And today even our entrance into the World Court is loaded with reservations which no World Court could ever accept.

(5) As a further addition to his whip technique, Wilson often atempted to coerce one group by appealing to a larger and more powerful group. Wilson did not like to fight alone. He felt more confident when he could threaten his enemies with public disfavor. At Princeton he appealed to the western alumni and to the friends of democracy in education generally to aid him in the fight against the aristocratic views of those students, faculty members, trustees and eastern alumni who bitterly opposed his quadrangle and graduate-school plans. Later, while president of this country, those members of the Democratic party who became too unruly were labeled obstructionists to party unity. Even that skillful parliamentarian, Senator James Reed, was publicly rebuked in 1920 when he was denied his twice-won seat at the national Democratic Convention. The rebuke was unfair, but for several years Reed was a man without a party.

In speech after speech, Wilson followed this policy of setting some hostile group against more powerful forces. The men who opposed the extensive reforms which he pushed through Congress from 1914 to 1916 were labeled foes of the nation-wide enthusiasm for the New Freedom. From 1917 to the signing of the Armistice he urged the people of the world to put forth every effort to crush the menacing autocracy of Germany. He matched the moral sentiment of the world against the German military machine. But he did even more. His most telling stroke came in urging the people of Germany to turn against their own government. When he stated that the German government had not served the true interests of the German people, many revolutionary groups in Germany were encouraged by his words. He thereby matched the liberal and radical sentiment of Germany against the conservative German government. Well has it been said that the words of Wilson did as much to destroy the German military machine as did the shells from Allied guns. But when the war was finally

won, Wilson did not lay aside this rhetorical device. Perhaps, as Mr. Simrell suggests, its use had become habitual, beyond Wilson's power to check or control. At any event, he pitted the nationalistic ambitions of Orlando, Lloyd-George, and Clemenceau against the world opinion which he himself had aroused. In fact, he had toured Europe before the Versailles conference began in order to arouse this international "will to peace." Even Clemenceau, the Tiger, feared to outrage too openly the awakened opinion of Europe. Encouraged by his partial victory with the treaty, Wilson planned to defeat his enemies in the Senate by appealing directly to the American people. On his western tour he attempted to change the views of certain "willful" western senators by stirring their constituencies to a pro-League sentiment. But his tactics were still more daring. He tried to coerce even the American public by constantly reminding them of the world-wide disfavor which America would merit if she refused to join the League! And but for his physical breakdown he might well have succeeded. His entire career sustains this axiom of rhetoric—"Pit a hostile group against the aroused sentiments of a more powerful group."

(6) Wilson was also an adept in the use of what, to borrow a term from music, we may call "counterpoint." He was able to change his attitude toward a vital question in such a way that he seemed still to keep his former opinion and only to be applying his former judgment to a changing situation. He never abandoned a principle; he merely applied his principle in a *different* manner to a *new* condition. In 1916 Wilson was the friend of peace; in 1917 he urged war to insure permanent peace. In 1916 he was a liberal; in 1917 and 1918 he ordered the Department of Justice to crush liberalism in this country in order that we might more effectively battle for world-wide liberalism. In 1917 he praised the glorious and noble spirit of England, Italy, and France; in 1919 he defended that spirit against the baser nationalistic natures of these same countries. From early youth to 1918 he proclaimed his intense Americanism; our proposed entrance in 1919 into that great superstate, the League of Nations, was but an application of that Americanism to world problems. By his skillful use of "counterpoint" Wilson bridged the transitions. Millions of his followers continued to follow, rarely conscious that the direction had changed.

(7) Somewhat reluctantly, Wilson recognized that despite their verbal idealism, the American people are intensely interested in making money. Although he often weakened his appeal by apologizing for it, time after time, on his western tour in 1919, he showed that a vote for the League was a vote for prosperity. "I want to put it as a business proposition," he said at Los Angeles, in September, 1919, "if I am obliged to come down as low as that, for I do not like, in debating the great traditions of a free people, to bring the debate down to the basis of dollars and cents; but if you want to bring it down to that, if anyone wants to bring it down to that, reason it out on that line. Is it easier to trade with a man who suspects and dislikes you or with one who trusts you?" For too many Americans are interested in the public question in direct proportion to its relation to their pocket-books. Wilson only partially realised this. The student of persuasive methods never forgets it. Even though he regards as unethical the use of this appeal, he must constantly stand prepared to expose uncompromisingly its use by his adversaries.

(8) In all his public speaking, Wilson displayed a dignity which won him wide-spread respect. He was not a good fellow, not a back-slapping politician. He was fully conscious that he was a great man. His very sentence-structure proclaims this consciousness. But, within limits, the world is apt to accept a man at his own valuation. Although some people felt that Wilson was too cold and distant, many more were favorably impressed by his conscious dignity and power.

These eight elements, therefore, constituted a part in Woodrow Wilson's rhetorical and persuasive method. Wilson was a maker of easily remembered phrases; he possessed the facility of phrasing the most optimistic hopes of mankind in organ-voiced English; and he not only expressed these hopes—he spoke for mankind, becoming the self-appointed leader of all liberal-minded people everywhere. He used these idealistic generalities as a whip; and he often attempted to coerce one group by pitting them against a larger and more powerful group. By this double use of the whip technique, Wilson threatened his political enemies with the disfavor which visits both those who oppose some noble principle and those who oppose the views of a powerful group. Wilson was also an adept at "counterpoint," being able to change

his views without appearing to do more than apply them to a new situation. Somewhat reluctantly, he found it expedient to appeal to the American's ever-present desire to make more money. But in all his speaking, he displayed a conscious dignity and power which won him world-wide admiration.

Until the day arrives when the teacher of speech is no longer interested in persuasive methods, the speeches of Wilson will continue to be rich in possibilities for research. And those who would teach their students to oppose the widespread use of rhetoric, will find there much to expose.

THE REFRAIN IN ORATORICAL PROSE

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PROFESSOR EARLE in his *English Prose* mentions the refrain as one of the embellishments of prose borrowed from poetry. After citing an illustration from Matthew Arnold, Professor Earle dismisses the subject. Genung mentions but does not take seriously this suggestion that there is a refrain in prose. Other writers on rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of oratory, discuss the use of the set phrase, but no one whom I studied, save Earle, had the boldness to call it the refrain. Whately, Bain, Lewes, Shurter all say about the same thing as DeMille expresses, "Perspicuity is frequently gained or increased by the iteration of some important fact or statement." My study leads me to believe that the refrain does unquestionably exist.

In my attempt to form a tentative definition of the refrain in prose as distinct from the refrain in poetry, I took into account the recognized difference that exists in the functions of prose and poetry. I believe that it is generally agreed that prose is for communication and that poetry is for expression. For me this meant that whatever else the refrain might do in prose, it had to make *meaning* clearer and more emphatic. The refrain, for this reason, could not be a group of nonsense syllables occurring in time. I conjectured that the refrain would probably be a word, a phrase, or a sentence. I thought I might be able to find it in paragraphs, in sections of speeches, or in whole compositions. With these

thoughts concerning the nature of the refrain in prose, I framed the following definition to guide me in my search: *The refrain in oratorical prose, or any prose for that matter, is the recurrence of the controlling idea in the form of the same word, phrase, or sentence.*

Many volumes of speeches had to be read before any number of examples were found. Just as the refrain is not found in every poem, the refrain in prose is not found in every speech. I shall give six examples and make a few remarks by the way of a conclusion.

"Acceptance of the Battle Flags," by John A. Andrew, *Models of Speech Composition,* J. M. O'Neill.

Proud *memories* of many a field; sweet *memories* alike of valor and friendship; sad *memories* of fraternal strife; tender *memories* of our fallen brothers and sons, whose dying eyes looked last upon their flaming folds; grand *memories* of heroic virtues sublimed by grief; exultant *memories* of the great and final victory of our country, our Union and the righteous cause; thankful *memories* of a deliverance wrought out for human nature itself, unexampled by any former achievement of arms—immortal *memories* with immortal honors blended, twine around these splintered staves, weave themselves along the warp and woof of these familiar flags, war-worn, begrimed, and baptized with blood.

"Against Pitt and War with America," by Lord Brougham, *Political Oratory,* T. B. Reed, Vol. I.

Gentlemen, I stand up in this contest against the friends and followers of Mr. Pitt, or, as they partially designate him, the *immortal* statesman, now no more. *Immortal* in the miseries of his devoted country! *Immortal* in the wounds of her bleeding liberties! *Immortal* in the cruel wars which spring from his cold miscalculating ambition! *Immortal* in the intolerable taxes, the countless loads of debt which these wars have flung upon us—which the youngest man among us will not live to see the end of! *Immortal* in the triumph of our enemies, and the ruin of our allies, the costly purchase of so much blood and treasure! *Immortal* in the afflictions of England!

"Memorial Day Oration," by Robert Ingersoll.

Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. In the defense of this sublime and self-evident truth the war was waged and won. [Further on in the address we find the same statement.] *The government derives its just*

powers from the consent of the governed and the 50,000,000 of people remember with gratitude the heroes of the revolution. [The statement occurs again.] It means that *governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,* and that each man is accountable to and for the government.

George Bancroft on "Andrew Jackson,"
Political Oratory, Volume 1.

By nature, by impulse, by education, by conviction, a friend to personal freedom—by education, political sympathies, and the fixed habit of his mind, a friend to the rights of states—unwilling that the liberty to the states should be trampled under foot—unwilling that the government should lose its vigor or be impaired, he rallied for the Constitution; and in its name he published to the world, *"The Union; it must be preserved."* The words were a spell to hush evil passion and to remove oppression. Under his effective guidance the favored interests which had struggled to perpetuate unjust legislation yielded to the voice of moderation and reform, and every mind that had for a moment contemplated a rupture of the states discarded it forever. The whole influence of the past was invoked in favor of the federal system; from the council chambers of the fathers who molded our institutions, from the hall where American independence was declared, the clear, loud cry was uttered—*"the Union; it must be preserved."* From every battle field of the Revolution—from Lexington and Bunker Hill, from Saratoga and Yorktown, from the fields that sheltered the men of Marion—the repeated, long-prolonged echoes came up—*"the Union; it must be preserved."* From every valley in our land, from every cabin on the pleasantest mountain sides, from the ships at our wharves, from the minds of the living millions of American freemen, from the thickly coming glories of futurity, the shout went up, like the sound of many waters, *"the Union: it must be preserved."*

"The March of the Flag," by Albert Beveridge,
Political Oratory, Volume 1.

Will you remember that we do what our fathers did,—we but pitch the tents of liberty farther westward, farther southward—we only continue the *march of the flag.*

The march of the flag.

In 1789 the flag of the republic waved over 4,000,000 souls in thirteen states, and their savage territory, which stretched to the Mississippi, to Canada, to the Floridas. The timid minds of that day said that no new territory was needed, and, for the hour, they were right. But Jefferson through whose

intellect the centuries marched; Jefferson whose blood was Saxon, but whose schooling was French and therefore whose deeds negatived his words; Jefferson, who dreamed of Cuba as as a state of the Union; Jefferson, the first imperialist of the republic—Jefferson acquired that imperial territory which swept from the Mississippi to the mountains, from Texas to the British possessions, and the *march of tne flag began.*

The infidels to the gospel of liberty raved, but the flag swept on. The title to the noble land out of which Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana have been carved was uncertain; Jefferson, strict constructionist of constitutional power though he was, obeyed the Anglo-Saxon impulse within him, whose watchword then and whose watchword throughout the world today is "Forward"; another empire was added to the republic and the *march of the flag went on!*

Those who deny the power of free institutions to expand urged every argument and more, that we hear today; but the people's judgment approved the command of their blood, and the *march of the flag went on.*

A screen of land from New Orleans to Florida shut us from the gulf, and over this and the Everglade penninsula waved the saffron flag of Spain. Andrew Jackson seized both, the American people stood at his back, and under Monroe the Floridas came under the dominion of the republic and the *march of the flag went on.*

The Cassandras prophesied every prophecy of despair we hear today, but *the march of the flag went on.* The Texans responded to the bugle calls of liberty, and *the march of the flag went on!* And, at last, we waged war with Mexico, and the flag swept over the southwest, over peerless California, past the gate of Gold, to Oregon, on the north, and from ocean to ocean its folds of glory blazed.

And now, obeying the same voice that Jefferson heard and obeyed, that Seward heard and obeyed, that Ulysses S. Grant heard and obeyed, William McKinley plants the flag over the islands of the seas, outposts of commerce, citadels of national security, and *the march of the flag goes on!* Bryan, Bailey, Bland and Blackburn command it to stand still, but the march of the flag goes on! And the question you will answer at the polls is, whether you stand with this quartet of disbelief in the American people, or whether you are *marching onward with the flag!*

"Nominating James G. Blaine for President," Robert Ingersoll,
Complete Lectures.

The man who has, in full, heaped and rounded measure,

all these splendid qualifications is the present grand and gallant leader of the Republican party—*James G. Blaine.*

Our country, crowned with the vast and marvelous achievements of its first century, asks for a man worthy of the past, and prophetic of her future; asks for a man who has the audacity of genius; asks for a man who is the grandest combination of heart, conscience and brain beneath her flag—such a man is *James G. Blaine.*

Like an armed warrior, like a plumed knight, *James G. Blaine* marched down the halls of the American Congress and threw his shining lance full and fair against the brazen forehead of the defamers of his country and the maligners of his honor.

James G. Blaine is now and has been for years the bearer of the sacred standard of the Republican party.

Illinois nominates for the next president of this country that prince of parliamentarians, that leader of leaders—*James G. Blaine.*

If space allowed I should like to give many more examples to substantiate the opinion that there is a refrain in prose. In the above examples we have the word repeated, we have the phrase recurring, and we have the whole sentence used to make clear or drive home the point. In order to show that these are not isolated instances of this interesting aspect of prose structure, I am in the next paragraph listing several other examples.

I have found Lloyd-George repeating such a significant phrase as *They attacked with the dawn;* Lyman Abbott repeats the phrase *The invisible makes* five times on a page and substitutes home, school nation, commercial prosperity for the object complement; Lincoln in his "Cooper Institute Address" repeated fifteen times the phrase *that the Federal government should control as to slavery in our Federal territories;* Wendell Phillips repeated the phrase *I thank thee, Jew!* in a section of a speech in which he ironically thanks Webster for the expression "rub-a-dub agitation"; William J. Bryan repeated in the peroration of a speech at the beginning of each paragraph the phrase, *Anglo-Saxon civilization has taught,* and follows this by way of contra-position, *American civilization will teach.* Phillips Brooks in his sermon "Is it I?" repeats this question several times. John Bunyan repeats his text, *So run that ye may obtain* endlessly. John Donne deliberately repeated his texts. One sermon contains its text, *Take heed that ye heare,* twen-

ty-five times. Henry van Dyke repeats *Ye are the salt of the earth* freely in his baccalaureate address, "Salt." James Proctor Knott uses with telling satire a repetition of *the ravishing Duluth* in his senatorial speech called "The Glories of Duluth." Edmund Burke secures the effect of the refrain in the peroration of his speech on "The Impeachment of Warren Hastings" when he repeats *I impeach him* six times. DeWitt Talmage in an emotional passage in "Big Blunders" repeats the phrase *The morning cometh!* three times. Booker T. Washington repeats the phrase *Cast down your bucket where you are* until it sings its way into consciousness. The phrase *The crime against Kansas* is repeated an unbelievable number of times in Sumner's speech; as in this instance I have found that many speakers either use the title of the address as a refrain, or have taken the title from the refrain.

Professor Parker in his *Principles of Aesthetics* reminds us that, "Emotion demands repetition, but action demands progression." These words are interesting in the light of the fact that most of the examples of the refrain I have found come from sermons, lyceum lectures, political oratory and other emotion-stirring pieces of oratory. I think the best example I found is the one on the march of the flag taken from Beveridge.

I believe that there is such an element in prose, especially oratorical prose, as the refrain; I think it is distinct enough to be accorded separate treatment under the general heading of repetition; it is found usually in emotional rather than intellectual prose; it may be a figure of speech; it may be a quotation from literature which says exactly what the speaker wishes to impart; it may be metrical; it is an agent of perspicuity and emphasis; it has much to do with rhythm in prose.

A SUGGESTIVE STUDY OF PUBLIC-SPEAKING RATING-SCALE VALUES

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THE Editor of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH states in a prefix to the article in the April number entitled "A Rating Scale For Public Speakers" contributed by Mr. Stevens, that he "is prejudiced against rating scales and 'scientific tests'," and that he prints the article "in the hope that it will call forth a general discussion." We do not suppose that the Editor is unsupported in his "prejudice." We are sometimes lead to wonder whether one of the bases for criticism of departments of public speaking may not be found in the fact that so many of our teachers of speech have been content to leave their prejudices unanalyzed and perhaps unjustified. Until these critics of the scientific method justify their prejudices by presenting us with more helpful devices for the nourishment of our methodology, may we not do well to investigate some of the methods that have been used successfully in other fields of study?

In other fields where a judge has been asked to make an immediate decision on a matter having many complex variables, the carefully weighted-point score-card method was accepted long ago as an improvement over the method of judging by general subjective impressions. We do believe that the significance of a device such as a rating scale, as Mr. Stevens has pointed out, should remain a relative one. The scales which we have worked out seem to us to permit of many possibilities not inherent in those contributed by Mr. Stevens. To us they have been a real help, and they are offered with the thought that others may profit by this or be stimulated to the formation of a better method.

CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF THE SCALES

These scales were originally constructed, not as ends in themselves but as a means to a further end. Last fall we became interested in the application of certain objective tests to the success of students in courses in Public Speaking. We were then faced

*Work done at Syracuse University.

with the necessity of obtaining some fairly reliable objective criterion with which these tests might be correlated. It is a recognized fact among educational psychologists that teachers differ very widely in the marks given on such objective material as that presented on papers in mathematics. Certainly there is much less reason to assume that marks given by a single instructor on such subjective matter as public speaking would have objective value. With the hope of arriving at a more objective correlate than the individual grade we set about the construction of these scales. We began by attempting to summarize the principal aim of a course in the Fundamentals of Public Speaking into a list of questions. These questions were submitted to five members of the staff of our Department of Public Speaking who were intimately connected with such a course. They were asked to distinguish between the relative significance of the questions on the list to the total effectiveness in public speaking on the basis of a scale from 1 to 5.

As a result of this checking a number of questions were omitted in the construction of our scale because of overlapping, ambiguity, and uncertainity of significance. The remaining forty questions were divisible into four types: (1) Those uniformly classified as of little or no significance in the total speaking situation; (2) Those uniformly classified as fundamentals in the total speaking situation; (3) Those agreed upon as relative in their significance in the total speaking situation; and (4) Those upon which there was considerable disagreement as to their relative significance in the total speaking situation. Type questions (3) and (4) were classified together depending upon their average score between type questions (1) and (2). These questions were then placed in scale one and given relative scores weighted in accordance with the five steps of comparative significance in the total speech situation. This weighting permitted allowance for more credit to the individual for the possession in small amount of a relatively important item than for the fully desirable possession of an item of relatively little or no significance. In using the scale the rater is instructed to draw a line through the number which indicates to him the relative possession of the characteristic by the speaker. When the speaker has finished, the credits he has received for each item are added to form a composite raw score indicative of his total speaking ability.

In our study, three instructors using the scale rated the students of one of their own, and a section of each of their colleagues' students during the delivery of a fifteen-minute semester final speech. Thus three independent scores were obtained on a definite speech for each student in three sections, each taught by a different instructor.

Scale II was devised in order to objectify the results by giving the students an opportunity of rating each other. This scale also provided a check upon the ability of students as judges. It was thought inadvisable to ask the students, with their less critical training, to use the more elaborate Scale I. Scale II was therefore presented as an abbreviated form.

Part A of Scale II may be recognized as an adaptation of Professor June Downey's "Will Temperament Profile" idea. By checking the lines as suggested and drawing a line conntecting the checks, we can obtain a profile of the individual's speaking ability, at least in so far as it is analyzable into these factors. By adding the numbers over the places checked for each item by all the members of a group and dividing by the total number, a fairly objective judgment on each item may be obtained.

Part B of Scale II was placed on the back of the sheet containing Part A in order that the student might be given an opportunity of making a unit judgment of the speaker's ability aside from any of its analyzable factors. By placing the unit judgment upon the back of the scale there was less opportunity for the formation of this unit judgment as a result of the direct computation of the items on Part A. In scoring Part B the unit judgments were numbered as steps from 1 to 5. By adding these numbers for each individual and dividing by the total number of judges we get a group-unit judgment of the individual's total speaking ability. The use of this scale gave us the average judgments of groups, i. e. class sections, who had completed one semester of speech training.

SCALE I—A RATING SCALE FOR SPEECH CRITICISM

Speaker---------- Rated by ----------

Rate the speaker only at or near the end of his speech. Carefully consider the speaker in regard to each question. When you have formed a clear judgment upon the item, put a mark through the number in the column at the right of the item which in your

judgment most clearly represents the relative amount of the characteristic in question exhibited by the speaker.

1. Does the speaker convey a clear concept of what he hopes to accomplish by the speech?	0	4	7	9
2. Is the topic chosen an appropriate one for the speaker, the audience, and the situation?	0	3	5	7
3. Is the material used definite, to the point, and appreciable?	0	3	5	7
4. Has the material been selected in a manner avoiding technicality and triteness?	0	2	3	5
5. Is the material so presented that it will appeal to varied types of experience and ideals?	0	3	5	7
6. Is the organization of the material unified, coherent, and logical?	0	3	5	7
7. Does the speech move and is it easy to follow?	0	2	3	5
8. Are the speaker's words carefully, readily and accurately chosen?	0	2	3	5
9. Is the language of the speaker relatively free from provincialism, colloquialisms, slang, etc.?	0		2	3
10. Is the speaker's grammar correct?	0	3	5	7
11. Does the speaker pleasantly and effectively vary sentence length and structure?	0		1	2
12. Does the speaker secure interest by appealing to varied types of mental imagery, and the use of figurative and imaginative language?	0		2	3
13. Is the speaker pleasantly unaffected and sincere in choice of words, language and manner?	0	2	3	5
14. Does the speaker's pronunciation meet a standard acceptable for his position?	0	2	3	5
15. Are there pronounced defects in breathing, throat or jaw tension, resonance, or insufficient use of lips and tongue?	0	3	5	7
16. Are letter, syllable, and word sounds given a proper quantity?	0	2	3	5
17. Is the speaker's volume or expressional energy adapted to the room, audience, thought, and emphasis?	0	3	5	7
18. Is the pitch of the speaker's voice properly modulated and inflected?	0	2	3	5
19. Is the rate of the speaker too fast or too slow?	0	3	5	7
20. Is the rate well broken and pleasantly rhythmic?	0		2	3
21. Does the speaker employ a full resonant tone quality?	0		2	3
22. Is the speaker emotionally well poised, confident and wholesome in his approach to the situation?	0	4	7	9
23. Is the speaker completely engrossed in his subject?	0	4	7	9
24. Is the speaker sincere but tolerant and considerate in attitude towards any opposition to his point of view?	0	2	3	5

25. Do we make a vital contact with the speaker's own experience and personality through his material?	0	4	7	9
26. Is the speaker objective in his attitude towards the audience?	0	4	7	9
27. Is the speaker pleasantly tactful and courteous in attitude towards his audience?	0	4	7	9
28. Does the speaker use humor advantageously?	0		2	3
29. Is the speaker's attitude towards the speaking situation one of dignity and concern?	0	3	5	7
30. Is the speaker's emphasis in the speaking situation one of immediate communication with his hearers?	0	4	7	9
31. Is the speaker's delivery free from distracting personal mannerisms that call attention away from the thought?	0	3	5	7
32. Is the speaker's posture free, relaxed, well poised and deliberate?	0	3	5	7
33. Is the speaker's total bodily activity varied and well coordinated?	0	2	3	5
34. Is there too much or too little action?	0	2	3	5
35. Does the speaker's facial expression actively support his oral communication?	0	2	3	5
36. Do the speaker's eyes vitalize and enforce his oral communication?	0	3	5	7
37. Does the speaker respond to the immediate reactions of the members of his audience?	0	3	5	7
38. Does the speaker effectively hold the attention of his audience?	0	3	5	7
39. Does the speaker maintain control of the situation?	0	3	5	7
40. Has the speaker taken adequate consideration of his personal appearance for the speaking situation?	0	2	3	5

Raw Score _____

SCALE II—PART A. A PUBLIC SPEAKING PROFILE

Profile of_____ Scored by_____

Read the analysis carefully. Consider the terms following each one of the caption terms as interpretative of that general characteristic. Give separate consideration to each of the nine general characteristics. If the speaker is very poor in the item check the line proceeding from the analysis of the trait at a point under the number 1 (one) in the Profile, if he is below the average in the possession of that trait check the line under number 2 (two), etc., number 3 indicating average, 4 above average, and 5, the very superior individual in possession and use of the particular char-

acteristic. Check the Profile during the last few minutes of the speech or at the end. *Be frank.* The speaker will not know your rating. *This is a test of your ability,* and will be carefully checked as such.

ANALYSIS	PROFILE				
How favorably have you been impressed by the speaker's:	1	2	3	4	5
1. Material: Knowledge, judgment, organization and interestingness?					
2. Attitudes: sincerity, confidence, dignity, concern, dynamic, friendliness and humor?					
3. Language: readiness and accuracy in choice of words, grammar, sentence structure, and pronunciation?					
4. Voice: quality, quantity, modulation, inflection, distinctness, breathing, and rate?					
5. Force: energy, enthusiasm, and aggressiveness?					
6. Action: posture, self-control, alertness, gracefulness, gesture, use of eyes and facial expressioin?					
7. Communication: spontaneity, objectivity, awareness of the audience, progressive responses to the audience?					
8. Appearance: attractiveness, healthfulness, clothing, toilet and neatness?					
9. Purpose: and how completely has he succeeded with you?					

SCALE II—PART B

In the light of this speech and in comparison with other student speakers I have heard, I would classify this speaker as (underline one):

Very Poor. Below Average. Average. Above Average. Superior.

RESULTS OF OUR USE OF THE SCALES

Our use of the scales gave us some interesting side-lights on the teaching of speech. We offer these results because we believe they demonstrate some of the ways in which public-speaking rating-scales can be used to advantage in more of our teaching work.

Our first study was concerned with a comparison of the scores

assigned the students of each section by the three instructors.[1] We shall designate the instructors by the terms A, B, and C. In A's section there were 16 students scored by A, B, and C; and in both B's and C's section there were 12 students scored by A, B, and C. The range and median scores given by each instructor for each section are presented in Table I. This table gives us objective evidence of at least two tendencies in the grading of these instructors which we had no other means of measuring:

TABLE I

RANGE AND MEDIAN[2] RAW SCORES ON SCALE I

	A's Section		B's Section		C's Section	
	Range	Median	Range	Median	Range	Median
A's Rating	224-159	196	232-156	176	219-126	180
B's Rating	237-171	199	241-147	212	234-132	179
C's Rating	203-134	173	208-129	172	226-150	186

1. Each instructor tended to grade students on a more or less constant level of difference. That is B's grades tended to be high, C's grades tended to be low, and A's grades tended toward an average score.

2. Each instructor tended to grade his own students more highly than those trained by another instructor. It is my judgment that here we have evidence to show that teachers do (and in this case precautions had been taken to avoid partiality) tend to grade on a basis of what "C. T. S." in the April number of the QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH called "my way" and consequently his students' way of doing it.

The next step in our investigation was the computation of coefficients of correlation[3] for all of the raw-score ratings of each

[1] We wish here to express our appreciation for the cooperation given by the members of our staff in evaluating the items on Scale I, and particularly to Professor Grace Bull and Mr. Richard Schanck who helped us rate the student speakers on which these results are based.

[2] Range is defined by Garrett in "Statistics in Psychology and Education" as "the interval between the largest and the smallest measures." Median is defined as "the point above which and below which are 50% of the measures."

[3] Garrett defines the coefficient of correlation as "the measure of mutual dependence or the degree of correspondnce between two sets of scores or measures," with 100 indicating perfect positive relationship and 100 indicating complete inverse relationship.

of the three instructors. These correlations computed by the product moment method, were for A and B $+ .59 \pm .07$; for A and C $+ .51 \pm .07$; and for B and C $+ .56 \pm .07$. Although these coefficients of correlation are not as high as might be expected, they indicate a decided trend of agreement among the three instructors on the entire group of students rated.

We next averaged the scores given each student by the three instructors and computed the average deviation of the scores assigned by each instructor from this composite average. This gave us the average number of raw-score credit points by which each instructor differed from his colleagues in the scores assigned the student speakers. Table II presents this data for each section. We see that:

TABLE II

AVERAGE DEVIATION OF EACH INSTRUCTOR'S SCORE IN CREDIT POINTS FROM THE COMPOSITE AVERAGE OF THREE SCORES

A. D. of	In A's Section	In B's Section	In C's Section
A's Scores	8	10	9
B's Scores	12	16	14
C's Scores	13	15	10

1. There was a noticeable consistency among the instructors in their ability to rate students in accordance with the most objective measure possible, i. e. the average of the three ratings. The average of A's average deviation in credit points was only 9 while B's average deviation in all sections was 14.

2. In no case was the average deviation of credit point assigned by any instructor in any of the nine sections rated greater than 16 per cent of the range of scores actually assigned by that instructor. Thorndike has considered displacements within one-fifth of the range fairly objective criteria of validity in measures such as this.

The second factor we sought to investigate was the extent of agreement between students and instructors in their rating of other student speakers. The unit class judgment ratings given by the students in each section on Scale II Part B were correlated, by the rank order method, with the Scale I raw scores given by the instructors. Table III gives us the results of these computations. In light of these correlations we may conclude:

TABLE III

CORRELATION OF STUDENTS AND INSTRUCTOR'S RATINGS

	A's Students' Ratings	B's Students' Ratings	C's Students' Ratings
A's ratings	.66	.73	.71
B's ratings	.34	.71	.85
C's ratings	.64	.68	.72

1. Since the correlations were consistently higher, with one exception, between the unit class judgment ratings and the instructor's ratings than between the ratings of the instructors, we have a more objective criterion of effective public speaking in the average of a large number of student scores than we have in the scores assigned by one instructor.

2. There was a recognizable difference in the ability of students in different sections to rate successful public speaking. The students of C's section correlated most highly with the instructor's ratings; those in B's section have a fairly consistent average correlation; and those in A's section had the lowest correlation with the instructor's ratings. If this order were found consistent with all sections taught by the same instructor it might serve as an indication of teaching ability.

3. We have here some further indication of the difference in the ability of instructors to rate successful public speaking students consistently. If we consider the average student rating expressed in the unit class judgment as an objective measure of public speaking in the way we considered the average of the instructors' scores as an objective measure in item 1 in interpretation of Table II, we find here that the instructors rank in the same order of ability. A's scores correlate most highly with this objective criterion, C's scores given an average correlation, and B's scores are the most variable and give the lowest total average correlation.

The third factor under consideration in our study may be suggested by the questions: (1) Are there any consistent correlations of elements in the speech situation with total effectiveness? (2) Are there any differences in the correlations of the items in the scale with the unit scores in different sections? The student ratings on Scale II were used for this study. Table IV gives us some evidence toward a conclusion on both of these questions:

TABLE IV

CORRELATIONS OF ITEMS ON SCALE II WITH UNIT SCORES

Items on the scale	Correlations with Unit Judgments in		
	A's Section	B's Section	C's Section
Material	.37	.55	.77
Attitudes	.84	.93	.93
Language	.77	.83	.86
Voice	.55	.83	.79
Force	.90	.85	.86
Action	.78	.88	.89
Communication	.79	.77	.84
Appearance	.59	.79	.53
Purpose	.61	.85	.61

1. In these ratings "Attitudes" and "Force" with "Action" a very close third, gave consistently high correlations with total effectiveness, while "Appearance" and "Material" are relatively much lower. We do not believe that we are to conclude from this that the material used has no effect upon the speech effectiveness. We note in the first place that even these correlations are fairly high. However, we believe that the real explanation for this low correlation may be found in the fact that since they were prepared to meet a similar assignment the material used by all speakers was relatively equal in quality. In other words, distinctions in "Attitudes," "Force," etc., were more definite and appreciable than were the distinctions in "Material." The final rank order from the highest to the lowest correlations was "Attitudes," "Force," "Action," "Language," "Communication," "Voice," "Appearance," "Purpose," and "Material."

2. Certain items in the scale seem to stand out in their correlation with the unit scores in each section. In A's and C's sections the correlations are distinctly more varied than are the correlations in B's section. If we were to find this true in all sections taught by these instructors, would we not be justified in saying that B's students would probably be most rounded in their speech training?

DISCUSSION

We would like to anticipate and meet some of the criticisms which may arise in regard to the suggestive methods here employed.

1. There are those who say that any attempt to break up the speech situation into elements will ignore the relationship of the

elements which is, in many cases, the more important factor. We admit that this may sometimes be the case. Like many other educational devices, the rating scale must be used with judgment. Thorndike has said in regard to this criticism of rating scales that "sufficient insight and investigation should enable us to secure all the advantages of the impressionistic judgment (except its speed and convenience) without any of its defects." It is our belief that with the use of both the item and the unit scores as provided for in Scale II we may largely eliminate this possible source of error.

2. Do we know whether our scales contain all the elements which may enter into the fundamentals of effective speaking? We make no pretensions to dogmatism in this matter. We do feel that any additional factors may be more easily determined when we carefully consider those with which we are familiar. In the mean time we may continue to use the unit score in giving credit for these factors.

3. There is undoubtedly some valid criticism in regard to the weighting of the elements in Scale I. We attempted to make the scale as free from prejudice on particular items as our means would permit by combining five separate points of view. When more extensive means are at hand these scales may be further objectified by future tests.

4. Will the rating scale require too much attention during the speech? The members of the audience should be free during the speech to consider only the thought. This criticism appears to me to indicate an entire lack of understanding in regard to the purpose of these scales. Most certainly they were not constructed for one to take to church on Sunday morning in order to help him better appreciate the sermon. They are in this regard purely an educational means, and constructed for the use of the student and the critic. Most certainly no one should attempt to use a rating scale who has not thoroughly familiarized himself with its contents and method. When this is done, it has been our experience, that instead of calling attention away from the speaker, it leads to a more strict attention and careful analysis, and increases the interest in critical procedure.

5. We wish to recognize and qualify some of the statistical conclusions presented, because of the limited number of cases upon which they are based. At this time the writer is conducting further

studies by which he hopes to further validate these conclusions. Since this work is relatively new, it was thought advisable to present the results as suggestive rather than wait for the longer process of thorough statistical validation.

6. We wish to repeat finally, that we do not believe that a rating scale should be considered an empirical measure of public speaking ability. We may hope in the future for better methods. Let us not neglect in the present some of the best tools we may have.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, our studies have convinced us that these values of rating scales for students of public speaking may be suggested:

1. The use of rating scales may lead among teachers of public speaking to less dogmatism and a more open-minded approach to our problems of content and methodology.

2. The use of rating scales may have an educational value to students of public speaking in that they keep the elements of the situation constantly before them.

3. The use of rating scales makes possible a fairly accurate weighting of the elements in the total situation.

4. The use of the rating scales makes possible a more scientific, objective, and verifiable basis of measuring speech effectiveness in terms of a specific performance.

5. Rating scales may be devised to represent speaking ability in terms of a raw score or in a graphic manner.

6. Rating scales may be used as a pedagogical device to increase the interest of students in class work.

7. Rating scales are more likely to lead to accurate grading than when the instructor "gets an impressioon" or follows random cues.

8. Rating scales furnish a measure by which ability to rate others may be determined.

9. Rating scales furnish a record of speech which may be used to advantage in speech training.

10. Rating scales enable the computation of a group judgment which may have more objective value than individual criticism.

11. Rating scales may be used to compare the work of sections taught by the same instructor.

12. Rating scales may be used to compare the work of different instructors.

AN OBJECTIVE STUDY OF THE RESPIRATORY PROCESSES ACCOMPANYING SPEECH

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ACCURATE vocal speech depends upon delicate and precise motor coördinations. Respiratory movements, especially, must occur with nice adjustment, because breath, and the control of breath, constitute the physical basis of voice production. If respiratory movements do not occur regularly and with nice adjustment to the kind of articulate expression desired, there is an interference with the rhythmical progression of speech. The significance of these facts became clear to me during a period of experimental procedure in the psychological laboratory at the University of California at Los Angeles. By means of standard kymograph apparatus, respiratory tracings were made in an examination of ten subjects suffering from speech disorders principally of the stammering type. The results demonstrated clearly that these disorders were accompanied by widespread muscular incoördinations affecting regular inspiration and expiration. It is not to be inferred that stammering is caused by faulty breath control. The two phenomena probably have the same cause, although the kymograph records were used successfully in explaining objectively to the subject the breath control aspect of his problem, and his stammering was measurably controlled by inducing a conscious breath rhythm.[1]

This study of stammering suggested the question: would it be profitable to use kymographs in regular speech classes, especially in those courses where emphasis is placed upon the voice mechanism and the conditions requisite to tone production? Could the student effect a greater progress by having objectified for him the respiratory process involved in speech? Would he be able to understand more clearly the meaning and importance of such terms as, tone support, breath control, diaphragmatic stroke, vocal attack, resonance, and word grouping?

Kymograph apparatus was set up, and each student required

[1] "An Objective Measurement of the Respiratory Disturbances in Speech Disorders." *Psych. Bul. Vol. 25*, August 1928, pp. 452-453.

to make at least two records during the semester. Caution was taken to make the conditions as uniform as possible. Only the student and instructor were present in the laboratory at the time the record was made. The apparatus was shown to the subject and the nature of the procedure was explained. Usually, a preliminary record was made in order that the speaker might become adjusted to the conditions and be able to relate himself to the problem without undue nervousness. The student was not allowed to observe the process of the record. He was placed in front of a speaker's stand before a black screen, and told to concentrate upon the problem. In each case he was directed to get the mental attitude of an audience situation and to reproduce his speech with freedom and purposiveness.

The intent of this article is to present an analysis of the records taken and to state certain conclusions concerning their practical application in the teaching of speech.

Our major point of inquiry concerned the character of respiratory movements involved in speech. We were concerned primarily with the question: What is the relation of upper chest to lower chest movements?

A study of respiration during speech must be studied with reference to basic physiological facts. The mechanism of breathing and the mechanics of respiratory movements are set forth as follows: "The chest acts very much like a bellows. When the bellows are opened air enters in consequence of the rarefaction of that of the interior, which is expanding to fill the larger space; and when the bellows are closed again it is expelled. To make the bellows quite like the lungs we must have only one opening in them, that of the nozzle, for both the entry and the exit of the air; and this opening should lead, not directly into the bellows cavity but into an elastic bag lying in it, and tied to the inner end of the nozzle-pipe. This sac would represent the lungs, and the space between its outside and inside of the lungs, the pleural cavities. . . . The thoracic cavity has a somewhat conical form determined by the shape of its skeleton, its narrower end being turned upward. . . . Below, it (thoracic cavity) is bounded by the diaphragm which forms a movable bottom to the otherwise tolerably rigid box. . . . In inspiration this box is increased in all its diameters—dorsiventrally, laterally, and from above down. The vertical enlargement of the thorax is

brought about by the contraction of the diphragm, a fibrous, dome-shaped membrane, with its concavity towards the abdomen, fixed by radiating muscular fibres to the lower ribs, the breastbone, and the vertebral column. The contraction of the diaphragm (in inspiration) increases greatly the size of the thorax chamber by adding to its lowest and widest part. . . . The thorax is enlarged dorsiventrally by virtue of the fact that in inspiration the breastbone and the sternal ends of the ribs attached to it are raised so that the disance between the sternum and the vertebral column is increased. This inspiratory elevation of the ribs is mainly due to the action of the scalene and external intercostal muscles. . . . During an inspiration the scalenes contract and fix the upper ribs firmly, and then the external intercostals shorten and each raises the rib below it. . . . The lateral enlargement of the chest is brought about by the rotation of the middle ribs which, as they are raised, roll round a little at their vertebral articulations and twist their cartilages. Each rib is curved and, if the bones be examined in their natural position in a skeleton, it will be seen that the most curved part lies below the level of a straight line drawn from the vertebral to the sternal attachment of the bone. By the rotation of the ribs during inspiration, this curved part is raised out, and the chest widened.[2]

Vocal teachers, while agreeing that breath is the basis of tone, —the raw material of the voice—have disagreed radically concerning the proper technic of breath control and have advised vocal exercises often diametrically opposed. Some teachers have disregarded the subject entirely considering it a mechanical interference with the thought processes essential to effective speaking.[3]

[2] According to Martin, *The Human Body*, Chap. XXIII, Respiration. The Mechanism of Breathing. The Regulation of Breathing. Pp. 413-417. See also, Starling, *Human Physiology;* Halliburton, *Handbook of Physiology;* and article by Keith on "The Mechanism of Respiration in Man" (L. Hill's *Further Advances in Physiology).*

[3] See *The New Vocal Art* by P. Mario Marafioti, M. D., author of *Caruso's Method of Voice Production and the Scientific Culture of the Voice.* Also, L. Lehman, *How to Sing.*

Marafioti says: "What about the breath?... One who is pretty well acquainted with the natural mechanism of voice production cannot help finding this bugbear ridiculous and realizing the useless waste of energy and time spent in applying methods and exercises of breathing whose final result is to injure the normal function of the vocal apparatus and

However, it is quite generally agreed today that in developing the proper conditions for both song and speech, we must take into account the physiological facts outlined above. The concensus of authoritative opinion is to the following effect: The primary condition essential to tone production lies in the muscular control of column or body of breath known as tone support. The proper method of securing this support is to increase the size of the windchest or bellows by raising the lower ribs which expands the chest in circumference and to contract and draw down the diaphragm which extends the chest downwards. This "central breathing" by which the major expansion is effected about the sides of the lower chest, at the back just underneath the shoulder blades, and at the "soft spot" just beneath the breast bone (Professor Winter describes this sensation as drawing the breath into the stomach) is the process of establishing the breath column or tone support. A precise balance of tension between motor and relaxation zones is essentially related to the further condition of tone production, namely, placement, freedom and resonance.[4] Dr. Aiken, in discussing the subject of The Breath (pp. 18-34), explains that "for vocal purposes a deep breath and a strong control over it are what must be acquired; for not only is it necessary to take in sufficient air to last for a prolonged period but its exit has to be regulated so that in a long phrase the end may be as well supplied with force as the beginning, and at any points within it, the appropriate accents may be given their due prominence. . . . It is also desirable that a considerable reserve of air should always be kept in the lungs, for much of the volume of the voice, as well as the control, is lost when the

impair the natural voice. The harm these spurious doctrines and practices on breath have caused Voice Culture is almost worthy of legal intervention .... The singing of today, which makes its stronghold the physical power of the breathing apparatus and elevates the diaphragm to the pose of ruler of so gentle an intellectual expression, when compared with the playing of musical instruments which is governed rather by skill than force, shows its artistic standard to be on the level of a circus number. Present schools of Voice Culture, in fact, transformed into gymnasiums for physical training, are the source of a harmful practice which, to a great extent, is responsible for the débâcle of the present Vocal Art." Chapter XIII, pp. 226-228.

[4] Kate Emil-Behnke, *Singers Difficulties: How to Overcome Them.* Katherine J. Everts, *The Speaking Voice.* W. A. Aiken, *The Voice.* Wesley Mills, *Voice Production.*

muscles of the chest are too much relaxed." The subject of breath control in vocal art is very clearly expounded by Kate Emil-Behnke:

> "Nothing can be more important than the acquirement of control of breath while nothing is such a potent cause of difficulty and has such far reaching ill-effects as lack of control, or mistaken methods. Without air no tone can be produced; it is the motive power of the voice; but whereas in silence breathing takes place automatically, the amount inspired varying in accordance with the varying needs of physical activities, in the production of tone *control* is needed.... Pitch, intensity of tone, length of phrase, sustained tone, staccato, flexibility, crescendo, diminuendo, are all the result of varying amounts of breath and of varying degrees of pressure; and in the main these all depend on the control of expiration.... The amount of breath required for singing will be greater than that required in the ordinary activities of life, but the way in which it is taken in is, or should be, the same. It is only a qestion of degree. Even a cursory study of physiology will show that the lungs are smallest at the top, where they are enclosed in a practically fixed, bony cage, and that they are largest at the bottom where they are surrounded only by soft, movable parts which yield freely to the movements of respiration.... The regulation and control of expiration are so difficult in upper chest breathing as to be well nigh impossible; and the effort entailed is so great as to cause gasping, wrong attack of tone, congestion of the vessels of the neck and throat, muscular fatigue, faulty intonation, unevenness, tremolo, and inability to sustain a long note or complete a long phrase.... On the other hand, by breathing as nature intended, in accordance with our physiology, viz. by the combined action of the diaphragm and lower intercostal muscles, we breath with perfect ease. Only in this way do we get the maximum expansion with the minimum of effort, with that speed, elasticity and control which are essential to the singer, because we are inflating the lungs where they are largest, and where they are surrounded only by soft, yielding parts."

These statements, though made in regard to the art of singing, present the case of breath control in speech. The degree of *control* is not so great in speech because the degree of effort is less, although in dramatic reading and in formal platform work the *control* required of the speaker may approximate that of the singer. Every speech teacher is familiar with the problems of the weak voice; and all of the problems of force, resonance, jerky phrasing, wrong placement have their relation to the breath control problem. With a desire to study this relationship more closely and objectively respiratory records were required of each student. An analysis of the results is here presented.

I. What is the relation of upper chest to lower chest movement during speech?

An accurate millimeter measurement was made of 100 records.

A base line was established in relation to each of the upper chest and lower chest tracings, vertical lines drawn to coincide with each inspiration or downward stroke of the tambour needle; and with a ruled glass plate the length of each excursion was measured and recorded. Thus was measured the average excursion or the depth and quantity of each inspiration made in preparation for each succeeding phrase. By comparing this average with the depth of each inspiration, the average variation was established. Figure I is a complete record of one tracing so computed. Column A gives the

A	B	A′	B′
4 — 0 = 4	2.9	6 — 3 = 3	.4
8 — 0 = 8	1.1	5 — 2 = 3	.4
6 — 0 = 6	.9	5 — 2 = 3	.4
8 — 1 = 7	.1	5.5 — 5 = 0.5	1.1
10 — 8 = 2	4.9	5 — 2 = 3	.4
12 — 2 = 10	3.1	5 — 2 = 3	.4
8 — 2 = 6	.9	5 — 2 = 3	.4
11 — 1 = 10	3.1	6 — 2.5 = 3.5	.9
9 — 2 = 7	.1	5 — 5 = 0.	2.6
10.5 — 10 = 0.5	6.4	5 — 2 = 3	.4
13 — 5 = 8	1.1	5 — 2.5 = 2.5	.1
12 — 4 = 8	1.1	5 — 2 = 3	.4
11 — 3 = 8	.1	5 — 2.5 = 2.5	.1
9 — 2 = 7	.1	5 — 1.5 = 3.5	.9
12 — 2 = 10	3.1	5 — 3 = 2	.6
10 — 6 = 4	2.9	5 — 3 = 2	.6
11 — 7 = 4	2.9	5 — 2 = 3	.4
13 — 2 = 11	4.1	5 — 2 = 3	.4
12 — 2 = 10	3.1	5 — 2 = 3	.4
19 1325	42.0	49.5	11.3
6.9	2.2	2.6	.6

FIG. I

Millimeter measurement of one record. A, extent of inspiration measured over diaphragm for each of 19 phrases (avg. 6.9); B, extent of each deviation from average (avg. dev. 2.2). Columns A′ and B′ are the corresponding measurements taken over the upper chest.

amount of each inspiration as measured over the diaphragmatic arch, the average excursion being 6.9 mm. The figures in column B represent the variations in the depth of the inspirations, the average variation being 2.2. The corresponding measurements of upper chest activity are represented by the averages of columns A′ and B′, 2.6 and .6.

Figures II and III present graphically the relation of lower chest or diaphragmatic breathing (D) to upper chest or costal breathing (C). The solid line is a graph of the average D excursions drawn in decreasing scale. The corresponding C average is correlated with the D average showing the extent to which there is



FIG. II



FIG. III

an overlapping, or the extent to which one type of breathing dominates.[5]

A comparison of these charts indicates the primary fact that the relation of C to D breathing is more constant with men. That is, the tendency toward upper chest breathing, and the actual number of cases where upper chest breathing dominates, is greater with women. Figure II shows five instances of dominant or near dominant chest activity for the men contrasted with eleven cases for the women, (Fig. III), a relation of 16 2/3 to 36 2/3%. While this phenomenon in itself should be expected, owing to habits of dress, physical training, etc., it is nevertheless interesting and valuable from the point of view of speech training. While it might be further assumed in advance that, as indicated by the charts, the amount of available breath or tone support is greater for men, due to the size of the bellows and greater physical activity, this fact becomes quite significant when related to the further indication that the proportion of D breath to C breath is in favor of the men. The average D expansion or inspiration for men is 6.1 and the average C expansion 4.2, an average constant different of 1.9, as compared respectively with the womens' averages of 4.6 and 3.7, an average difference of .9.

The conclusions derived from these records are that it is natural for central or diaphragmatic breathing to dominate and that women tend more toward upper chest breathing than men.

[5] It should be clearly noted that the statistical summaries of these records are indicative only and should be so interpreted. Owing to the large number of records made during the year and to the limitations of time upon both the student and instructor, precise and scientifically accurate measurement made possible by using manometers could not be made. However, definite precautions were taken to keep the conditions of each record as constant as possible under the circumstances. The tension of the pneumographs as well as their position upon the subject was checked; the T tubes were not closed until the pneumographs were fastened, insuring thereby no expansion or deflation of the tambour diphragm until the record was started; frequent inspections were made to detect any fine holes in the tubing, pneumographs and tambours, a circumstance which would affect the excursion of the recording needle. Considering these precautions, as well as the fact that nearly two hundred records were completed, the conclusions herein stated may be regarded safely as indicative of general conditions.

II. Are there measurable differences of breath control between beginning and advanced students?

To obtain an accurate comparison between beginning and advanced students one should use the same material; but our purpose was to use the kymograph in the study of each student's personal problems as revealed by the material with which he was working, and the following data is based on a comparison of the results obtained with two different sets of material. The beginning students delivered memorized material from selections requiring directness and force. The advanced students were registered in a course in Literary Interpretation and used material from Alfred Noyes' poem, "The Highwayman" and from the fight scene in Matthew Arnold's, "Sohrab and Rustum." It is quite obvious that one reason for the differences noted is that the advanced students were more highly motivated by the imaginative and emotional content of the material they were handling; but we were concerned with the respiratory process, and the real significance is that the records of the more advanced students indicate a marked technique in the control of breath.

FIG. IV

Figure IV is based on the records of 17 students reading lines 397-447 and 455-469 from "Sohrab and Rustum," and Figure V is based on the records of 17 students interpreting stanzas 1-2, Part



FIG. V

I, and verses 8-9, Part II, from "The Highwayman." The statistical summary of these charts is presented in contrast to Figures II and III (Fig. VI). The contrasting averages of 1.9-4.6, .9-2.7,

	Men	*Women*	*Men and Women*	
	BEGINNING STUDENTS			
D	6.1	4.6	5.35	
C	4.2	3.7	3.95	
Avg. Dif.	1.9	.9	1.4	
	ADVANCED STUDENTS			
D	8.3	6.3	6.9	The Highwayman
C	3.7	3.6	3.8	
Avg. Dif.	4.6	2.7	3.0	
D	8.3	5.3	6.4	Sohrab and Rustum
C	3.7	2.9	3.2	
Avg. Dif.	4.6	2.4	3.2	

FIG. VI

1.4-3.1 are clearly indicative of a larger tone support and breath control required in dramatic reading; and allowing for differences in material, presents an interesting contrast between the beginning and the trained student of speech.

III. What is the effect of athletic training on conditions requisite to tone production?

One frequently hears the generalization that athletes have poor voices. They do not breathe correctly, for they have been trained to breathe for vital purposes (a maximum inflation of the chest in all dimensions), which is opposed to breath control for voice purposes. Respiratory tracings of ten athletes are among those in Figure I. The measurements of these records are set off by themselves in Figure VII.

		D C	
1.		11.1 — 8.2	(Football)
2.		8.7 — 5.2	(Track)
3.		7.7 — 4.7	(Track)
4.		6.6 — 3.8	(Football)
5.		6.3 — 4.3	(Football)
6.		4.8 — 7.8	(Football)
7.		3.6 — 3.2	(Football)
8.		3.4 — 2.8	(Basketball)
9.		1.7 — 2.7	(Football)
10.		1.6 — 1.9	(Tennis)
	10	55.5 — 44.7	
		5.5 — 4.5	

FIG. VII

It is hardly safe to make a generalization from these ten records. There is one notable case of dominant chest breathing. The averages for the first five are 8.1 (D), and 5.2 (C); and for the second five the figures are 3.0 (D) and 3.7 (C). The averages for the ten, however, 5.5 (D) and 4.5 (C) indicate dominant central breathing although the small average difference of 1.0 tends to support the generalization that, owing very probably to habits engendered by physical training, athletes are handicapped by faulty breath control.

IV. What practical use can be made of kymograph records? Is the time and labor spent in making them justified by concrete results?

The chief advantage of the record lies in the fact that many of the physical processes of speech can be objectified for the stu-

dent. The subject of breath control, its nature and value, is little understood save by very earnest students who have studied vocal music and expect to major in speech. The average student's concept of such elements of technic as tone support, breath control, tone placement, vocal attack, expulsive control of the voice, phrasing or word grouping, coördination of breath control with phrasing, etc., remains in a cloudy state of perception. These terms, and the actual physical processes that accompany them can be diagramed clearly and effectively by means of the kymograph. The purposes of certain vocal exercises such as those used to develop a "sense of diaphragm" may be recorded and clearly explained. Nervousness accompanied by tremors over the solar plexus are unmistakably revealed. Students who breathe with a kind of boat-rocking movement, contracting the muscles of the lower waist as they expand the upper chest and vice versa can be classified and properly advised. If, by means of a signal magnet a base line be drawn and the phrases checked by the instructor or operator as the student is speaking, the speaker's coördination of phrasing and tone support may be studied. The nature and degree of vocal attack is made particularly clear by these records.



FIG. VIII

Figure VIII is an interesting record of markedly shallow breathing and at the same time of dominant upper chest breathing. The subject was asked to perform a standard exercise of counting vigorously to ten on one breath, attacking expulsively each numeral. The windchest or lungs may be drawn schematically as in Figure IX.

Figure IX is a tracing made by a woman student who was extremely self-conscious and who spoke with very little animation and



FIG. IX

A. Complemental air: air that can be taken in as extra or surplus air; B. Tidal air: ordinary intake and out-put. C. Supplemental air: usually in lungs plus D. D. Residual air: always in lungs even in greatest expiration.

directness. The record indicates that the amount of complemental capacity was practically nil and the amount of tidal air very small. The last part of the record traces the movements of a rapid panting exercise and shows clearly again the small intake of breath and the inability of the student to maintain a steady column of breath. Note how the upper tracing rises, and how the excursions of the lower curve narrow, indicating a rapid depletion of the supporting breath.



FIG. X

Figure X is a record of the same counting exercise showing a much larger excursion and the proper relation between D and C. However, it will be noted that the student depletes his supporting breath on about the fifth or sixth numeral and the curve flattens out.

Figure XI is also a record of a special exercise similar to the counting exercise. The student was directed to repeat the line,



FIG. XI

"What makes that front rank man fall down?" ("Danny Deever") attacking precisely each word and increasing the force or diaphragmatic stroke with each repetition. The line is delivered five times, the degree of force ranging from moderate expulsive energy to strong explosive. Note that the attack upon each word is clearly indicated by a hump or hook, and that these humps are varied as to position and depth according to the degree of force employed.

FIG. XII

Figure XII illustrates an instance of practical application. The triangular sections indicate the release of unvocalized breath, an uneconomical use of tone support. This condition was corrected with the result of more vocal energy and smoother speech.

Figure XIII reproduces a record of a short speech together with three special exercises and a period of normal respiration. The speech phrases are checked on the base line, and although there is not a perfect correlation the speaker's breath preparation for



FIG. XIII

each phrase is clearly indicated and represents one of the most valuable uses to which the record may be put.

Figure XIV is the record of an "A" student's interpretation of lines 397-447 from "Sohrab and Rustum," and is included here as an example of excellent breath control. In this record the drum was slowed down by using a No. 2 fan.



FIG. XIV

V. Is there any correlation between the character of the kymograph record and the proficiency of the student in speaking and reading?

The letters at the top of Figures II, III, IV, and V represent the grades of the respective students. Equated in terms of the grade point system (A=3, B=2, C=1, D=0, F=—2) the first and second parts of each curve stand according to the following grade point totals:

	First half	Second half
Fig III	57	48
Fig IV	81	66
Fig V	28	16
Fig VI	25	24

It would appear, therefore that the students whose records indicate the best breath control made the best grades. However, the grade does not represent proficiency only. Effort, attitude, thoroughness, punctuality and many elements may be involved in the instructor's

grade standard. But this is a subject which we intend to determine accurately, and are now at work on the determination of what the correlation actually is.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

One hundred kymograph records of the respiratory processes involved in speech indicate that (1) the natural tendency of central or diaphragmatic breathing dominates, (2) men breathe more deeply than women, (3) there is a greater tendency among women toward upper chest breathing, (4) the records of advanced students compared with the tracings made by beginning students indicate a marked progress toward the technic of breath control, (5) athletes tend toward upper chest dominance, (6) practical use can be made of these records in objectifying for the student the physical processes of tone production, and (7) there is a probable correlation between the respiratory record and the proficiency of the student in song and speech.

This study is a preliminary survey suggestive of a line of research which if carried out with refined technic may contribute much to our teaching methods. It is our purpose to check the conclusions of this first study by the use of selected subjects and the addition of two manometers by which exact and uniform conditions may be established for each tracing.

WHATELY AND HIS RHETORIC[1]

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University of Pittsburgh

IF one accepts Aristotle's statement that rhetoric is "an off-shoot of Dialectic and of that Ethical science which may fairly be called Politics," then Richard Whately was unusually well qualified by taste, temperament, and training for the composition of a text on rhetoric.

He pubished in 1826 a textbook on Logic, which he several times revised in the course of its eight later editions, he served as

[1] This is a study of the Introduction and Parts I and II of Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric*, and the statements here made must be understood as applying only to those portions of the work. The two remaining, and perhaps the most valuable and original parts, are on Style and Elocution. Page references are to the seventh edition (1846).

Professor of Political Economy at Oxford from 1829 until his elevation to the Archbishopric, and he founded and endowed in the University of Dublin a chair of Political Economy. The influences surrounding him as student and tutor at Oriel College reacted favorably upon a temperament already strongly disposed to disputation, and his entire life was spent in an atmosphere of theological controversy. Whately's *Rhetoric* is essentially a textbook on argumentation. It was this phase of rhetoric which was of primary interest and importance in his mind, and which received from him the most attention in the five revisions of the work.

A. Formative Influences

The influence of Copleston

Little is known of Whately's undergraduate years at Oxford except that he early attracted the favorable notice of his tutor, Edward Copleston, and the two formed a strong attachment which lasted as long as the latter lived. It is easy to imagine that Whately's taste for controversy may have been whetted by familiarity with the satirical and argumentative works which his tutor was at this time publishing. The first of these, *Advice to a Young Reviewer,* appeared in 1807, one year before Whately came up for honors. His *Examiner Examined, or Logic Vindicated* appeared two years later. It is a spirited, and at times brutal, attack upon Kett's *Logic Made Easy.* His furious controversy with the *Edinburgh Review* raged through the years 1811 and 1812. It is inconceivable that the young Whately, who must have known their authorship though they were all published anonymously, should not have been deeply stirred by these glorious battles of his beloved tutor, and it is quite likely that they did much to stimulate his interest in logic and in the technique of controversy. His indebtedness to Copleston for materials in his own treatise on Logic is freely acknowledged, in his dedication and preface to that work, and in various places in his later correspondence with Copleston.[2]

Copleston's views on the nature and province of Rhetoric, particularly in its relation to Logic, are stated in one of the closing paragraphs of his attack on Kett:

> Of the various purposes then which Language may be made to serve, the first in order and in utility is that which

[2] Cf. Whately, E. Jane, *Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, D. D.,* London, 1866. I, 60, 352; II, 80.

> Logic regulates. This may be placed at one extremity of the series. At the other extremity is Poetry, where language, as well as thought, is made subservient to the production of a refined pleasure. The several gradations of the scale between these extreme points are occupied by the various branches of Rhetoric, taking Rhetoric in its most extensive signification as the art of good writing. To demonstrate the reason of those principles which conduce to the end of good writing, to shew how they depart, and why they depart, from the rigid laws of Logic, is one of the most grateful services which philosophy can render to polite literature. When we measure these anomalies, as they may be called, by that standard, we better know how to estimate their propriety, their congruity, their relative force, and their utility. The doing of this, I admit, belongs to the province of Rhetoric, but without Logic it cannot be done. *The Examiner Examined,* p. 52.

A fuller account of the place of rhetoric in Whately's education may be found in Copleston's account of the "Course of Studies pursued at Oxford," which forms Chapter IV of his first *Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford.* In both the preliminary and the final examinations, candidates for honors were examined in logic (p. 140). In the later case:

> The Examination then proceeds to Rhetoric and Ethics. Upon these subjects the celebrated treatises of Aristotle are chiefly used: and whoever is master of them knows what an exercise of the mind it is to acquire a thorough insight into the argument, and what a serious discipline the student must have undergone, who has accomplished this point. The accurate method observed in each treatise renders it not a perplexing, but merely an arduous task: the precision of the language, the close connection of the reasoning, the enlarged philosophical views, and the immense store of principles and maxims which they contain, point them out as the best calculated perhaps of any single works for bringing into play all the energies of the intellect, and for trying, not merely the intelligence of the scholar, but the habit of discrimination he has formed, the general accuracy of his thoughts, and the force and vigor of his mind. If it be at all of use to divide, to distinguish, and to define, to study clear arrangement and order, to discern connection, and to comprehend a plan composed of many widely separated parts, hardly any works can be named, so well adapted to these purposes. To these is often added, at the option of the student, the treatise on Politics, which is in fact a continuation and completion of the Ethical System.
>
> Besides these treatises of Aristotle, Quintilian as belong-

> ing to Rhetoric, and the philosophical works of Cicero, especially that De Officiis, as belonging to Ethics, are admitted. And these last, as being of easier attainment, are of course the choice of many candidates. But neither of them are strictly indispensable (pp. 140-1).

This passage shows not only the content of a part of Whately's education, but also something of the aim and method of his tutor in teaching. It should be remembered that this content and this method were in all probability continued in Whately's own teaching during the years when the *Rhetoric* was taking form in his own mind and on paper. It is significant that the relative importance in Copleston's mind of the works here mentioned is almost exactly echoed in the number of references to each in Whately's *Rhetoric*.

The high esteem in which Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was held by Copleston is further shown in that portion of the first *Reply* devoted to a defense of Aristotle:

> The Treatise on Rhetoric is a magazine of intellectual riches. Under an arrangement the most accurate perhaps and the most luminous ever marked out, the diversified elements of thought, of feeling, and of taste, are presented in due order to the reader's mind. Nothing is arbitrary, nothing gratuitous. Long experience with mankind, attentive observation of human nature in public and private life, the political history of past times, and the occurrences of his own age, furnished him with the materials of his great work. In the course of the enquiry, nothing is left untouched, on which Rhetoric, in all its branches, has any bearing. His principles are the result of extensive original induction. He sought them, if ever man did seek them, in the living pattern of the human heart. All the recesses and windings of that hidden region he has explored: all its caprices and affections, whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuse, to gratify, or to offend it, have been carefully examined. The reason of these phaenomena is demonstrated, the method of creating them is explained. The third Book contains a body of rules for good writing, traced to these natural principles, out of which they all grow, and illustrated by examples, which his own intimate acquaintance with the best poets and orators of Greece readily supplied. The whole is a textbook of human feeling; a storehouse of taste; an examplar of condensed and accurate, but uniformly clear and candid, reasoning (pp. 26-7).
>
> It would lead me too far, if I were to do justice to my own feelings on this subject (pp. 26-7).

Small wonder then that Whately should have been deeply influenced by Aristotle, and especially by the *Rhetoric*.

Whately's biographer says, "He was perhaps the leader among those who rendered the ethics and rhetoric of the Stagirite for many years the class-book of his University, and who studied to unite them, by comparison and analysis, with all that they esteemed most valuable in modern philosophy. For the enthusiastic and exclusive Aristotelian tendency of Oxford minds, for a whole generation after his introduction to tutorial life, no man was so responsible as Whately."[3]

Of a somewhat later period John Morley wrote, "Whately's common sense had set a new fashion, and Aristotle was studied as the master of those who know how to teach us the right way about the real world."[4]

THE ORIEL COMMON ROOM

A very important formative influence of a later period was the Oriel Common Room. "Oriel College at that time," says a student of the period, "contained some of the most distinguished personages, the most vigorous minds, and the most attractive characters in Oxford. From the provost, Dr. Copleston, to the youngest undergraduate they had been carefully selected, for to get a son into Oriel was a great thing in those days. Keble, Whately, Tyler, and Hawkins were tutors."[5] He continues later (p. 21), "There was something more than a morbid intellectual restlessness in the so-called Oriel School of that day." This was the period "when Copleston and Whately ruled the college and threatened to dominate over the University" (p. 23).

"Copleston, Whately, Keble, Davison, Hawkins, Hampden, and Arnold," says another student,[6] "formed in Oxford what was known as the *Noetic* School, maintaining around them a continuing dialectical and mental ferment. Tommy Short used to say that Davison and Whately habitually crammed for after-dinner talk; and unfortunate outlanders whose digestion of the dinner and enjoyment of the port wine was spoiled by it, complained that Oriel

[3] *Life*, I, p. 19.

[4] *Life of Gladstone*, I, P. 51.

[5] MOZLEY, REV. T., *Reminiscences, Chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement*, Boston, 1882, V. I., p. 18.

[6] TUCKWELL, W., *Reminiscences of Oxford*, London, 1907, p. 17.

Common Room *stunk* of logic. A country gentleman once, after listening to Whately's talk throughout the evening, thanked him formally for the pains he had taken to instruct him. 'Oh, no,' said Whately, 'not instruct; I did not mean to be didactic; but one sometimes likes having an anvil on which to beat out one's thoughts.' ''

Bishop Hinds, his pupil and lifelong friend, wrote that the ''Common Room was to him not a mere place of resort for relaxation and recreation, but a school for sharpening his argumentative powers, and for training him to make that use of them in his social intercourse, in Parliament, and in other public assemblies, which was so striking and effective. It is hardly too much to say, that he was not less indebted to Oriel Common Room than to the college lectures in the earlier portion of his life.''[7] Mark Pattison said the Noetics ''called everything in question; they appealed to first principles, and disallowed authority as a judge in intellectual matters. There was a wholesome intellectual ferment constantly maintained in the Oriel Common-room.''[8]

Such an environment would tend to stimulate Whately's natural independence and originality in thinking. He had in addition a blunt uncompromising honesty which, fostered in this circle of brilliant and sympathetic friends, led him to be at times more outspoken and tactless than was good for his own reputation. Mozley says,[9] ''It would not be possible now to describe the terror his presence was sure to infuse among all who wished things to remain such as they were in their own lifetime. Instead of being comforted and built up in the good old fashion they were told they were altogether wrong, and must first retrace all their steps and undo all they had been doing. What was worse, the efficacy of the cure which had become necessary consisted in the hearers thinking it out for themselves.'' His biographer admits[10] that ''Whately was never a popular man in the ordinary sense of the word. His opinions clashed too decidedly with those which prevailed in the Oxford society of his day to render him so in general life.'' The *Edinburgh Review,* in an obituary notice reviewing his *Common-*

[7] *Life,* pp. 26-7.
[8] *Memoirs,* London, 1885, p. 79.
[9] *Op. cit.,* p. 20.
[10] *Life,* I, p. 27.

place Book, and Fitzpatrick's *Memoirs of Richard Whately,* says,[11] "With younger men he had great influence through the generous and expansive nature of his political liberalism, and (it must be added) not a little of the Johnsonian tendency to argue down, trip up, and domineer over, antagonists in controversy."

WHATELY'S INDEPENDENCE OF MIND

No understanding of the *Rhetoric* can be complete which does not reckon with the vigor and originality of Whately's mind. He prided himself upon the independence of his thinking, and attempted to impart the same independence to his pupils. He was a master of the Socratic dialectic (though strangely indifferent to Plato[12] and insisted always that his pupils think for themselves. Bishop Hinds gives an excellent example from his early Oxford days (1813) of his employment of the Socratic method upon a stranger encountered in a stage coach.[13] "Do not adopt my opinions because they *are mine,*" he said to one of his pupils, "but judge for yourself."[14] To Lady Osborn he wrote, "And is it getting up a faction for me you are after? No, I'll have no Whatelyites! . . . I wish people to believe all the facts which I state on my own knowledge—because I state none which I have not ascertained to be true; and to listen to the reasons I give for my conclusions—because I never use any arguments which do not appear to me sound. And that is all the conformity I covet. Any one who tries to imitate me, is sure to be unlike me in the important circumstance of being an imitator; and no one can think as I do who does not think for himself."[15]

But while urging his pupils to think for themselves he sometimes, like the Platonic Socrates, insisted that they should reach the same conclusions as himself. While Newman acknowledges freely that Whately "opened his mind, and taught him to think and to use his reason," he adds, "When I was diverging from him in opinion (which he did not like) I thought of dedicating my first book to him, in words to the effect that he had not only taught me

[11] Vol. CXX, Oct. 1864, p. 372.

[12] "With Plato's intellectual peculiarities, on the other hand, he had little sympathy." *Life,* I, p. 19.

[13] *Life,* I, pp. 24-6.

[14] *Life,* I, p. 32.

[15] *Life,* II, p. 47.

to think, but to think for myself.''[16] Mozley is probably not far wrong in saying that Newman ''would have been ready to love and admire Whately to the end, but for the inexorable condition of friendship imposed by Whately—absolute and implicit agreement in thought, word, and deed.''[17]

As a partial consequence perhaps of this intolerance of opposition, he was frequently caught as his biographer observes,[18] ''quoting, with much approbation, expressions of this or that follower, which in truth are mere 'Whateleiana,' consciously or unconsciously borrowed from him.'' It is certainly true that his religious works, as well as the *Rhetoric*, contain frequent appeals to the writings of his lifelong friends and followers: Hinds, Hampden, Senior, and Dickinson. On this point the *Edinburgh Review* observes,[19] '' 'What people most readily and cordially approve,' he somewhere says, 'is the echo of their own sentiments'; and he does not seem to have been in the least aware how truly he was characterizing himself.''

In this connection should be noted the comment of J. S. Mill that ''he was the least equipped with books among any of the great thinkers of his time.''[20]

''His favorite authors were few,'' says his biographer. ''Aristotle, Thucydides, Bacon, Bishop Butler, Warburton, Adam Smith; these were, perhaps, his principal intimates among great writers; and it will be easily seen that they are among the most 'suggestive'; among those who could furnish the most ready texts on which his ruminating powers might be expended.''[21]

This meagre acquaintance with books was perhaps not so great a handicap in the composition of his *Rhetoric* as in the composition of some of his other works. He was well grounded in the rhetorical works of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Bacon, and of his immediate predecessors, Blair and Campbell. However, he evidently lacked acquaintance with, or interest in, the orations of Demos-

[16] *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, London, 1921, p. 11.

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

Cf. the correspondence on their break in the *Apologia*, pp. 380-7, or in Whately's *Life*, I, pp. 233-40.

[18] *Life*, I, p. 28.

[19] CXX, Oct. 1864, p. 389.

[20] CAMB. *Hist. of Lit.*, XII, p. 316.

[21] *Life*, I, p. 10.

thenes, Cicero, and Burke,[22] and when he needs an illustration he turns, not to standard oratory, but to some theological essay of his own, or to the sermon of one of his pupils or friends.

Though Whately was independent and liberal in his religious opinions, so liberal that many questioned the wisdom of his elevation to the archiepiscopacy,[23] and the Commissioner of Stamps refused to exempt his *Thoughts on the Sabbath* from the Pamphlet Duty on the ground that it was not a religious work,[24] yet in fundamental matters he was sound and conservative, and a staunch champion of his church and creed.[25] So in the *Rhetoric,* though he states frankly all the objections that have been raised to the study and practise of rhetoric, and even claims that only second-rate minds can expect high success in oratory (p. 31), yet he takes Aristotle as his master, claiming that his treatise, though the earliest on the subject, is also the best (p. 7), since it is not *an* art of rhetoric, but *the* art of rhetoric (p. 16) and so follows in the main the traditional methods and teachings in the subject.

Guizot, then ambassador to England, who met him in London in 1840, has left an admirable summary of his character:

> Parmi les prélats anglicans avec lesquels je fis connaissance, l'archevêque de Dublin, M. Whately, correspondant de notre institut, m'intéressa et me surprit; esprit originel, fécond, inattendu, instruit et ingénieux plutôt que profond dans les sciences philosophiques et sociales, le meilleur des hommes, parfaitement désintéressé, tolérant, libéral, populaire, et, à travers son infatigable activité et son intarissable conversation, étrangement distrait, familier, ahuri, dégiggandé, amiable et attachant, quelque impolitesse qu'il commette et quelque convenance qu'il oublie.''[26]

[22] Though he refers twice to "Demosthenes on the Crown" (pp. 140 and 203), and once to "Cicero against Verres" (p. 197).

[23] Cf. *Life, I,* pp. 102-4.

[24] Cf. *Westminister Review,* Vol. XIII, July, 1830, p. 183.

[25] Cf. Arnold's letter to Rev. Cornish, Dec. 23, 1831, in Stanley's *Life of Arnold,* Vol. I, p. 275. "Now I am sure that in point of real essential holiness, so far as man can judge of man, there does not live a truer Christian than Whately; and it does grieve me most deeply to hear people speak of him as a dangerous and latitudinarian character, because in him the intellectual part of his nature keeps pace with the spiritual."

[26] Quoted in the *Life,* I, p. 454.

HIS METHOD OF COMPOSITION

Whately's method of working out his ideas is described by his biographer:

> As in the early school and Oxford days, of which we are now writing, so down to his latest times, the daily occupation of his brain was to seize on some notion of what he considered a practical order, belonging to any one of the various subjects with which his mind occupied itself; to follow it out to its minutest ramifications, and to bring it home with him, turned from the mere germ into the complete production. And this perpetual 'chopping logic with himself' he carried on not less copiously when his usually solitary walks were enlivened with companionship. His talk was rather didactic than controversial; which naturally rendered his company unpopular with some, while it gave him the mastery over other spirits of a different mould. 'His real object, or his original objects,' (sic) writes one of his earliest and ablest friends, 'was to get up clearly and beat out his ideas for his own use. Thus he wrote his books.' *Life*, I, pp. 10-11.

It was thus that he worked out the principal parts of the *Logic* with his friend and tutor, Copleston.[27] And in a similar manner was evolved his early satire, *Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bonaparte*.[28] Fitzpatrick records a letter from Newman in which he says, "It was one of his peculiarities at that time to hammer out his thoughts (if I may so speak) by means of other minds, and he conversed so well and so profitably, that it was a pleasure to be so employed by him."[29] Newman is here writing of his part in the composition of Whately's *Logic*. It is regrettable that no such direct testimony is available as to the composition of the *Rhetoric*. But presumably it was "hammered out" in much the same way,

[27] "It was in their long walks together in the woods and meadows near Oxford that they discussed and worked out such subjects as form much of the groundwork of the 'Logic'." *Life*, I, p. 14.

[28] Rev. R. N. Boultbee, a former pupil, writes, " I was in the habit of walking out into the country with him two or three times a week, and during these rambles I was made the recipient of many of his most original thoughts, preserved in his Commonplace Book. Well do I remember the shady bank in Bagley Wood, where he first read to me the draft of the 'Historic Doubts'." *Life*, I, p. 38.

[29] FITZPATRICK, W. J., *Memoirs of Richard Whately*, London, 1864, Vol. I, p. 47.

the anonymous "young friends" mentioned in the Preface serving as anvils.

As early as 1809 Whately began jotting down his thoughts in a Commonplace Book.[30] "He always considered this practice to have been highly beneficial to his own mind,"[31] said his daughter. "It contributed undoubtedly to the clearness and correctness of his style; and by thus working out, correcting, and revising the results of his own reflections and studies, a vast body of materials was prepared for future works." The entries in the Commonplace Book are brief essays of one to ten pages each. It is significant that the notes to his edition of Bacon's Essays (1856) are not textual criticism or exposition, but similar brief essays on thoughts suggested by Bacon. Many of his longer writings, including the *Rhetoric*, as will be shown later, are made up of just brief original essays, connected into a more or less coherent structure by short transitional passages.

HIS INTEREST IN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Whately's interest in Political Economy may well have been derived from the studies of his undergraduate days. Copleston records that the subject was introduced into the lectures on Modern History. To him, as to Whately, it was more a treatment of economy than of politics, though he deplores the fact that the study often narrowed the student's views, and "made him regard every public measure simply in the relation it bears to national wealth."[32] Whately's fondness for puzzles, problems, and "logical traps,"[33] and his unsuitability for political philosophy of Burkian breadth, would lead one to expect in him a greater interest in speculation over economic problems, than in the application of political principles to a criticism of the British Constitution. It follows that for him Political Economy had little relation to rhetoric. He conceived rhetoric more as an art of theological disputation than as a science of influencing voters, legislators and judges. The *Rhetoric* contains four references to Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, but none to his *Wealth of Nations*. It contains one reference

[30] *Life*, I, p. 14.

[31] *Miscellaneous Remains from the Commonplace Book of Richard Whately, D. D.*, London, 1864, p. vi.

[32] First *Reply*, p. 172.

[33] Cf. *Edinburgh Review*, Vol. CXX, p. 397.

to Burke *On the Sublime*, but none to his speeches. It has frequent references to the then current theological controversies, but it contains no reference at all to the oratory of Pitt, Fox, Erskine, Canning, Brougham, or O'Connell. Oxford in Whately's day (1805-1831) might well have been a religious cloister, completely insulated from all political ideas. When later Whately sat with the bench of bishops in the House of Lords, he took an active interest in only three political problems: the transportation of criminals, Jewish disabilities, and the Irish poor laws. Lord Holland's remark to Guizot is significant: " 'Je ne suis pas sûr', me dit Lord Holland, 'que dans son indiscrète sincérité il ne dise pas qu'il ne sait point de bonne raison pour qu'il y ait, à la Chambre des Lords, un banc des évêques.' "[34]

SUMMARY

Out of this milieu then was Whately's *Rhetoric* formed. The factors contributing to it may be summarized thus: A natural fondness for dialectic (in the Platonic sense of discussion by dialogue) and disputation, fostered by early training in logic, and in Aristotle's Rhetoric, and by the ferment of the Oriel Common Room; a long experience as a tutor in teaching both logic and rhetoric; a vigorous and independent mind, coupled with a blunt uncompromising honesty; an early acquired habit of using others as an anvil on which to hammer out his own thoughts, which were then recorded in essay form in his Commonplace Book; a tendency to depend too much upon a few congenial friends and a few familiar books; an ability to examine most questions with candid and unprejudiced mind while clinging tenaciously, almost intolerantly, to fundamental premises; a deep interest in political economy coupled with a curious indifference to politics.

B. Probable Date of the composition of the Rhetoric

Of the exact date of the composition of the Rhetoric it is impossible to speak with accuracy. The finished work was published in 1828, probably early in the year, as it was reviewed in the *Monthly Review* for February of that year. De Quincey's well-known review appeared in the December number of *Blackwood's*. Of the history of the work prior to its publication we know little more than is stated in its Preface: "A brief outline of the princi-

[34] Quoted from Guizot's *Mémoires* in Whately's *Life*, I, p. 454.

pal part of the following work was sketched out several years ago for the private use of some young friends; and from that MS. chiefly, the Article "Rhetoric" in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana was afterwards drawn up. I was induced to believe that it might be more useful if published in a separate form, and I have accordingly, with the assistance of some friends revised the treatise, and made a few additions and other alterations which suggested themselves; besides dividing it in a manner more convenient for reference."

The identity of the "young friends" is unknown, but they were doubtless Whately's pupils at Oxford during the period between 1811, when he was elected fellow of Oriel College, and 1822, when he married and left Oxford to take a pastoral living at Halesworth.

The *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, or Universal Dictionary of Knowledge, on an Original Plan*, projected by S. T. Coleridge, began to appear in 1817, and continued by "parts" until 1845. Volume I, containing the *Rhetoric* and *Logic*, seems to have been published complete for the first time in 1829. Coleridge's Introduction, attempting a methodical organization of the whole field of knowledge, makes no mention of rhetoric, but Whately's article on that subject follows immediately after his article on logic. Whately's two contributions are preceded by Grammar, and followed by Geometry, Arithmetic, Algebra, etc.—all of which (Rhetoric omitted) are classified in Coleridge's curious Prospectus as Formal Sciences, in the general division of Pure Sciences.[35]

The *Quarterly Review* for October, 1817, lists under "New Publications" Volume I, Part I of the new encyclopaedia. *Blackwood's* for May, 1818, notes the publication of Part II. And from then on for many years there are in various reviews announcements of the publication of successive "parts" of the work. Just what each part contained it seems impossible now to determine. There is, however, a hint in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for May, 1818,

[35] Whately said of Coleridge's dissertation, "I had thought to cut it out and burn it when I had the volume bound, but I resolved to keep it as a curious specimen of what trash a very clever man *can* write." *Life*, II, p. 316. He could not have been pleased at the publication in 1851 of Coleridge's dissertation, together with his own articles on Logic and Rhetoric under the title, "Encyclopaedia of Mental Science."

which notes under works nearly ready for publication, "The Third Part of the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana,* containing the continuation of Grammar, in the Pure Sciences; the conclusion of Hydrodynamics, as including Hydrostatics and Hydraulics in the mixed and applied sciences; sections of the early History of Egypt, Assyria," etc. One may infer from this that the various articles were published piecemeal, and that a part of the *Rhetoric* was composed and published perhaps ten years before the publication of the entire work in 1828. But there is one factor which points to a later date. Cardinal Newman, in a letter to W. J. Fitzpatrick written in 1864,[36] says, "My part in Whately's Logic was small indeed. He wrote it originally in 'Analytical Dialogues', as he called them. In this shape I first saw it in 1822. At the same date he employed me to draw it up in synthetical form; and when he wrote his article for the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana* he made use of this rough draft of mine as a sort of basis for his own work." It is apparent then, if Newman's memory is accurate over this period of 42 years, that the article "Logic" was composed after 1822. And it seems likely that the *Rhetoric* was composed after the *Logic.* It was certainly second in Whately's interest, it follows the *Logic* in the *Metropolitana,* and as a separate work it appeared two years after the *Logic* was published.

It would seem to be a safe assumption, then, that though Whately may have made notes on rhetoric during his first years of teaching, and doubtless did at that time make numerous entries on the subject in his Commonplace Book, yet the finished work as it appeared in the *Metropolitana* was probably not put together until the years of his pastoral service at Halesworth (1822-5), or possibly even after his return to Oxford as Principal of Alban Hall.

C. Growth of the *Rhetoric*

The *Rhetoric* received a share of Whately's attention during at least twenty years of his life; that is, from its first conception, probably during his tutorial service at Oxford, till its final revision in 1846, after he had served for fifteen years as Archbishop of Dublin. During this period it went through eight editions: its first appearance in the *Metropolitana* and seven editions as a separate

[36] Cf. Fitzpatrick's *Memoirs of Richard Whately,* London, 1864, Vol. I, p. 47.

work. It was five times revised: in the first[37], third, fifth, sixth, and seventh editions, and in the course of these revisions grew to considerably more than double its original dimensions. It would seem that to Bishop Whately to revise meant to enlarge. It is true that there are frequent changes in wording, aiming generally at increased clarity, but the bulk of the changes are additions, often of single phrases and sentences, but more often of whole paragraphs, or even of longer passages of one to twenty pages.

There are only three important excisions. One was a note to a part of the preface in which he took to task a writer in the *Westminster Review* for some criticism of Oxford. This note appeared in the first two editions, and thereafter was omitted. The second was a part of a note (cf. p. 158) defending himself from some criticism on his *Logic*. It too appeared only in the first two editions. The third was a passage of three long paragraphs (cf. p. 208) in criticism of Bentham's *Book of Fallacies,* which appeared originally in the text of the *Metropolitana* article, was reduced to a footnote in the first two editions, and thereafter omitted. It would seem that at about the time of his elevation to the See of Dublin, Whately made it a settled rule to abstain from personal controversy.

Of the 271 pages in that portion of the *Rhetoric* here under consideration, approximately 109 were in the *Metropolitana* article. A total of about 16 pages was added in the first edition, 33 in the third, 10 in the fifth, 19 in the sixth, and finally 84 in the seventh. The figures do not include additions placed in the appendix. Of the total of 162 pages added from first to last, 11 went to form a

[37] I have been unable to find a first edition, but assume on what seems to be good evidence that the second edition, which I have examined, is a reprinting of the first. It appeared in the same year as the first. When the third edition appeared two years later it carried after the Preface the following Advertisement: "Some considerable additions having been made to the third edition, the Author has directed all of them that are of any material consequence to be printed for the accommodation of the purchasers of the former editions, separately and in such form as to be conveniently appended to the volume." The fourth edition, which is a second printing of the third, contained the same notice under the same heading, viz., "Advertisement to the Third Edition." The fifth, sixth, and seventh editions are all marked on the title page "Revised." No such notice appears in the second edition.

Preface, 25 were added to the Introduction, 78 to Part I, on Conviction, and 48 to Part II, on Persuasion. If we exclude from Part II the lecture on "The Intellectual and Moral Influences of the Professions," the additions to this Part total only 22 pages. To Part III, on Style, barely 6 pages were added to the original 75, and to Part IV, on Elocution, a similar amount was added. It is plain that Whately's primary interest was in Conviction, that part of rhetoric which lies closest to logic.

It is obvious from an examination of these changes that twenty years of revision made little alteration in the basic plan of the work. There is not one change in the order in which the items are presented, and there are only a few changes in the location of illustrative material. Neither are any important new topics introduced, if one excepts the discussion in the Introduction of composition exercises and debating societies. The most extensive additions are those on testimony and authority, analogy, and burden of proof and presumption, in Part I, and on the employment of appeals to the feelings and on inconsistency, in Part II. None of these, unless it be the last, is strictly speaking a new topic. The additions are in the main either slight variations on themes discussed in the original publication, or further illustration of such matter.

D. Sources of the *Rhetoric*

It is time now to inquire as to the sources from which Whately drew his materials. As he was scrupulously honest in acknowledging all his borrowings, this is a relatively easy task. As hinted above, his principal indebtedness is to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, no less than 39 specific references to that work being made. There are besides several references to the *Poetics, Politics, and Ethics*. It would be difficult to find in Whately (or for that matter in *any* sound work on rhetoric) anything that is not stated or at least suggested in Arisotle, and yet he makes not a single quotation of any length from his acknowledged master. This is especially surprising since he does quote at length from Cicero, from Thucydides, from Campbell, and from others. But Aristotle seems merely to have furnished him with texts on which his own ruminative powers might work.

Whately's definition of rhetoric

Whately's definition of rhetoric is unique. He does not follow Aristotle in limiting rhetoric to persuasion. This he thinks is too narrow a province. On the other hand he rejects the conception

which he finds current in his day that rhetoric includes all composition in prose. Between these two he intends to steer a middle course, and to treat of rhetoric as "argumentative composition, generally and exclusively" (p. 4). Instead of accepting the traditional or the current definition of the term, he uses "rhetoric" arbitrarily to cover the particular activity in which he is most interested. Then instead of justifying under such a definition the inclusion of a dissertation on persuasion, he remarks at the beginning of his treatment of that subject that "the *Conviction* of the understanding . . . is an essential *part* of Persuasion" (p. 175). He does not deplore appeals to the "passions" as extraneous to rhetoric, but quotes with approval Campbell's defense of such appeals as right and necessary (pp. 176-7), and claims that Aristotle deplored only "the excitement of such feelings as *ought not to influence* the decision of the question in hand" (p. 177). But he makes no attempt to justify his inclusion of rules for persuasion in a treatise which is to consider "argumentative composition exclusively." Indeed, in introducing the subject he says (p. 188) that he intends to give a few rules for "those parts of any Composition which are designed to influence the Will," as if he were treating here of a different kind of composition. His definition applies properly to his Introduction and Part I, but not to his treatment of Persuasion, Style, and Elocution, as he practically concedes in the first two paragraphs of Part I, Chapter II. All of these could have been included under Aristotle's definition.

It should be noted that Whately avoided the confusion of rhetoric with poetic which prevailed generally after Aristotle down to Campbell. Whately was evidently unacquainted with mediaeval rhetoric, and was not in this matter of definition influenced by his immediate predecessors, Blair and Campbell. His distaste for poetry was also perhaps an advantage.

THE SUBDIVISIONS OF RHETORIC

Whately's fourfold division of rhetoric into Conviction (the invention of arguments), Persuasion, Style, and Elocution, is distinctly his own. It does not parallel Aristotle's division of all proofs into artificial and inartificial, which Whately definitely rejects,[38] nor to the division of artificial into ethical, pathetic, and logical proofs. Whately, however, includes all these forms of

[38] Cf. his note p. 39.

proof, giving them his own arrangement, making ethical proof subsidiary to pathetic (Pt. II, iii). He ignores also Aristotle's division of rhetoric into three species,—deliberative, forensic, and epideiktic. This is to be expected since he had little interest in either legal or legislative procedure, and eulogistic oratory was rare in his day. Neither does he follow the traditional fivefold division of classical rhetoric: *inventio, dispositio, elocutio, pronuntiatio,* and *memoria.* His Part I treats of the "invention" of arguments, and in the same Part, Chapter III, sections 4, 5, 7, and 9, in Chapter IV, and in Part II, Chapter II, section 5, there are discussions of "disposition." The traditional *elocutio* is treated in his Part III, Style; *pronuntiatio* and *memoria,* in Part IV, Elocution. Whately was the first important writer to transfer the term "elocution" from style to delivery.

SOURCES OF PART I

Whately's indebtedness to Aristotle for his treatment of "Conviction," his page heading for this Part, is readily apparent. His division of all arguments into *a priori* and "the other class" (he rejects the term *a posteriori,* p. 52) is derived from Aristotle.[39] though he departs from Aristotle's subdivision when he classifies arguments from sign not with probabilities, but with example, under what are generally called *a posteriori* arguments. His discussion of probability (p. 47 ff.) borrows from both the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* of Aristotle, and acknowledges indebtedness also to Campbell. On Testimony his debt to Aristotle is less evident. He borrows from Locke, Paley, and Campbell, and here as throughout the *Rhetoric* makes frequent reference to his *Elements of Logic.*[40] The section on the calculation of chances (pp. 76-81) is typically Whateleian in its presumably original observations based upon common sense and common experience, and in its evidence of a fondness for problems, and skill in inventing examples. The same may be said for the section on the argument from "progressive approach."

The treatment of example and induction (pp. 85-108) owes more to Aristotle, though he again makes frequent reference to his

[39] *Rhet.* I, iii.

[40] The *Logic* seems to have been based largely upon a work by Aldrich, then in general use at Oxford. Doubtless much of it was original with Whately and Copleston. His indebtedness to others is not as freely or as frequently acknowledged in the *Logic* as in the *Rhetoric.*

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[40] The *Logic* seems to have been based largely upon a work by Aldrich, then in general use at Oxford. Doubtless much of it was original with Whately and Copleston. His indebtedness to others is not as freely or as frequently acknowledged in the *Logic* as in the *Rhetoric.*

own *Logic*. He draws illustrative material from theology, chemistry, political economy, history, medicine, and common experience. He quotes from or refers to his own works on Logic, on Political Economy, his *Lessons on Reasoning*, his speech on the Jewish Relief Bill, and cites also the Bible, Thucydides, Cicero, Mandeville, Bacon, Adam Smith, Copleston, and the *Edinburgh Review*.

The section distinguishing arguments of confutation from those which aim only to satisfy a candid mind (pp. 108-12), is again largely original, though it borrows paragraphs from Adam Smith and Paley, and refers once to Aristotle's *Ethics*. Whately's ruminative habits are further evident in the long section on Presumption and burden of proof (pp. 112-32). There is no clue as to what caused him to insert this topic in the third edition, and amplify it in subsequent editions. It owes no indebtedness to Aristotle or Campbell, but seems to be characteristically the product of Whately's own mind. The sources of his illustrations are as usual diverse. He cites his own *Logic* and several of his theological works, and draws material from Horace, Shakespeare, Milton, Bacon, Hooker, Johnson, and the Bible, as well as from his experiences with Parliament, and the popularity of his work on Logic.

In treating of arrangement, too (pp. 137-46), he follows in the main his own mind, expressing regret that Aristotle and Cicero did not furnish more precepts on this topic. He returns to Aristotle for a text for his treatment of refutation (146-50), citing his division of refutation into counter-syllogism and objection, and his statement that there is no distinct class of refutatory arguments. Much of the discussion of this topic is somewhat technical, being drawn largely from the *Logic*, but it is unusually rich in illustrative material, drawn as usual from a wide range of reading and observation. Chapter IV on Introductions and Conclusions draws again from Aristotle and Cicero, but is characteristically original in treatment and illustration.

SOURCES OF PART II

In his treatment of persuasion Whately again takes his texts in the main from Aristotle and Campbell. The subject invites him to typical brief essays on the prejudice existing against excitement of the feelings, on the necessary indirectness of appeals to the feelings, on the dangers of practicing rhetoric on oneself, etc. Following the teachings of eighteenth century "Moral Philosophy" he

conceives of reason and will as existing in separate compartments, and so not to be moved by the same means. He accepts Dugald Stewart's division of the "Active Principles of our nature" into appetites, desires, and affections, to which he adds self-love, and the "Moral-faculty" (Adam Smith's "sense of propriety"), but in the ensuing discussion of the conduct of appeals to the feelings, he makes no use of this division. Such an analysis of the various feelings as Aristotle gives, he does not feel called upon to make.

His brief caution against exhortation (pp. 190-2) seems to be his own, but in discussing the advantages of copious detail he borrows from Cicero, Quintilian, and Campbell. His only reference to Cicero's orations occurs in his treatment of climax (p. 197). Comparison, climax, and amplification are all considered in relation to their effect on the feelings, though Whately recognizes that they are "connected in some degree with style" (p. 199). The modes of heightening an impression, suggested in Aristotle's treatment of style, are by Whately included in this general discussion of the conduct of appeals to the feelings (p. 199). In lieu of Aristotle's analysis of the emotions and description "of the prevailing Characters of men of different ages and situations," Whately inserts at this point (p. 204) a reference to his lecture on the professional dangers to which ministers, physicians, and lawyers are subject.

In introducing the subject of "ethical" persuasion Whately frequently acknowledges his indebtedness to Aristotle, and quotes twice again from Campbell. He gives the subject an original turn by discussing the speaker's character chiefly in terms of the varying taste and intelligence of his hearers. His remarks on the disadvantages of being thought eloquent (pp. 210-15) are largely original. The basis of this discussion throughout is Aristotle's threefold division of character into intelligence, virtue, and goodwill, and he found Aristotle especially rich in texts for his discussion of "authority derived from experience," "allaying of unfavorable impressions," and "ridicule."

In summary, then, it may be said that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* furnished the bulk of the texts from which Whately developed his thoughts on rhetoric. The whole treatise bears evidence of his preoccupation with logic. He borrows frequently from Campbell, and gets occasional thoughts from Cicero and Bacon. His thinking is

colored throughout by his close familiarity with the writings of Butler, Paley, Adam Smith, and Copleston.

SOURCES OF HIS ILLUSTRATIONS

His illustrations are drawn from a somewhat wider range of reading. Among the ancients he refers frequently to Thucydides, and less often to Horace and Tacitus. He is familiar with Shakespeare. He draws more from eighteenth century literature than from his contemporaries. He refers frequently to the Bible, and very frequently to his own theological writings, and those of his friends, Copleston, Hinds, and Dickinson.

It may be well to tabulate the number of his references to or quotations from his principal sources. They are as follows: Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* 39; *Poetics,* 2; *Ethics,* 4; *Politics,* 1; Whately's *Elements of Logic,* 32; his various volumes of essays on theological subjects, 10; his charges, speeches, sermons, and other works, 15; the Bible, 16; Cicero's *De Oratore,* 8; *De Officiis,* 2; *Oration on Verres,* 1; Campbell's *Rhetoric,* 9; Bacon, 9; Thucydides, 8; Paley, 6; Shakespeare, 5; Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments,* 4; the *Edinburgh Review,* 4; *Butler's Analogy,* 4; Dugald Stewart, 3; Horace, 3; Tacitus, 3; Warburton, 2; Burke *On the Sublime,* 1; *Defense of Natural Society,* 1; Milton's *Paradise Lost,* 1; *Tractate of Education,* 1; Swift, 2.

The Lowndes *Bibliographical Manual* lists ninety-seven published works by Richard Whately. These, so far as I have examined them, contain numerous quotations from and cross references to each other. The *Rhetoric* (i. e. excluding the portions on Style and Elocution) has no fewer than fifty-seven references to his other published works. It is hardly inaccurate to say that Whately's chief source was his own other works. Well might his biographer say, in commenting upon his comparative want of reading, that "he continually stumbled upon the thoughts of others, and reproduced them in perfect honesty as his own. This was one of his characteristics through life. It is singular to read one of his earlier critics commenting on his tendency to reproduce the 'commonplace of other writers, not unfrequently, without any apparent consciousness of their ever having seen the light before'; while one of his latest, Mr. Stuart Mill, speaking of his philosophical investigations, says that 'of all persons in modern times, entitled to the name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading was the scantiest, in

proportion to their intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr. Brown. But though indolent readers they were both of them active and fertile thinkers.' ''[41]

A word should be added concerning the facility with which Whately found illustrations from common observation of life, and the felicity with which he used them. For instance, in defending the necessity for having names for rhetorical terms, he asks us to consider the inconvenience to a carpenter of ''having no names for the several operations of *sawing, planing, boring,* etc.'' (p. 19). In discussing the selection of subjects for school compositions, he says (p. 23), the student ''may freely transplant indeed from other writers such thoughts as will take root in the soil of his own mind; but he must never be tempted to collect *dried specimens.*'' He recommends (p. 142) that an unpopular thesis be kept out of sight as much as possible ''because men listen with prejudice, if at all, to arguments that are avowedly leading to a conclusion which they are indisposed to admit;'' and ''if we thus, as it were, mask the battery, they will not be able to shelter themselves from the discharge.'' In recommending moderation in combating deep-rooted prejudice he says (p. 165), ''Laborers who are employed in *driving wedges* into a block of wood, are careful to use blows of no greater force than is just sufficient. If they strike *too hard,* the elasticity of the wood will *throw out the wedge.*''

In conclusion it may be said that inasmuch as the field of Rhetoric is somewhat limited, and was completely surveyed by Aristotle, no new principles are to be expected in a modern work on this subject. Whatever claim to originality may be made for Whately, must consist chiefly in his novelty of illustration and of arrangement. As to his point of view it should be noted that throughout his treatment of the subject he looks primarily to the establishment of past fact, rather than to the determination of future policy. Even in his discussion of Persuasion, he seems more concerned with an abstract moving of the will, than with a practical incitement to present action. Rhetoric for him has little to do with the legislature, charged with the determination of a wise future policy. It is rather the instrument of the theologian, bent upon proving the soundness of his doctrines, or the authenticity of his beliefs.

[41] *Life,* I, p. 10.

THE FORUM

IN DEFENSE OF RHETORIC

To the Editor of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH:

Dear Sir:—The attacks on rhetoric by Bishop Jewell and Mr. Simrell printed in the June number of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH, show an interesting difference in attitude. One would hesitate to argue with Bishop Jewell because, as Professor Hudson suggests, he was quite evidently indulging in a harmless little orgy of rhetorical display, and knew it. But one cannot help fearing that Mr. Simrell is really serious. A writer ordinarily does not twist a phrase like "recognizing human characteristics" into "pandering to human weaknesses" unless his emotions are aroused. Hence some reply seems necessary, lest the notion prevail that his attack is unanswerable.

It must be noted at the start that Mr. Simrell does not decry all rhetoric. He approves exposition and logic. What he dislikes is "mere rhetoric," which includes "all the devices of persuasion which are either substituted for or added to logical argument and veritable information." He goes on to say that we should use dialectic whenever possible, and in any event "tell the truth and let it go at that."

Telling the truth and letting it go at that is a worthy ideal. The trouble is, of course, that in practice it leads to misconceptions just as easily as does "mere rhetoric." For instance, Mr. Simrell says that Socrates compared rhetoric with cookery and that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a cook-book. Nothing could be truer. But nothing could be more misleading than the inference which Mr. Simrell wants us to draw. Some moderns, who regard a cook as a first cousin to a scullion (unless, of course, the cook happens to be a mother or a wife, when we continually deplore the fact that our salaries will not allow us to keep a servant) and think of a cook-book as a greasy tome cached behind the kitchen stove, may im-

mediately jump to the conclusion that Plato and Aristotle thought both cookery and rhetoric of little account. Aristotle, however, did not share all of Plato's prejudices. Anything could be an art, he thought, which could be reduced to rules. Aristotle would not have been at all ashamed to decare that one chief purpose of his *Rhetoric* was to prove rhetoric an art, to put it into the category with scientific cookery. To admit without question that he succeeded, to call his *Rhetoric* a cook-book, might be, therefore, from Aristotle's point of view, one of the highest possible compliments.

The analogy between rhetoric and cookery is worth laboring a bit further perhaps, because it goes to the very heart of the problem. What, after all, is cookery? The art of preparing foods for human consumption, of treating raw beef so that the ordinary mortal can chew and digest it, of adding salt and pepper to potatoes, of turning unpalatable grains of wheat into palatable slices of bread. Rhetoric, in much the same way, may be defined as the art of preparing facts and logical deductions for human understanding, of treating tables of statistics so that the ordinary mortal can find meaning in them, of adding wit and vivid illustrations to cold exposition, of turning unpalatable truths into palatable rules of action. Both arts recognize human desires, or, if you will, "pander to human weaknesses." The question is whether these desires are actual needs, whether these weaknesses are necessary and inevitable weaknesses.

On this point we may imagine a dialogue between Mr. Simrell and Aristotle:

MR. SIMRELL: Raw meat is better than cooked meat.

ARISTOTLE: Quite so.

MR. SIMRELL: Then that's that.

ARISTOTLE (timidly): But there are many people who cannot eat raw meat and uncooked potatoes.

MR. SIMRELL: That makes no difference. We'll feed them raw meat and uncooked potatoes, anyhow, and make 'em like it.

A Napoleonic gesture, truly. One might almost say a Neroic gesture. But not one to be taken too seriously.

I submit that the analogy holds for rhetoric. If all human beings were so highly intelligent that reason alone affected their decision, logic and pure exposition might suffice. But the majority

of human beings are not that way, and never will be. This world, as G. K. Chesterton, among others, has said, is not a reasonable world. Religion, for instance, is not based on reason. No one can prove by a syllogism that there is a God. Faith, hope, and charity, the three great Christian virtues, are essentially unreasonable. The very existence of faith denotes lack of logical proof. Hope is necessary only in proportion to the hopelessness of the cause. Charity is giving someone else more than he deserves; to give him precisely what he deserves would be justice. Love is unreasonable; if humans were reasonable, they would mate on the same principles that guide breeders of domestic animals. All humanitarian impulses are unreasonable; logically, the insane should be killed, the poor allowed to starve, the weak exposed according to the Spartan custom. Art is essentially unreasonable, for the most logical ages have produced least, and the most perfect technician is often not so great as his more intuitive brother. Religion, faith, hope, charity, love, humanity, art may denote weakness, but they supply much of the world's happiness. And since unreasonableness and emotion play so large a part in life, human decisions of all sorts are inevitably affected by them.

Knowing all this, Aristotle, after praising exposition and logic, went on to say, "There are people whom one cannot instruct." Then he showed how such people can be influenced to make correct decisions. Mr. Simrell implies that such people shouldn't exist, and if they do, nothing ought to be done about it. He is like a bystander exhorting a sculptor to use the blunt end of his chisel on a granite block. The blunt end may have many theoretical advantages over the sharp end. *But it won't cut granite.* Nor will any amount of railing and tearing of hair make the granite softer. The only sensible course, therefore, is to urge the sculptor to carve something good. Rhetoricians today do not necessarily believe that rhetoric is the "best method of making civic and moral virtue prevail;" they simply realize that it is usually the only possible method.

The manner in which Mr. Simrell's theory would work, not in Utopia, but in this world, can be indicated by scrutinizing his own example of Woodrow Wilson's speeches on the Versailles treaty. Wilson, says Mr. Simrell (and quite accurately), did not give his American audiences a clear, detailed exposition of the provisions of

that treaty. Instead, he gave them his interpretation of it; "and Echo answers 'What was in the treaty?'" Now if Mr. Wilson had done as Mr. Simrell wanted him to do, Echo would not have answered at all. Echo would have been asleep long since with the rest of the audience. Nothing is more deadly to an audience than an extended exposition of something it cares little about. The average American voter cared little about the boundary between Poland and Germany or the status of Shantung. Nor did he want to hear the intricacies of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This may be sad, but it's true. Mr. Wilson may have misjudged his audiences in some other respect, but he certainly did not lose prestige or harm his party simply because his explanation of the Versailles treaty was mere rhetoric. That is perhaps the most naïve of the many theories about the reason for the Harding landslide. What Mr. Wilson gave his audiences, and what they wanted, was his interpretation of the treaty. They could make something of that. They could have made nothing of a logical analysis of it, for (sad to relate, again, but true) they were not experts in Political Science or International Law. Nor will the mass of people in America ever be. In a democracy, the mass of voters must make decisions on advice from leaders they can trust. If the leaders give no advice, advance no arguments that the people can understand, show no connection between the decision and the people's interests, the decision will inevitably be made by prejudice or guess based on abyssmal ignorance.

So much for the efficacy of cold exposition on a general audience. But Mr. Simrell offers another substitute for rhetoric—dialectic. His only descriptive sentence pictures dialecticians "stopping to define terms and following wherever the discussion leads them." Presumably, he believes Plato's not impartial contention that dialectic infallibly leads to a true conclusion.

But even a cursory reading of Plato's Dialogues shows what any teacher can observe in the classroom, that in dialectic the person with the stronger mind reaches the conclusion he desires. Socrates seldom ends a dialogue on a note in agreement with his opponent's ideas. Dialectic, as Aristotle says, draws opposite conclusions.

In other words, the dialectician, like the rhetorician, can get the result he wants if he knows how to do it. Socrates achieves many

of his victories by false analogy, ambiguity of definition, and shifting ground. Huck Finn, using the same tactics, proves that Indiana grass is pink and that the sun moves around the earth. Hence, to substitute dialectic for rhetoric would seem to be, even from Mr. Simrell's point of view, a doubtful improvement. Dialectic, as a method, is as susceptible of abuse as rhetoric. To imply that it is not, is simply to add another mental-habit-breeding fallacy to an already overcrowded list. Not that dialectic is not a valuable exercise. It *is* valuable, but it should be used with open eyes and in its right relation to rhetoric. Dialectic is not a substitute for rhetoric, but, as Aristotle says, its counterpart. The two work hand in hand. Dialectic examines words and ideas, helping the speaker to arrive at a conclusion; rhetoric devises ways and means of passing on that conclusion to others. To substitute one for the other is like substituting bread for butter or ham for eggs.

The picture of the "well-informed man who merely tells us the truth and lets it go at that," with which Mr. Simrell garnishes his final paragraph is appealing but misleading. In affairs of state, where decisions have to be made not on any absolute basis but on a basis of probability and expediency, what is truth? Lincoln certainly believed he was telling the truth when he said that unless the spread of slavery was stopped the country would be divided. Douglas believed he was telling the truth when he said that the best solution to the slavery problem was to allow each state to decide the question for itself. Garrison believed he was telling the truth when he said slavery should be abolished. Calhoun believed he was telling the truth when he said slavery had to be protected and extended. Were they all liars? Or was Lincoln saved from that fate because his prediction was correct? Was each truthful only in so far as he clung to specific instances and untruthful the moment he started to generalize? Or should none of them have expressed any conviction at all?

Suppose we consider a more recent situation. There is a division of opinion today as to the value of Prohibition. The same facts are accessible to Nicholas Murray Butler as to Senator Borah. Yet, with the same facts before them, these men arrive at precisely opposite conclusions as to the *expediency* of repealing the Eighteenth Amendment. What is the truth? Can economists tell us? There are economists on both sides. Can political scientists tell us? They,

too, are divided. Where is there, then, any man who can "tell us the truth and let it go at that?" The fact is that there is some truth on each side of any debatable public question. So long as that is the fact, and so long as public questions must be decided by the people, rhetoric of one sort or another is inevitable and indispensable.

But let us suppose for the moment that all rhetoric could be abolished and each voter confined to a single room with a copy of an entirely impartial tract setting forth the bare facts about Prohibition. On election day the voter will be led forth, with his ears stopped with cotton, to the voting-booth. On what basis will he vote? According to Mr. Simrell's own quotation from Professor Dewey, the voter's decision will be controlled by his previous habits of thought. If he remains isolated and deaf for another four years, he will vote the same way again. Each time he will tell on his ballot the truth *as he sees it*. Where is there any chance of progress unless he is somehow sometime persuaded by someone else to throw aside his prejudices for the moment and vote for truth as that other person sees it?

Instead of being cynical, we should be thankful that intelligent leaders have at their command the power to persuade others. That the unintelligent and corrupt have the same power is lamentable, but not dangerous as it might seem. Aristotle was not playing Pollyanna when he said that in an even battle of rhetoric the better side will prevail. The duty of the American college is to see that the battle line of the intelligent is kept full. That can never be accomplished if we teach our students that rhetoric is a dishonorable weapon. All that we can say with justice is that it should not be used dishonorably.

Very truly yours,
RAYMOND F. HOWES, *Washington University*

GESTALT AGAIN

To the Editor of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH:

Dear Sir:—One cannot be unmindful of the compliment when so distinguished a scholar as Professor Ogden considers it worth his while to reply to any article on a psychological subject. The fact that that article was primarily a criticism of another speech teacher's interpretation of Professor Ogden's own psychological

point of view, does not minimize the honor.[1] Yet the compliment does not place upon the writer of that criticism any obligation to accept all that the eminent psychologist and educator may have to say.

There is in America no abler exponent than Professor Ogden of that system of psychology known as *Gestalttheorie*. His own text, *Psychology and Education*, was written from that point of view. Hence it will not be taken amiss if, in this brief surrejoinder, I shall quote him quite freely.

Behaviorist or Gestaltist? What does it mean to be one or the other? And what does it matter? There is no system of thought, psychological or otherwise, which is followed blindly by all who profess adherence to that particular point of view. Not all Structuralists were able to agree with everything that Titchener ever wrote; there are no doubt Gestaltists who are able to think independently, even though by so doing they are led somewhat away from the path beaten by Köhler and Koffka; certainly there are Behaviorists who do not accept all that Watson, Weiss or Max Meyer have said about the operation of the human mind. To insist that when one admits being a Behaviorist he thereby commits himself to the Watsonian brand, or to any other brand, is just as fallacious as to sentence a Gestaltist forever to follow the specific utterances of the present leaders of *Gestalttheorie*. Scientists do not so readily fall into such absolute classifications, even though they may and do accept certain basic tenets.

The Behaviorist accepts as fundamental—he even fights for it—the proposition that our responses to situations, our situation-responses as Professor Ogden puts it, are made by the organism acting as a whole, an integrated whole. I can well imagine the following definition of integration appearing in a text on psychology, as written by a thorough-going Behaviorist: "Whatever is integrated constitutes a 'whole,' the integers, units or 'elements' of which are discoverable only in terms of aspects, attributes, or various phases of the whole." This is a good description of the organism responding in a given situation. It may be likewise a description of the situation itself. It might be remarked that this

[1] Cf. This Journal, Vol. XIV, February, June and November, 1928. Pp. 8-29; 334-359; 530-534.

"whole" *does* consist of "integers, units, or 'elements'." Thus, to use an illustration taken from *Psychology and Education,* if I see a stone in a path, there are undoubtedly a stone *and* a path, and a wood or a field through which the path runs; taken all together, they form the "whole." "But," our author might go on to say, "the members of larger 'wholes' may articulate and form smaller 'wholes' by virtue of their subordinate aspects or members." In other words, even though the organism may and does act as a unit, this unit may be considered as having certain "members, units or 'elements'," bearing certain relations one to another, and being in themselves unitary because they in turn consist of still smaller members that bear certain relations one to another. Yet the above quotations were taken from Professor Ogden's *Psychology and Education* (p. 91), and define integration from the Gestaltist's point of view. There is nothing in these definitions to which an ardent Behaviorist would likely take exception.

Contrary to a rather popular notion, most Behaviorists do not make any attempt to construct a mosaic out of these smaller and still smaller members of the total pattern of behavior. Even Watson, whom Professor Ogden quotes quite freely,[2] describes total patterns of response, in the very passages quoted. However, say what one will about the totality of patterns, the "wholeness" of the responses, the fact remains that every configuration does consist of elements bearing certain relations one to another, and to the whole itself. That is what constitutes the configuration. It may be true that we cannot think of the integers of a configuration apart from the pattern; it is certainly true that we can best understand the pattern and make our adjustments to it by knowing something of the elements which comprise its every aspect, and of their mutual interrelations.

We are in agreement with Professor Ogden when he maintains in his article that we are not dealing with discrete entities. In our teaching of speech we have to deal with total patterns, with wholes. Every speech situation is a whole, and must be met as such. But no two situations are alike, because the elements are always different—different people, different places of meeting, different purposes that call the people together, and so on *ad infinitum.* It is not enough

[2] *Psychology and Education,* pp. 8-10, 19, 29, 35, 71, and others.

that the speaker know that the situations are not the same; he must know *why* they are not, what *elements* have been changed from the one occasion to the other. To attempt to build up a pattern of behavior which will solve every problem—and each speaking situation is a problem requiring a solution—out of simple reflexes would be absurd; and we honestly try not to be absurd.

It would be equally nonsensical to instruct a student to prepare a selection for interpretation in the following manner: first, memorize the words of your selection; second, work out the particular vocal changes that will give you the best "expression" (whatever that may mean); and finally, superimpose upon that a set of separate, discrete actions or gestures that will fit the ideas and the voice. Ridiculous? Of course it is. But, supposing that our student has made a careful study of his selection, of his method of presentation, according to the most approved "patterns." What if some particular phase of this configuration does not suit him, is found to be ineffective? Is it not good sense to study the element that is giving trouble, whether it be a gesture, a shift of position, an inflection, a certain play of facial muscles, or any other aspect of his total presentation, in an attempt to correct it and fit it into the whole? If we are writing, do we not revise, correct, change a word here, a comma there, add a line and strike out a phrase? We are, presumably, trying to get a higher degree of articulateness into the total pattern; but we do it by the obvious process of studying the elements, the integers or units, in relation to other elements, integers or units. Is this *Gestalt*, or Behavior?

Professor Ogden agrees, in his article, that "Nature no longer 'tends'." "Neither," he adds, "does the organism. In order to avoid this teleological implication, I was at pains to avoid the terms 'tend' and 'tendency' altogether in my book, *Psychology and Education*" (p. 531). While he has been quite successful in avoiding these *terms*, I fear that he has not been so successful in avoiding the concept, or *fact*. He has simply substituted other terms: The following quotations from his book will illustrate the synonymity of these terms with "tendency:" "While the most characteristic feature of an instinct is the attraction of the particular situation that confronts the animal, and an active *disposition*[3] to

[3] Italics mine.

alter the situation . . ." (p. 57). ". . . since form is defined by context, what the mind brings to apprehension, and what the organism brings to its response by way of *dispositional readiness*[3] . . ." (p. 134). "Since the attitude of play manifests itself long before the child is able to distinguish between earnest and playful endeavor, we must consider it among the original *dispositions* of man."[3] (p. 101. Cf. Thorndike's *Original Nature*.) ". . . the ability to draw these distinctions (between images) depends not only upon individual *propensity*[3] and education, but also upon the sense-modality employed" (p. 180). When he says that "all higher forms of animals must mate *for*[3] regeneration" (p. 68), he is stating directly a biological teleology which he himself must tacitly admit.

My objection to the statement that "nature tends to close the circuit" was to the figure of speech involved, the personification of 'nature,' which implies what Professor Ogden in his article repudiates, namely, "an external agency of some sort, as a means of integration." Science no longer thinks of nature as having the capacity to act.

But although Professor Ogden repudiates that principle in his article, in the first chapter of his book he either commits the error of teleological implication or is using the highly figurative language of the street. One section of that chapter is titled, "How, When, and Why Nature is Right (Sec. 4, p. 12). "We have seen," he says, "that nature furnishes different endowments to different individuals. . ." (p. 14). "Nature also provides different environments as well as different species of living beings to inhabit these environments" *(Idem)*. These are but two of the several similar statements. Such expressions might be acceptable in literary style, but they have no place in scientific writing. Their tolerance, in this case, savors too much of straining at the gnat and swallowing the camel.

That organisms "tend" there can be no doubt. That there may be no "conscious" tendency, or analysis of purpose, among lower animals, is agreed. Among human beings "conscious purpose" usually takes the form of implicit verbalization or some other type of imagery. That all forms of life are more likely to act in certain ways than in others there is no question. Most plants grow

[3] Italics mine.

towards the sunlight. We plant our gardens, knowing that under favorable conditions, our seeds will "tend" to germinate and grow. Given a situation, the *probabilities* are that the organism, plant or animal, will act in a certain general manner. In other words, it will tend to act thus: there is a tendency, a propensity, a disposition, a dispositional readiness—call it what you will, the fact remains. It is because of this tendency that we can estimate probabilities, make predictions, plan for the future of our children. Our whole educational system, society itself, is built upon this foundation.

Professor Ogden says in his article that I lack "insight." Which leads me to venture a definition for that much-discussed and much-used term. From what I gather, partly from reading Köhler's accounts of his experiments, and partly from Professor Ogden's account of falling over a stone, I submit that "insight" is the *perception of the relations existing between the elements of a configuration*. Thus, when he says that if he falls over a stone lying in the path[4], he lacks insight regarding the stone, he simply means that he fails to perceive the relation between that element in the configuration and the rest of the total situation, including the response. If he responds by any of the other alternatives, he has insight, he perceives that relation, and does something about it, which is an aspect of the perceiving.

In this connection, an interesting story is told of Köhler and one of his experiments. It seems that Köhler had placed a banana in a hollow tube, and had placed the tube and banana, together with a long stick, in the cage with the ape. The idea, apparently, was to see if the ape would have the "insight" to poke the banana out of the tube with the stick. But evidently the ape had more "insight" than the experimenter, for, to the surprise of the observers, he merely "up-ended" the tube, whereupon the banana fell out!

Now as to the particular point wherein I am supposed to lack "insight," namely, the acquisition of a stage-fall. My statement was, and is, this: "To say that the method is right when it 'feels' right is nonsense; stage technique is not acquired by such a rule of thumb." It should be pointed out that my criticism on this point was with regard to Professor Parrish's interpretation.[5] In the

[4] *Psychology and Education*, pp. 124 ff.

[5] Cf. This Journal, Vol. XIV, June 1928, p. 351 ff.

original article on "Implications of *Gestalt* Psychology," appear these two paragraphs:

'In order to acquire a "stage-fall" one must resort to practise; but practise will never bring perfection in the art unless one hits upon an appropriate method, and selects it by the way it *feels*. The principle of learning how to fall gracefully, and indeed of learning how to do anything with skill, is not practise alone, but the creation of a response which is felt to be appropriate to the conditions imposed. Practise merely affords opportunity for making such a selection. We do not become graceful by simply repeating an awkward act until we become inured to it; for grace means economy of action, the right coördination of flexion and contraction.' (Quoted from Ogden, p. 38).

From these statements it follows that attention to the separate parts of a gesture is bad. Each gesture should be treated as a whole, or rather as merely an aspect of a total bodily and mental response. It will become graceful or effective when it comes to feel right.[6]

(Italics mine.)

Aside from the fallacy of *non sequitur* committed in this passage, the conclusion is quite at variance with common experience. Nothing in the passage quoted from Ogden could possibly lead to such a conclusion. Professor Ogden in his article inquires how the actor is to know which are the "correct elements." My point is that they are *selected* not by how they *feel*, but how they *look*, how they make the audience feel. That may be one reason for the presence of a director. Imagine—if you can—a group of actors rehearsing a play, each one going about his stage-business relying solely upon whether or not his actions *"felt right!"* It may be true that after those elements have been selected on the basis of how they look, the actor thenceforth may and probably does depend largely on the kinesthetic and other proprioceptive imagery involved. In that sense one may work out actions according to the way they "feel."

I admit that I have not told how these "correct elements" integrate themselves into the whole pattern. I even confess that I am unable to do so. But I am curious as to just what this "essential determinant principle" is that Professor Ogden insists is the means by which habits are formed (p. 533). In his book he defines habit as " 'acquired reflexes', resulting from drill or training" (p. 39).

[6] Cf. This Journal, Vol. XIV, February 1928, p. 17.

"The formation of a habit," he says, "takes place whenever a special act becomes stereotyped and thus ceases to be the focus of a configuration" (p. 321). But while this may be somewhat descriptive of what may go on in terms of total patterns, it tells no more of *how* a special act becomes stereotyped and ceases to be the focus of a configuration than I have told of how "correct elements" become integrated into the total pattern. Are "essential determinant principles" exclusive to the Gestaltist's configurations?

To come back to the point which I tried to bring out in my former article, I still am of the opinion that, while *Gestalttheorie* may have a slightly different focus of emphasis, fundamentally it is not enough different from the basic tenets of the Behavioristic position to justify a quarrel. It seems to be essentially an attempt to catch up with what the Behaviorist has known for a long time. What teachers of speech are interested in, what we must have, is a system whereby we can improve the speech of our students. We can talk freely about "patterns" and "configurations" and "wholes" and "articulateness." But when we have elaborated upon that theme, as we actually do in our classes, our students are more likely than not to come back at us with "Just what can I do about it?" What shall we say? What shall we do? We do the common-sense thing—which is also sound theoretically—we attempt to point out the factors that contribute to ineffectiveness, to replace them by more effective elements, and thus build up, not a mosaic, but a closely articulated pattern that will meet the particular situation imposed. Believe me, the speech teacher who takes either the psychological or the rhetorical approach cannot get along without patterns any more than he can get along without behavior. But he never bothers his head about any inherent conflict between the two; he simply uses behavior-patterns to meet situation-patterns. If this be Behaviorism, or if it be *Gestalttheorie*, make what you will of it.

Very truly yours,

GILES WILKESON GRAY, *University of Iowa*

TOURNAMENT DEBATING

To the Editor of THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH:

Dear Sir:—The remarks of Mr. Barnard, of Lakewood High School, published in the FORUM of the April QUARTERLY greatly interested me. Condemning the "tournament idea in high-school de-

bating," he advocates that the secondary school adopt the college policy of scheduling debates "with whomever it pleases." Taking up his favorite rhetorical device, the question, I ask *why?* It is difficult to understand just what he is objecting to—but why are the evils of "coaching" and aiming to "win" attributed to the selection of question, side, and opponent by authorities outside the school? Is it inferred that if the school does its own selecting, it can find easy enough opposition so the matter of winning need cause no worry? Is that debating which "wins" the kind that does not "teach"?

Indeed, no debater in a "tournament" would dare make such an unsupported assertion as: "What is the type of debating that emerges from the tournament system? Usually the 'coach-made' type that is so obnoxious to all lovers of good debate." Is not Mr. Barnard objecting to bad practices existent in spite of forensic leagues rather than because of them? He seems not to have investigated thoroughly, as every debater should, to discover that in the Michigan League, for example, each school does have considerable choice regarding side and opponent and is even given plenty of opportunity to help select the question, if these be virtues.

All of education seems to be based upon the finding of incentives. Why does Mr. Barnard recommend the National Forensic League? That surely admits the very stimulating effect of a broad organization. And when he suggests it exercises no dictation, one is forced to smile. It so far overthrows his "as-you-please" idea as to rigidly define the credit points required for membership. And, horror of horrors, these credit points are based upon "victories!" Will we never get down to pure "teaching?" Must we train to win honor degrees (which this National Forensic League awards) or "be free to develop youngsters?" And it may be disconcerting to discover that the National Forensic League in defining its purpose states: "Just as the athlete receives the coveted school letter for his efforts, so the debater is to receive a national honor key for his work." Yet this athletic idea, with its unpardonable sins—coaches and victories,—is what we were to avoid! Consistency, where residest thou?

The nice thing about this League is that it admits coaches to membership, and of course we understand they are the ones who

really win debates and thus most deserve this honor awarded as a result of "victories."

Do not take me too seriously, Mr. Editor, I am heartily in favor of the excellent National Forensic League which was organized by the same Pi Kappa Delta that also has the consistency to favor organized high-school debate leagues. And, having observed closely and been connected with debating both "as-you-please" and under the auspices of the Michigan High-School Debating League I must contribute a different generalization: Because of the rapidly changing personnel of the high-school faculty, and for other reasons, it is the debate league alone which gives promise of minimizing the evils of "coaching" and of making debate a truly valuable training in extemporaneous public speaking. To me "winning" is not inherently evil. It is what we try to do throughout life.

Also, if the objection to debate leagues is to be that not enough debaters are given training, let us remember that there is every opportunity for the school to schedule additional contests as it pleases and thus secure the "points of superiority not to be overlooked" in *both* systems. Some day I expect to hear the scholarly suggestion that we should have more Presidents of the United States in order to give to a greater number that excellent honor and training in statesmanship. Let us leave to interclass debating and other forms of speech training within the school the attribute of "democracy."

Very truly yours,

RUPERT L. CORTRIGHT, *Syracuse University*

NEW BOOKS

[New books are sent to staff reviewers, but voluntary contributions are gladly considered. Manuscripts should be sent to Hoyt. H. Hudson, Review Editor, Princeton University.]

Good American Speech. By MARGARET PRENDERGAST MCLEAN. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1928.

"Allah is Allah, and Mohammed is his Prophet!" seems to be the attitude in this book, only recently off the press. The volume will reveal itself to the great majority of teachers of speech as one of those written for the primary purpose of advancing a particular point of view which is not so generally accepted as the small coterie of which the author is a member would wish. The author herself admits that she does "not pretend to have presented anything new or original. I have simply brought a little basket and filled it with some of the choice fruits of other men's labors which I hope to distribute among others who may greatly profit by them . . . but who are too busy or too much interested in other things to find them for themselves."

The specific point of view taken by the author is the attitude to be expected of one having been brought up in the tradition that true culture is determined by geographical consideraions, and that cultivated speakers are located according to the points of the compass. Of course if one starts out with that basic assumption there is little to be said by way of disagreement. But it must be discounted approximately eighty-three and one-third percent, for the simple reason that at least that proportion of the American population has been reared in quite other traditions, and are wholly unashamed of their rearing.

With quite a number of the author's remarks we shall all agree quite heartily. To their implications, however, and to even a greater number of statements, quite a few of us will raise a mild protest. The appeal to "put an end to the civil wars concerning American speech" strikes us as an entirely reasonable request. But, one is

led to inquire, who started this "civil war?" And who keeps it going? There are undoubtedly sectional *differences* in pronunciation; but sectional *prejudice*—a term used over and over again—against the speech of another section exists, in America, almost wholly in one locality. There is only one group of people "who insist that their particular sectional dialect must be right and therefore, all other forms of speech that differ from it must be wrong;" and that group, unfortunately, is the one represented by the author of *Good American Speech*. It is this small though confident band that is keeping the civil war going, by continually sniping at all who may differ from them. It is they who have maintained the offensive—and to not a few that offensive is becoming more and more just that. Their attitude seems to be that we shall have peace when and only when the rest of America shall be brought safely into the castle keep, when the speech of one hundred millions and more shall be changed to fit the "standards" set up by the self-appointed apostles of sweetness and light, standards which in all reason are far from representative of all good American speech.

One great difficulty in the book is that having enunciated the underlying principle of pronunciation—"*usus et jus et norma loquendi* [sic], usage is the law and rule of speech" (p. 55)—the author proceeds to ignore it altogether. With all due respect to the notable authorities she quotes, one must insist that such authorities do not formulate the speech habits of a people, certainly not of the American people. These habits are very strong; they grow up utterly without particular aim or purpose on the part of the users of the language; and, I rather suspect, if any changes take place in the future, they will follow the same age-old procedure, notwithstanding the small band of evangelical phoneticians crying in the wilderness. The sensible procedure, of course, is to make an effort, not to formulate rules primarily, but to discover how people actually do talk, how they actually do pronounce their words. And it is quite safe to suggest, without transcending the bounds of human experience, that there are fully as many "cultured" people using the so-called "wrong" forms as there are using the forms recommended by the author. Which, even according to her own dictum, rather makes these "wrong" forms right. "Standard English . . . in America at the present time, is the English which is actually used by the most cultivated speakers in America" (p. 59).

Quite true. It makes little difference whether "most" in the statement quoted is an adverb or an adjective; equally cultivated people in America use various forms of pronunciation, but there are probably more of them that use the outlawed forms. If it be suggested that speakers show their lack of cultivation by using these other forms, then we have the type of logical fallacy known as arguing in a circle. The minor differences in pronunciation in America cannot be made the basis of social strata or of social exclusiveness.

When it is said that certain speech prejudices are common to all corners of America, one can without difficulty sense a thinly veiled reservation; the implication is that "all the world is wrong but me and thee." Everyone else is prejudiced, but we are not, because we are right; we concede it! We are of that "small number of men and women with broad minds, clear and wide vision, and general culture who are free from the doubts and prejudices that beset the masses and whose speech is of a very high standard." (p. 52). One is reminded of the professor of epistemology who was asked if his particular system of philosophy might not also some day be proved wrong. "Why, no," was the almost pained reply, "This is the truth!" It might not be inappropriate to suggest here that if one is particularly eager to serve a certain group of people, as the author professes herself to be, it may not be the best way to establish good-will by repeatedly charging them with prejudice.

"It is time," says the author, "for all . . . to sit down together as *Americans* [italics in the original], draw in their sharp claws of sectional prejudice, put an end to the civil wars concerning American speech, and calmly and impartially talk the matter over with open minds and charitable hearts" (p. 55). And then is one to understand that a compromise is to be reached by adopting, "willingly and whole-heartedly," the forms which the author recommends? ("Won't you walk into my parlor"?)

"But if one wishes to belong to the most refined social class one must use the form of speech of that class" (p. 62). In other words, if you would reveal your innate, or acquired, refinement, as we have done, you must do as *we* do. ("I thank thee that I am not as other men are!")

The distress of the "young woman of several years' experience

as a teacher but with a limited knowledge of phonetics'' (p. 54), who was in a quandary as to what form of pronunciation to teach to a group of students coming from all over America, will not, probably, arouse any great feeling of sympathy. Nor does the incident narrated impress one with the necessity for a uniform standard of pronunciation. Most teachers of speech have encountered exactly the same situation. Few colleges and universities nowadays draw their student body from one locality; and even in the elementary and high schools there is often a polyglot population. The obvious solution to the problem is to ignore it altogether. Why insist that one must say [kʌltʃə] when his whole background has trained him to say [kʌltʃəɹ], and when he is but keeping company with a large group of cultivated speakers? That the former has any acoustical superiority over the latter is a matter to be determined by experimental research; the assertion that there is an advantage in ''acoustical distinctness'' is of doubtful validity. Consider, if you will, radio announcers from East to West. Their speech must have ''acoustical distinctness,'' and yet almost without exception they use the type of pronunciation to be heard throughout the West and Middle West.

What point is there in requiring students to say [bɑθ], when they and probably all the people with whom they will ever be closely associated—cultured people, too—will say [baθ] or even [bæθ]? Had this young woman with several years of experience known her *speech* better than she knew her phonetics, she would not have bothered her head about ''what form of pronunciation to teach the Western girls.''

''America is geographically far removed from the other countries and this may be partially responsible for the fact that, heretofore, Americans have given but little thought to language in general; they have had very meagre training in foreign languages or in the spoken form of their own. Where there has been training in spoken English it has often been so influenced by lack of wide knowledge or by prejudice on the part of the teacher that it has been as bad as no training at all'' (p. 75). What geographical remoteness has to do with this particular proposition is not at all clear. The implication is, of course, that in other countries much attention is paid to the matter of speech, and therefore, there is a closer approximation to uniformity in pronunciation. The first of

these is to be doubted; it is questionable whether these other countries have in general made as much effort to advance good speaking as has been made in America. That they have made noteworthy contributions to science, in the field of speech, cannot be doubted, however. Does the author know that speaking has been taught in America continuously since the founding of Harvard?

The fact is that in those other countries the variations in pronunciation are far more marked than they are in America. In no other place in the world is there such a marked uniformity in pronunciation. Dialects do not exist in America, except for a few isolated regions, and in those very few cases the isolation is rapidly breaking down. Shaw's *Pygmalion* was possible in England, the seat of this "international, world-wide form of cultured usage"; but it would never have been written if the author of that play had been an American, living in America.

"The author has never met an American who was not willing to accept the standard form of English speech as being the best form when the meaning and significance of 'standard' was clearly explained. When he fully understands that it is the international, world-wide form of cultured usage which he is advised to adopt, he does so eagerly and whole-heartedly. It is the *mistaken* idea that he is being advised to adopt some other person's regional or national dialect that arouses his indignation, creates his stubborn prejudices, makes him deaf to reason and blind to truth and keeps him in the linguistic gutter" (p. 77).

Now the unadorned truth is that there is no one "international, world-wide form of cultured usage." There are various forms which are accepted at par wherever they are heard. There are, as has been pointed out, differences, regional differences; any one form is as good as any other. With respect to the whole of American speech, the particular form advocated is every bit as truly a dialect, a regional mannerism, as is the form which is in use by the cultivated speakers of any other area—and no more so, except that it is used by a far smaller number of Americans. But, we are told, if one prefers his own particular regional or national form, and declines to adopt another, he is stubborn, prejudiced, deaf to reason, blind to truth and content to wallow in the mire of the "linguistic gutter!" ("There, but for the grace of God, go I!") It's a fearful, a terrible condition we are in, and we do not

even know it—one hundred millions of us, and more. We don't even know what "standard English" means!

"*Why* do cultured speakers in all English-speaking countries tend to speak the same particular form of English during the same period?" (p. 62). The answer is of course that they do not, at least in the present age. The typical speech of Canadians, for example, resembles far more closely the Mid-Western type of pronunciation than it does the form recommended by the author. Australian speech is somewhat more like that of the native British or Irish, partly because of its isolation from other English-speaking countries, and mainly because the cultural contacts with England are closer than are those of Canada. But *not* because they have made any attempt consciously to follow the traditions of "culture."

The typical forms of American pronunciation—at least two of the three great divisions, those used by the vast majority of the population, including most of the most cultivated and cultured speakers—are different from the speech described by Ripman, Jones, Sweet, Tilly, Grandgent, *et al.*, as being standard for England. The probabilities are that for several generations they will continue to be different from England. Most Americans are quite willing that this should be so. Strange to say, few of them are cast down into utter depression by the realization of the fact that their speech is barbarous, inelegant, crude, when the particular barbarisms, inelegancies and crudities amount solely to the few minor differences in pronunciation that do exist.

What are these differences? A careful examination of "*Good American Speech*" reveals no more than four chief ones. For the most part the pronunciations given in the lists of words would be accepted almost anywhere, certainly throughout the West. In the South there are some additional variations. These four critical differences lie (1) in the pronunciation of the [ɹ] before consonants; the author says that [ɹ] is never used before consonants; it is used only before vowels. (2) In many words in which the Westerner uses [ɑ] or [æ], the form recommended is [ɑ]. In fact, in her phonetic alphabet, the author does not allow the inclusion of [a], which she says is never used except as the first element of the diphthong [aɪ], where she uses a different symbol. (3) In many words, such as those ending in "*tory,*" *(laboratory, oratory,)* the elision in the last two syllables is more pronounced than is heard in

most localities. (4) In many words such as *court, hoarse, ore,* in which the Westerner and Southerner uses [o], the vowel recommended is [ɔ] thus, whereas the most frequently heard pronunciation is [koɹs], [hoɹs], [oɹ], or, in the South, [ko:t], [ho:s], [o:], it is advised that Americans say [kɔ:t], [hɔ:s], [ɔ:ə]. These are practically all. What a tempest in a teapot! It is for non-conformity in these four differences that "all the world is wrong but me and thee!"

Regardless of any rules devised by phoneticians, who have no authority to devise rules of the sort, [ɹ] *is* used before consonants, and in other places besides before vowels. The vowels [a] and [æ] *are* heard more frequently than recommended, and in words where [ɑ] is the supposed "standard." *Laboratory* and *oratory* and other words with similar endings *are* pronounced with the last two syllables quite distinct, though not accentuated. The combination [oɹ] *is* heard throughout the West, as spoken by several millions of speakers; and the [ɔ] in its place is heard so seldom as to be very noticeable when it strikes the ear. As has been indicated, cultivated speakers and cultured people use these particular forms habitually, in private and public speech, and are quite unashamed, totally unaware that they are below standard, if indeed they are.

The nub of the whole matter may be found embedded within the following quotation: "English is the most widely used of any language in the world to-day and its use is rapidly increasing, extending to all parts of the world. Modern ships, express trains, telephones, airplanes and radios, have brought its speakers very close together. *America (or any other nation) can no longer hold aloof from the rest of the world or act or speak without consideration of what is being done in other countries"* (p. 75. Italics mine). That American isolation has broken down tremendously in the past thirty years, there can be no doubt; for the most part we have profited by the change. America can no longer be charged with acting or speaking without regard to what is being done and said in other countries. Facilities for international and trans-oceanic communication will have to be far better than they are at present, however, for that growing "consideration of what is being done in other countries" to affect the generality of American pronunciation.

Oddly, the criticisms made of our speech by foreign observers

have little or nothing to do with pronunciation. Americans are, perhaps properly and justly, charged with having poor speech; we are often singled out by our mannerisms in vocal utterance. But the truth is that these criticisms are with regard to our *voices* rather than to our pronunciation. We are said to have loud, harsh, strident voices, in contradistinction to the softer, more pleasantly modulated tones to be heard from the Continental. If these advocates of good American speech would themselves take as much interest—and initiative—in ending the "civil war" as they seem to want everyone else to do, and devote themselves to correcting those other speech factors which merit criticism, both at home and abroad, they would merit a goodly following. But when they insist that all but themselves are prejudiced, blind to reason, deaf to truth, and in a linguistic gutter, with respect to a single, uniform standard of pronunciation, that is quite another matter.

The informative material presented in the book is the usual kind to be expected in books on phonetics as written nowadays. Narrow transcription is used throughout—a practice often advisable, even needed, in teaching the foreign born; but it is quite cumbersome in teaching students whose phonetic background includes, for example, the aspirated plosives anyway. The lists of transcribed words is as good as in most texts. The section on "Transliteration" is of doubtful value, probably because it is so poorly presented.

The author follows the present phonetic fashion of considering [o] and [e] as always diphthongs. It is probable that they frequently are, excepting in unaccented syllables. But the generalization that they are always diphthongized into [oU] and [eɪ] seems a bit unwarranted.

For information, Klinghardt is followed closely. Photographic studies seem to suggest that there is yet much to be said about intonation. The unaided ear, which was the only instrumentation used by this German scholar, is not infallible; and there are such great individual differences in hearing that rules formulated on such a basis are probably no more than points of departure, if even that.

The style in which the book is written is spotty. The author often lapses from the solidly instructional to the elaborate, effusive, rhapsodical. In make-up the book lacks solidity, body.

If the reader will disregard the first eighty pages, and read the rest with considerable discrimination, making due allowances for the influences under which the author writes, the book should not do a tremendous amount of damage, and might perhaps do a modicum of good.

G. W. GRAY, *University of Iowa*

The Psychology of Language. By W. B. PILLSBURY AND C. L. MEADER. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1928; pp. 306: $3.

The chapters in this book have grown out of the lectures given by these two professors at the University of Michigan. As long ago as 1912 the book, it was rumored, was to be. Finally it is here. Professor Meader had one of the first laboratories in the world equipped for the study of linguistics; Professor Pillsbury is most widely known for his study of attention. Graduate students in speech at the University of Michigan have enjoyed the privilege of taking these lectures, and they are now happy that in the present form they are made available for teachers of speech everywhere.

While this book covers much ground made familiar by recent writers on the problems of speech and language, such as de Laguna, Richards, Sapir, and Delacroix, it does so with a particular purpose in mind, the psychological interpretation. Bio-linguistic in treatment, the book may be said to begin and end with muscle movement as the explanation of the phenomenon of language. Every chapter sticks to the task of explaining in terms of psychology the processes involved in speaking and writing. For example, sound changes have been treated philologically before, but never have psychological laws been adduced to explain them.

Who is there among teachers of speech who does not welcome every source of information on such subjects as find treatment under the following chapter headings: The Scope of Language Study, The Nervous Mechanisms of Speech, The Speech Organs, The Senses Involved in Speech, Mental Processes in Speech, Motor Processes in Speech, The Origin of Languages, Language Receptors, Reading and Listening, Thought and Language, Words and their Meanings, The Mental Antecedents of Speech, Sound Changes in Language, Syntax?

The student will find in the earlier chapters of the book much that looks familiar at first glance; he may even be tempted to skip over it as old material. However, this part of the book is written with the emphasis on language processes. Motor and sensory processes are spoken of in their relation to the problems of understanding how thought and language evolve. For example, much attention is given to localization of function in the brain but the Broca and Wernicke areas, a summary of Head's work on Aphasia, receive the lion's share of attention because these are the ones concerned with speech. In other words a distinguished psychologist and linguist have focused all of their knowledge on the problem of language. Up to chapter five, we have, as I said, a consideration of the anatomy and physiology of processes concerned in language problems. Beginning with chapter five, deductions based on psychological laws are made. There is a dissertation on how the mechanisms are used, a treatment of laws which determine the response in the reader and listener. It is stated that language for the psychologist has two aspects: first, how do ordinary psychological laws find expression in language?; and second, what determines the effects that words and language exert upon the purely mental phenomena? It is assumed that the thought and word are altogether distinct for the sake of the study, although it is realized that the assumption is only provisional.

Thought and language are discussed in detail in chapter 10. (1) How does thought get translated into words as one prepares to speak? (2) What bearing does this have upon actual vocal expression? The case of thought-translation singled out for analysis is the one of anticipatory intention. The anticipatory intention, it is said, becomes elaborated into thought; the thought becomes translated into words; the thought finds vocal expression. It is recognized that there are other types of relationship such as speaking without noticeable antecedent imagery and the case of the vague notion of what is to be said in advance of talking but without definite words or separate images that correspond to the words. A discussion of Wundt's assertion that the process of the development of the sentence in preparation for speech is nearly always analytic rather than synthetic makes a good starting point. This statement is criticized, keeping, however, the value of the position; but arguing that while they cannot agree that the idea to be expressed is always definitely present in consciousness in advance of

analysis and expression, yet it is certainly true that there is some foreshadowing of what is to be said before it is definitely prepared for expression. The chapter goes on to discuss the preliminary intention, the formulation of the idea in words, the process of censoring language (held highly important), the formulation of larger units of speech, relation of the actual expression to the thought. This chapter is the heart of the book. All chapters lead to and front it. It is claimed that the vocal organs act at once under the influence of the intention, the social environment, and the habitual connection of the movements of the vocal or writing organs. The automatic execution of a movement while attention is pre-occupied shows only that the connection of vocal movements with ideas is extremely close and that probably many phrases or sentences constitute units that may be initiated as wholes by a single idea.

After an elaboration of the four theories of thought that take into account the four characteristics of thought, it is said, "All the four theories of thought with which we started may be said to fall into one. Thinking may go on in words or in images equally well, but that which makes both images and words capable of carrying thought, is not their peculiar structure but their reference, and the reference in either case is not to other words or images, but to types, to organized experiences, and to their representatives." This is practically the position of Ogden and Richards in *The Meaning of Meaning*. To quote further, "But this reference to types does not serve to distinguish thought processes from the simpler states, for the simplest precepts and memories are also shot through with types with reference to these abstract thoughts. No consciousness is entirely without this typical meaning, although growth in intelligence is marked by progress from the relatively meaningless to the meaningful .... In brief, the essence of all thought processes is to be found in the fact of meaning .... In the study of the relation of thought to language, one may assume that what one means by thought is some form of this system of meanings; by language, either the words as mental images or the actual motor processes and sounds heard that are called out by the thought. It is by no means easy to make sure exactly what goes on in the individual mind when one speaks. This is in large part due to the fact that one is much more concerned with the

outcome, with what is being said and the effect that it shall have upon the hearer, than with the mental operations."[1] These quotations are taken from chapter nine. In chapten ten, which I discussed above, Pillsbury attempts to discover what the mental antecedents of speech are.

The chapter on syntax written by Meader, takes up in order, variation and stability in language factors, the sentence, the grammatical categories, the parts of speech, the verbless sentence, priority in the development of specialized forms, the development of case, the relation of inflection to the expression of ideas.

The volume is well illustrated. The bibliography at the end of each chapter makes one wish he had enough money to buy a few of the books noted. Such a book as this, based as it is on physiological psychology, will give the teacher of speech new lease on the intellectual life so liable to be dulled by the assault of the mediocrity of the class room. It is provocative. It does not claim to be the final word. Tomorrow we may read a book that carries us further into the mysteries of the mind but for the time being here is a good book to read and to own.

LIONEL CROCKER, *Denison University*

Abraham Lincoln: 1809-1858. By ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928: 2 volumes, pp. 1348.

Another biography of Lincoln! Yet the work is amply justified by its thoroughness of treatment. Every detail of any importance has been given most careful attention. Here we have, it would seem, the final account of the life of America's statesman and orator.

In the first volume, Lincoln's early life and growth are treated. The material is typically biographical in nature. Here one finds more of an historical survey. In it, Mr. Beveridge paints a vivid picture of the times, and on this background portrays the movements of Lincoln as he emerges from an obscure small-town lawyer to a man of national importance.

Throughout the two volumes, mention is made of all of Lincoln's more important speeches. Unfortunately, however, the author ventures no rhetorical criticism. Much attention is given to several individual speeches, as, for example, an entire chapter

on The Peoria Speech of 1854, but only the historical events incident to the occasion are revealed. Little is said about the speech itself. But for an understanding of the significance of what Lincoln said, this chapter, as well as the entire second volume, is excellent.

Mr. Beveridge makes a distinct contribution to our field, however, when he publishes in full the "House-Divided-Against-Itself Speech" just as Lincoln prepared it for the *Illinois State Journal*. The author has preserved Lincoln's own italics, as well as his short paragraphs, many of which are "often of but one sentence, and even these sentences, sometimes of only six words, each of one syllable." The italics give, as much as any comments possibly could, a fairly good conception of Lincoln's delivery. And, certainly, they indicate every idea which Lincoln desired to lodge in the minds of his audience.

Excerpts from Lincoln's speech given to the Scott Club of Springfield, August 24, 1852 are also included in this biography, and the account of this speech which Mr. Beveridge gives would also have been a valuable contribution had not Mr. Wiley of Ohio State University, in an excellent litle volume bearing the title *Four Speeches by Abraham Lincoln Hitherto Unpublished or Unknown*, given us the speech in full a few months before Mr. Beveridge's work appeared.

As for the debates, the author's treatment is a disappointment. He says, "Solely on their merits, the debates themselves deserve little notice. For the most part, each speaker merely repeated what he had said before." Yet Mr. Beveridge devotes the entire following chapter to the Freeport Debate, which was a turning point in the careers of both Lincoln and Douglas. What he does, however, is only to give excerpts from the speeches, and a few descriptions of the men and the conditions under which they spoke.

Mr. Beveridge has given us a biography, even though unfinished, which will rank along with the best we have on Lincoln. But in it, as in other lives of speakers, one notices the absence of sound rhetorical criticism. This, surely, is a neglected aspect of the work done on men who have influenced their times by the spoken word.

MARVIN G. BAUER, *Washington and Lee University*

The Public Mind: its disorders; its exploitation. By NORMAN ANGELL. New York, Dutton, 1926: pp. 220.

The Public and Its Problems. By JOHN DEWEY. New York, Henry Holt, 1927: pp. 224.

The Right Radical Mr. C. E. S. Wood includes among his reports of "Heavenly Discourse" this bit of dialogue between God and a Child Seraph who interrupts a celestial conversation on the subject of war:

CHILD SERAPH: What is war?

GOD: Man's supreme stupidity in greed. Whoever wins loses...

CHILD SERAPH: Must it always go on?

GOD: Till man achieves wisdom.

CHILD SERAPH: When?

GOD: You visit earth, Jesus' earth. Attend a meeting of the American Legion—Daughters of the Revolution and Confederacy—call on General Fries of the Poison Gas De-Department, visit the movies, look at the herd; come back and tell me when man will achieve wisdom.

In these two books a publicist and a philosopher, after observing the herd as revealed in such phenomena as war, the American Legion, the Daughters of the Revolution and Confederacy, poison gas departments, and movies, as well as its more useful activities, attempt to answer the question posed by God and the Seraph. Each by the standards of his trade answers it well. If Professor Dewey is more thorough, more thoughtful, more comprehensive, Norman Angell is more concrete, more vivid, more comprehensible. If the publicist neglects the more difficult implications of his theory, the philosopher explores more implications than the reader can readily follow.

When will man achieve wisdom? When he conquers human nature, is Norman Angell's answer. When "free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication," is Professor Dewey's. The former may seem the more adequate—at first sight. But the clinical exhibits which Norman Angell uses to show the disorders and exploitation of the public mind all go to demonstrate that the conquest of human nature is already largely accomplished in the civilized world, and, as most anthropologists agree, has not greatly lessened human stupidity. Man learns his stupidities. In fact, as Professor Dewey says, "everything which is distinctively human is learned, not native," and certainly the more serious stupidities in modern society are distinctively

human. Norman Angell's "conquest of human nature" depends upon two things: "a sense of social obligation to rise at times above instinct, temper, passion," and a sense of "the moral obligation to be intelligent." One of the most interesting chapters in his book, however, is devoted to proving that the parsons and the professors, who, without doubt, have generally recognized both of these obligations, are not in the least immune to stupidity when a really good epidemic is going around. The real conclusion of his book, the one which his evidence supports, is that the disorders of the public mind are so general, so dependable, and so obvious that any one acquainted with the arts of propaganda can exploit it to his heart's content without any substantial protest from even the most socially and morally minded. If the idols of the tribe and the cave and the theatre have lost any worshippers, the idols of the forum and the high priests of propaganda have gathered them in.

Professor Dewey begins his search for the way to human wisdom approximately where Norman Angell loses himself and retraces his steps. Inasmuch as what appears to be stupidity, in the light of complete knowledge, appears entirely reasonable when, as is the way of propaganda, half the truth is suppressed and the other half exaggerated, and may as well be committed *because of* "a sense of social obligation" as in default of such a sense, the philosopher's solution of "free social inquiry indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication" seems to be the real solution of the disorders of the public mind. The implications of Professor Dewey's thesis are quite impossible to summarize, and even, as I have said, occasionally difficult to grasp, but it would be entirely fair to the context of the quotation to emphasize the adjectives "free" and "full." Inquiry must be free of any predetermined purpose, and communication must present all of the knowledge which inquiry makes available; else there is no escape from the stupidities which are merely intelligent responses to half-truths.

"Our "essential need, in other words," according to America's greatest living philosopher, "is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is *the* problem of the public."

It may be that the improvement is already under way. At

any rate such books as these, and especially Professor Dewey's, ought to be good for the souls of public speaking teachers, ought to increase their confidence in the potential dignity of the art which they teach, their conviction that it may amount to something more than salesmanship or vaudeville.

V. E. SIMRELL, *Dartmouth College*

Publicity for Social Work. By MARY SWAIN ROUTZAHN AND EVART G. ROUTZAHN. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1928, pp. xviii, 392.

I suppose the implication of all such books must be that anything to make people want to do good, or to better themselves, is justified. And, on the whole, this volume succeeds in offering social workers effective weapons to bring about these ends. Philosophic considerations of publicity and social work are omitted. Legitimacy of appeal is considered, but the emphasis is on effectiveness rather than on ideal considerations. It must be said, however, that this book urges more legitimacy, good taste and dignity than is usual in publicity.

The chapter on public speaking, which has been criticized in detail by James A. Winans, is a brief but practical guide to platform publicity. In addition to subjects usually treated in the textbooks, there are interesting discussions of the problems and advantages of illustrated lectures and radio talks.

In reading the chapter on plays, tableaux, pageants, etc., one wonders if the ballyhoo artist—even the seeker for social welfare—must be given the right of eminent domain in the fine arts. But in spite of such shortcomings, the book is successful in supplying usable information regarding publicity for social work.

FRANKLIN FOLSOM, *Swarthmore College*

Readings in Public Opinion. By W. BROOKE GRAVES. New York: Appleton's, 1928, pp. viii, 1281. $6.

Propaganda. By EDWARD L. BERNAYS. New York: Horace Liveright, 1928, pp. 159. $2.50.

Propaganda Technique in the World War. By HAROLD LASSWELL. New York: Knopf, 1927, pp. 233. $3.25.

Political Behavior. By FRANK R. KENT. New York: Wm. Morrow, 1928, pp. 342. $2.50.

When Plato defined rhetoric as the art of persuading an ignorant multitude, without imparting any real instruction, he refused to allow it the dignity of a science, but called it a knack, a habit of a bold and ready wit. A systematic observation of rhetoricians and their ways in these days, however, contributes largely to that body of knowledge sometimes called political science. As the power of persuasion and public opinion dominates society more completely, it is studied by more observers, and from varied points of view. Advertisers, salesmen, and propagandists, we often say, manipulate public opinion in order to promote the prosperity of certain interests or the strength of particular causes as distinguished from the welfare of society as a whole. When we believe a cause to be identical with public welfare we may then use a slightly more dignified term and call its promoters publicists, or even statesmen. Psychologists, many of whom claim to confine their interests to an explanation of the behavior of the human organism, find the phenomena of persuasion and public opinion increasingly significant in the interpretation of the individual. When you add mystical entities to the psychologist's observations, you may get a full-fledged sociologist; and when an economist studies persuasion "scientifically," he may join the "younger school," and discard most of his inheritance from the classical thinkers. From the present-day observation of this despised knack of the persuader, then, we get books on rhetoric, advertising, salesmanship, propaganda, publicity, psychology, sociology, political science, economics, historical sociology, sociological history,—and at times we have them all combined in philosophy.

To fix a hierarchy of values for all the works resulting from a study of the phenomena of persuasion is very difficult; it is unnecessary for the discussion of such a book as *Readings in Public Opinion*, by W. Brooke Graves. The editor of this volume happens to be a professor of political science, and the introduction is written by another professor of political science, but, to quote from the preface, "when a student of government begins to study the formation and control of public opinion by political parties, he comes early to a realization of the fact that no one can hope to understand the influence of parties upon opinion until, or unless, he studies the various other types of public control, for no one of the institutions affecting such control can be isolated as in a

vacuum." Professor Graves has drawn from the most significant contemporary writers upon opinion; they represent many fields of thought and learning, but the editor has unified them with notes and chapters of his own. The volume will interest all students of public opinion, and will be of value to many academic departments.

The introductory section contains chapters on the formation of personal opinion, the role of discussion, group opinion as related to public opinion, the conditions and scope of public opinion, hereditary and environmental influences upon opinion, and public opinion in the community. Part II, in its various chapters, studies the influence of the school, the church, the press, the theatre, literature, music, art, the spoken word, and the radio programs on public opinion. Part III presents the work of the public relations counsel, the influence of chambers of commerce, of the corporations and of labor, of trade, civic, and improvement associations, and of race upon opinion. The final section, devoted in general to government and public opinion, contains chapters on the reformer, the demagogue, the leader, the political party, freedom of speech, executive leadership in legislation, the administration of justice, censorship, public opinion on foreign affairs in a democracy, public opinion in war time, and international public opinion. The value of so encyclopaedic a book is greatly increased by the subject and author indexes.

The editor would not be likely to claim that all the material included is of equal value. Mr. Watson's exposition of behaviorism as originally presented in *Harper's* magazine, for example, is a journalistic treatment of a scientific subject, and there are numerous selections of like nature. In such a book, however, much is to be said for popular, rather than scientific, discussions. In the main the material is concrete, varied, and designed to interest the undergraduate. Clashing points of view are presented, though one does not read many chapters without suspecting Professor Graves of an intent to "liberalize" his students, whatever that may mean. The Topics for Further Investigation and Discussion at the end of each chapter present valuable bibliographies, are stimulating, and show that the editor has been over an enormous amount of material. They will provide excellent assignments for students in public speaking, debate, discussion, and dialectic.

Edward L. Bernays, whose earlier work, *Crystallizing Public Opinion,* set forth the activities of the Public Relations Counsel, has collected his essays in various periodicals under the title, *Propaganda.* While the book is propaganda for propaganda rather than a philosophical treatment of all the factors involved, it is an intelligent presentation of the case, and does not seem to overstate the benefits conferred upon society by certain types of publicity through the increased effectiveness of political leadership, a more intelligent understanding of business, education, social service, art, and science. The final chapter on the mechanism of propaganda is a rather hasty winding-up of the book. It must be admitted that the whole volume seems designed to create gratitude for, rather than understanding of, the propagandist.

H. D. Lasswell's volume is a well-documented, thoroughgoing study of the propaganda technique employed by the various governments in the World War in setting forth their own high aims, in fastening guilt upon the foe, in arousing hatred of the enemy through accounts of his atrocities, in creating the illusion of victory, in preserving friendship among the allies, and in demoralizing the enemy. Professor Lasswell assumes an objective, scientific attitude throughout, seeking neither to praise nor to blame, but to understand. The net result for one reader, however, was more indignation over the helpless plight of the individual than could have been produced by any rhetorical attack upon propaganda. A reading of this volume would do as much for peace as any attack upon war that has come to my notice. The note on bibliography will be extremely useful to all students of the subject.

When you study the means by which voters are persuaded through speeches, written or spoken, you are studying rhetoric. When you add the extraneous persuasive forces of party regularity, machines, subservience to money power, freedom from moral scruples, according to Mr. Kent, you have political behavior. "Looked at in the right light," says Mr. Kent, "politics is not an immoral game—it is merely unmoral." An application of this Machiavellian point of view to American politics results in the formulation of rules which are often disavowed, but usually practised. The frank acceptance of them, based upon the conviction that the American electorate is and will remain stupid and inert, Mr. Kent seems to believe, will result in more effective

campaigning, and will save the energy often wasted in reform movements which are so far out of touch with reality that they are foredoomed to failure. The chapters on the art of seeming to say something without doing so, on giving the public a good show, on "hokum," on name and face stuff, on getting attention from the press, are specifically rhetorical instruction. If incorporated into texts on rhetoric they would probably shock even those who will admit that rhetoric is as unmoral as politics. Perhaps the best place for such information is in Professor Shorey's course in preventive rhetoric.

EVERETT HUNT, *Swarthmore College*

Public Discussion and Debate. By A. CRAIG BAIRD. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1928: pp. iv, 370.

The statement with which the author begins his Preface indicates very clearly the purpose and scope of *Public Discussion and Debate:* "This book attempts to restate familiar argumentative principles in terms of present-day speech, logic, and psychology."

While the author proceeds along somewhat conventional lines, treating the principles usually considered in texts on argumentation, he has undoubtedly given us the clearest and most satisfactory exposition of the subject yet to appear.

A noticeable feature is the liberal use of illustrative material on practically every page of the book, thus clarifying, enforcing, and showing the practical application of the theory under discussion. Concerning the character of the illustrations, the author states in the Preface: "Since students learn best by examples close to their thinking and experience, I make no apology for the numerous illustrations drawn from contemporary life,—that of the campus and the present-day world. I have deliberately avoided extended excerpts from classical or older argumentative models, because years of experience as a teacher of debate in colleges have convinced me that students automatically ignore such passages. This text is a reflection of public thought and controversy at the time of writing. I have encouraged the students to grapple with these problems, and so to acquire genuine education."

The average student will welcome this feature and will study the text with an added interest, realizing that the principles he is studying have a practical application in his daily life.

Each chapter is followed by a longer and more varied list of exercises than is usually found in texts of this character. This will "permit wide opportunity for adaptation to the needs of individual classes." At the end of each chapter is a list of "References" which will be found helpful to instructors who may wish to asign collateral reading. A good bibliography is included at the end of the volume.

In the chapter on "The Brief and the Rhetorical Outline," the usual rules for brief drawing are presented, but the author has avoided extreme rigidity in his treatment of the subject. He stresses the brief as an essential step in preparation, and not as an outline from which a speech is to be made. "The process of adaptation to your audience will lead you to a method of development more or less different from the order of the brief." He answers those who object to "the woodenness of the resulting speech," by saying: "Even if these dull characteristics inevitably followed the brief, the formal outline would probably be justified. For the process, as suggested at the outset of this chapter, gives order to your thinking, clearness to your thought, logical sequence and definiteness of statement, and other rhetorical results that are no mean elements in an effective speech. If conviction and understanding may thus be obtained, a certain amount of ponderousness is excusable."

The author meets the criticism of students of logic "that the brief is 'based on the categorical syllogism and therefore does not fit all kinds of arguments. There is need for an alternative type of reasoning and method of arrangement.' This alternative type would not argue so much as it would set forth the situation in expository or narrative form." Professor Baird replies "It must be admitted that the brief does not contain *all* the material which a persuasive speaker would present to an audience; that the order in which the ideas are unfolded in the speech might be vastly different from the sequence of the brief. Nevertheless the brief such as has been proposed in this chapter forms a logical pattern of the argument that may well be used as a basis for the type of speech described by the critics."

"To meet the need for the inclusion of the expository or other compositional elements that do not find a place in the formal brief, the construction of the rhetorical outline is advised. The rhetorical

outline is a device that aims to set forth completely the processes of exposition and argument contained in a persuasive or informational speech or article.... This rhetorical outline, then, is in reality a combination of the analytical or expository outline, the argumentative brief, and the speaker's outline for delivery."

The book contains a somewhat more extended discussion of logic than is usually found in texts on argumentation and debating. The logical processes especially applicable to argumentation are quite adequately treated and well illustrated. The chapter on Deduction ends with a single paragraph on the "Practical Use of Syllogistic Reasoning." Since many students have difficulty in applying the rules of syllogistic reasoning to the arguments of every-day life, a fuller discussion of this subject would have been helpful.

The only weak section in the book is that part of the chapter on Delivery devoted to the discussion of Action and Voice. We question the wisdom of including in a work on argumentation these technical subjects, for which an entire volume is needed. In such a brief discussion only very broad generalities can be expressed, which are of little practical value to the student. He is told that he needs to acquire certain bodily and vocal technique, but for the most part he is left to use his own ingenuity concerning the means for gaining the desired ends. Every experienced instructor knows that such general instruction makes but slight impression on the average student.

The author's attempt to crowd much into a few paragraphs in this chapter occasionally results in some bad advice being given, as for example, "learn to listen to your own voice." Surely he does not intend to suggest that the student shall learn to listen to his own voice while speaking to an audience, but undoubtedly such would be the inference of the student from this short injunction. Would it not be rather disastrous to undertake to "listen to your own voice" while using the extemporaneous method of speaking, which the author so well advocates?

Regardless of this criticism on the last chapter, *Public Discussion and Debate* is a very satisfactory text, which undoubtedly will have a wide use.

CHARLES A. MARSH, *University of California at Los Angeles*

Principles of Effective Speaking: A Text for Colleges and Universities. By WILLIAM PHILLIPS SANDFORD AND WILLARD HAYES YEAGER. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1928: pp. xv, 416.

This is somewhat more than just another college text. It represents the work of men who are conscious of the tradition of their subject and are more or less at home in that tradition. Such a book is a creditable result of the graduate study of rhetoric which has so notably advanced in the past decade. It affords, in a way, a barometric reading of the atmosphere in which we work. Where the present authors show a failure in their mastery of the rhetorical tradition, that failure is usually one which is shared by their fellow-students. On the other hand, they frequently have gone beyond their compeers in assimilating the old with the new and the new with the old. They have learned most from Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, among the ancients. Whately and Campbell they mention in their preface; but it is quite evident that we have not here, and probably not elsewhere, got the meat from those writers. Rush's *Philosophy of the Human Voice* is recognized for the landmark it was. Of books published since 1900, Phillips' *Effective Speaking* and Winans' *Public Speaking* seem, on the evidence of this text, most firmly entrenched in the tradition. Interesting and valuable material has been taken from rhetorical studies by Professors Parrish and Lindsley published in the QUARTERLY JOURNAL.

When we turn to the contributions of the authors themselves, we find a notable preponderance of tri-partite divisions. The reduction of the five canons of classical rhetoric to the three of content, composition, and delivery, is perhaps unobjectionable; but "content" does not suggest the active process which rhetorical invention was and is. The reduction of the general ends of speaking to information, persuasion, and entertainment, is defensible and gets rid of a number of problems. The amplification of Winans' two essentials of conversational quality to the three "fundamentals of delivery"—sense of communication, sincerity, and animation—seems more questionable. The authors find five "elements of interestingness"—the vital, the familiar, the varied, the striking, and the concrete. This list will serve, though surely the striking and the varied overlap badly, and the familiar and the concrete

still more badly. The failure of the authors to wrestle with the question, "What is concrete?" results in some superficiality of treatment.

The authors' suggestions for outlining fill some of the most valuable and original pages in the book. The idea of indicating rhetorical treatment by marginal notes upon the logical outline seems excellent. But the section lacks illustration, with no complete outline of any kind printed. If the methods here explained have been used, why not give a specimen of the result?

Other minor criticisms may be listed briefly. The opening chapter, "Speaking as an Aid to Success," suggests the comment that still we do not seem to take ourselves for granted, but feel an obligation to sell our subject. In the list of specimen references, upon the subject "Correspondence Schools," the entries from the library card catalogue are confusing and rather useless without further data; those from periodicals are as bad, since they are merely titles of articles, with no regard to the names or dates of the magazines in which they appeared. The list is by no means a good model to set before students. Of the illustrative speeches in the Appendix, some readers will question whether the headline history and almanac science of "The Lost Arts" ought further to be disseminated and endorsed. But it *is* an effective speech, though in the present version its effectiveness is weakened by a debased and incoherent text of the last four paragraphs; a better text is to be found in *Modern Eloquence* and in Martyn's *Wendell Phillips*.

The style in which *Principles of Effective Speaking* is written, and the typography and format, leave little or nothing to be desired. The present reviewer gags at the reference to Colonel Lindbergh as "Lindy," but that may be his weakness. Proof errors are at the hardly reducible minimum. The omission of an index, however, is a fault hard to forgive.

But the shortcomings here pointed at are matched and overmatched by excellences. Professor Ketcham has good reason to be proud of this work, by two of his students, dedicated to him as one "who has been a leader in the application of the ancient principles of rhetoric to modern speaking."

HOYT H. HUDSON, *Princeton University*

The Art of Interpretative Speech. Principles and Practices of Effective Reading. By CHARLES H. WOOLBERT AND SEVERINA E. NELSON. New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1927: pp. vii, 385.

Not so many years ago teachers of interpretation were divided into two well-defined groups. One group held that interpretation should be approached through the mastery of techniques; the other, that if the students could only be brought to think the thought and feel the emotion all these other things would be added unto them. Between these two groups a great gulf was fixed; not so wide as to prevent the pasing back and forth of occasional arguments, but deep enough to prevent effective efforts at reconciliation. The authors of *The Art of Interpretative Speech* have approached the subject from the standpoint of the new psychology and offer what seems to me a practical method for utilizing the contributions of both "schools."

Book I is an exposition of how one thinks the thought, how vocal is related to subvocal speech, how the black marks on the page "stir up in us ideas by making us say sentences to ourselves." There are three main factors to consider in oral reading:

1. What the page symbols do to the interpreter.
2. The interpreter's skill in reading.
3. Recognition of the mental capacity and tastes of the listener.

As far as I know, this is the first textbook to lay the psychological foundations for the study of these three problems.

Book II is an explication of the techniques of impression and expression, based on the psychological principles set forth in Book I. Under "The Technique of Impression" there are chapters on logical and emotional meaning, logical setting, emotional setting, logical details, and emotional details. The part devoted to "The Technique of Expression" includes chapters on bodily activity, the technique of vocal quality, force, the rhythm of interpretation, pitch and melody in interpretation, and the art of interpretation. The chapter on bodily activity contains a good discussion of muscle tensions as a basis for the study of gesture.

The authors have provided "an abundance of literary material for class use, with plenty left over for public presentation." Along with selections from Shakespeare, Browning, Tennyson and other literary immortals, we find others from the best present-day

writers, among them De la Mare, Hagedorn, Lindsay, Sandburg, Sarett, and Untermeyer.

The method of using the literary material is not so apparent. Each teacher is left almost entirely to his own ingenuity and resources. Teachers of experience who are also masters of the art of interpretation will not regard this as a defect; they will work out their own courses to suit their own needs. But, in my estimation, the rest of us would welcome more of the methodology that the authors, as successful teachers of interpretation, could give.

The Art of Interpretative Speech is a distinct contribution to the pedagogy of our field. It is one of the books that no teacher of interpretation can afford to be without.

H. L. EWBANK, *Madison, Wisconsin*

Communicative Speaking. By J. STANLEY GRAY. Boston: Expression Co., 1928: pp. 299: $2.50.

To an age of many speech texts, but few good ones, Professor Gray has contributed another, designed especially for the high school or junior college. He presents his subject-matter in three parts: Speaking Habits, Debating, and Speech Construction. Some might question the place of debate in a general speech course but it is justified by the author as a means of developing extempore speaking. It might be noted that it has not always had that result in inter-high-school debating.

It is unfortunate that the book seems to have been written hurriedly. Perhaps incorrect spelling and poor sentence structure must be excused in the first edition, and this is reason enough to hope for a second. Disturbing inconsistencies have slipped into the text. For example: On page 37 occurs the statement, "A transition or movement on the platform to denote a transition or change in thought, should be well studied and practiced." But on page 38 is found this saner thought: "Studied, prearranged action is always mechanical and ineffective." The chapter on "Communicating the Meaning by Voice" is unimpressive. Therein, on page 48, is given a sentence to illustrate change in meaning due to change in pitch where there is every reason to believe it is more largely, if not entirely, due to phrasing. Of course the physiology of breathing and general vocal sound production is a

controversial matter. But when on page 52 Professor Gray attributes emotion to *sympathetic* nervous control it is important to point out that Allport's *Social Psychology* (p. 86) shows that this can refer only to unpleasant emotions. During pleasant emotions the cranio-sacral division holds sway, or, in a few cases, the cerebrospinal.

At the conclusion of Part I are printed two lectures, Conwell's "Acres of Diamonds" and Hedley's "The Sunny Side of Life," both of which are excellent for memory work; and each is divided into twenty selections. A chapter on criticism, just preceding these, presents some material of interest.

The author presents debating in a very practical way, taking the oportunity to include a brief lauding of the Oregon Plan. The student brief and the student speech included are good models. The whole section on debate is so well written it hardly seems we are reading from the same author. One might, however, question the explanation of rebuttal. Two steps are pointed out: 1. Showing the weakness of the opponent's argument; 2. Substituting another argument in place of it. It is not made clear that this second step should include showing the resulting effect upon the two cases.

Part III, on Speech Construction, is rather better written than Part I and has some good suggestions drawn from the author's experience. It seems indiscriminate to refer to the speech plan here as the "brief" when it is clearly shown to be different from the debate brief discussed in Part II. It will be fortunate for Mr. Gray if he escapes criticism for placing in a high-school text swearing and praying in the same emotional category, as he does on page 225.

One is exasperated by continual advice for the instructor, even carried to such extremes as, "the remedy lies with the teacher" (p. 248). There are many similar statements of no interest to the student and even with bad suggestion. When on page 163 the statement is made: "In 1916 when Wilson was re-elected president, most voters considered just one issue—'Is it wise to change presidents in this period of crisis'?" one feels the author has not acquainted himself with the issue of that campaign. Then again Profesor Gray has, on page 50, described the stage-frightened voice

as too *low* in pitch,—a description which observation does not bear out.

The subject-matter of the text can lay little claim to newness, and the book will not be criticized for being overly thorough. Many criticisms here presented are minor ones which can be corrected. After all, something must be expected of the instructor—perhaps this review has not done justice to *Communicative Speaking*. Its physical qualities are excellent, it is well bound, and the paper and print used make it very readable.

RUPERT L. CORTRIGHT, *Syracuse University*

How to Talk. By JOHN MANTLE CLAPP AND EDWIN A. KANE. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1928: pp. 631.

This book is not addressed to teachers of speech, and perhaps for that very reason is more stimulating than many another new book in the field. All too frequently we become so engrossed in applied psychology, applied logic, dramatic technique, the psysiology of the vocal cords, and the mysteries of phonetic symbols that we forget to ask ourselves: What is it all about, anyhow? What is talk? What does it mean to the ordinary mortal who spends eight hours a day in a business office and Sunday afternoon on the golf links? Professors Clapp and Kane answer some of those questions with downright common sense; and the results are frequently startling.

For instance, public speaking is given only 155 pages out of a total of 631. Why? The answer becomes evident when we follow the average man through a typical day. In the morning, perhaps, he has to make a report to his boss on a drainage project and then tell the foreman of a ditch-digging gang what to do. Then he takes part in a conference with other employees or with representatives of competing business houses. At noon he may go to luncheon with several other members of a business men's club. In the afternoon he meets other members of a committee to build a new school-house. Perhaps he has to preside at the meeting. In the evening he has to talk to his wife and correct or punish his children. Or he may have to engage in social conversation with friends of the family. The opportunity to make a public speech may not come more than once a year, and even then he can successfully evade the responsibility nine times out of ten. In other

words, those of us who consider public speaking as highly important and conversation as rather unimportant simply don't know what's going on in the world. Professors Clapp and Kane set us right by giving three of the four main sections of their book to speech in business life, speech growing out of social and professional relations, and speech in private hours.

Their method of approach is, in general, to elaborate the principle that the effective talker is the one who adapts his ideas to the other fellow. If you have to make a report to your boss, consider first, how much he knows about the specific problem and second, precisely what he wants to learn from you. If you do this, your report will be clear and concise. If you have to discipline your six-year-old son, try to discover first what his motive was in stealing the jam. Then you can punish him sensibly and equitably. If you have to make a public speech, think of yourself as a member of the audience and imagine what you would need or expect or like to hear.

The authors amplify this skeleton, not with principles of audience psychology, but with hundreds of pertinent illustrations taken from actual everyday experience. For instance, they give fourteen specific examples of good openings for public speeches without any reference at all to the principles of attention. Whether this method would serve for a textbook is open to question, but there can be no doubt that it does a great deal to make this book a readable manual for the ordinary man and a storehouse of useful illustrations for the teacher of speech.

RAYMOND F. HOWES, *Washington University*

A Bibliography of the Phi Beta Kappa Society. By CLARK SUTHERLAND NORTHUP (now President of the national Phi Beta Kappa Society). New York: The Elisha Parmele Press, 1928. pp. viii, 328.

The chief interest of this thoroughgoing work for readers of the JOURNAL is indicated by a sentence in the Preface: "A large number of our best public addresses, and a respectable number of poems of merit, have been delivered originally before gatherings of the Phi Beta Kappa; and thus the aims and ideals of the Society have found expression in literature of enduring excellence."

In turning over the pages of the bibliography one will note references to many speeches of interest. Pages 88-99, for example, give references to addresss by Edward Everett, Jared Sparks, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Charles Sumner, Horace Bushnell, George William Curtis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Charles Francis Adams, Theodore Dwight Woolsey, Thomas Francis Bayard, Wendell Phillips, Carl Schurz, Charles W. Eliot, Richard C. Jebb, Daniel Coit Gilman and other notable men. One is also told where to find these addresses, often in several different works, and also where may be found comments, reviews and replies. Probably the most interesting example is the note on Emerson's "The American Scholar," pp. 91-93. There are named twenty different works which contain this address, most of which will be found in a good library. References are given also to comments on the address by Henry van Dyke, Stuart P. Sherman, Bliss Perry, William Henry Channing, O. W. Holmes, Richard Garnett, and others, and to notes on the occasion by James Russell Lowell, Bliss Perry and Lionel Crocker. Thus thanks to the research of Professor Northup the teacher of public speaking is given a most helpful start on the critical study of this famous oration.

Incidentally the reviewer learns from a note concerning the dinner of the Phi Beta Kappa at the meeting before which Emerson delivered "The American Scholar," that Edward Everett Hale published an article on "Dinner Speaking" in the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1867.

On the whole, one decides, this is a book worth having within handy reach.

J. A. WINANS, *Dartmouth College*

Crowell's Dictionary of English Grammar and Handbook of American Usage. By MAURICE H. WEEKEEN. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1928: pp. ix, 703.

This book has two significant aims. The first is to bring some order into the terminology of literature, rhetoric, prosody and grammar. The second is to create a guide to American usage. These two aims are quite distinct, yet all the definitions are indexed together. This mechanical feature is unfortunate because the book gives an impression of formlessness as a result of it. Another mechanical feature, the printing, is also unfortunate. It lacks a cer-

tain dignity and grace that might have been helpful in creating a more distinguished atmosphere for the book as a whole. While considering these structural features, it might be well to mention that pronunciations are seldom given. This is not only inconsistent with the simplification of much of the material, but it seriously limits the usefulness of the book to the layman.

We must be grateful to Mr. Weseen for the service rendered by compiling a dictionary of grammar. It is now possible to have at hand one book that will throw light on many, if not most, of the problems of terminology of language and literature.

The secondary aim of this book, the creation of a handbook of American usage, is not quite so successfully realized as is the primary aim. Perhaps this criticism results from comparing the present book with Fowler's unbelievably great work on English usage. However, much that is distinctly American in speech is here set down, and we should welcome this achievement, even if we believe that it is not adequate in many respects.

FRANKLIN FOLSOM, *Swarthmore College*

The Influence of the Audience on Shakespeare's Drama. By ROBERT BRIDGES. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927; pp. x, 29.

Since the laureate author announces that to him the typographical experiments embodied in this brochure "are of more interest than the matter," these may be considered first. Readers acquainted with Robert Bridges' prose must know that some decades ago he devised a phonetic alphabet for English, striving to make his symbols at once serviceable, comely, and reminiscent of English manuscript tradition. In the brochure at hand, the first part of a new edition of the author's essays, a beginning has been made toward the use of this phonetic alphabet. Here the following changes from ordinary spelling are introduced: a symbol which might be called a tailed *i* is used for the diphthongal sound usually called long *i*; a tailed *n*, resembling the International phonetic symbol, is used for the sound usually spelled *ng;* the mute final *e* is dropped where the preceding vowel is short, giving us the forms "hav" and "giv," "infinit" but "finite"; mute *g* (but not mute *n*) is dropped from words like "might" and "height"; a script *a* is used for the long Italian sound of that letter; a script *g* is used for the hard sound, and a print *g* for the soft. Some incon-

sistencies result from these changes; but the resultant text, in the excellent font here used, is pleasant to the eye and not at all difficult to read. What is more, Mr. Bridges implies that in essays yet to be reprinted he will gradually expand his use of phonetic spelling; we may assume that the last essay to appear will be printed entirely in the symbols of his choice.

Turning to the study of Shakespeare and his audience, we find that Mr. Bridges has assumed that all the good of Shakespeare came out of his own artistic self, while whatever came from a desire to please his audience was bad. "Shakespeare should not be put into the hands of the young," he concludes, "without a warning that the foolish things in his plays were written to please the foolish, the filthy for the filthy, and the brutal for the brutal; and that, if out of veneration for his genius we are led to admire or even to tolerate such things, we may be thereby not conforming ourselves to him, but only degrading ourselves to the level of his audience, and learning contamination from those wretched beings who can never be forgiven their share in preventing the greatest poet and dramatist of the world from being the best artist. Is it not possible that "those wretched beings" also were responsible for a few of the excellences of the dramatist? For example, did not he write his best poetical passages in speeches which answered a popular demand for rhetorical exhibition on the stage? Mr. Bridges appears to have done only half—and that perhaps the less important half—of the work called for by his title.

H. H. H.

The Art of Playwriting. Lectures delivered at the University of Pennsylvania on the Mask and Wig Foundation. Philadelphia: the University of Pennsylvania Press: 1928.

This book prints handsomely the following lectures which constituted a course running from February to May of 1928: "Writing and Playwrighting" by Jesse Lynch Williams; "Substance and Art in the Drama" by Langdon Mitchell; "The Carving of the Ivory" by Lord Dunsany; "A Play is Presented" by Gilbert Emery; "The Construction of a Play" by Rachel Crothers. Professor Arthur Hobson Quinn has good cause for the gratification which he expresses in his Foreword. These lectures are stimulat-

ing; they are rich with lessons of experience; they are varied, but there is, underlying their variety, a unity of purpose and devotion.

H. H. H.

The Oxford Recitations. With a Preface by JOHN MASEFIELD. New York: The MacMillan Company: 1928: $1.50.

For readers of the JOURNAL, perhaps the most interesting part of this book will be the Preface, which brings up to date the story of the Oxford Contests in Verse-Speaking, founded by John Masefield in 1923. The founder expresses the hope that hereafter these occasions may take the form of festivals: "perhaps only one of the three days will be given over to contests; the other two days may be given to displays of spoken poetry by those who have won prizes or distinction in the contests hitherto held."

The readings set to contestants in last year's competition, here printed, consist of the following: *Love in the Desert,* a brief play in verse, for two women, by Laurence Binyon; *A Parting* and *The Return,* brief dramatic dialogues likewise for two women, by Gordon Bottomley; Polyxena's speech and the Meessenger's speech from the *Hecuba* of Euripides, translated by John Masefield. Some of us cannot but mourn the apparent displacing of lyrical by dramatic poetry in last year's contest; though, to be sure, there are lyrical portions in all these poems.

H. H. H.

Power Control. By H. S. RAUSHENBUSH AND HARRY W. LAIDLER. New York: New Republic, Inc., 1928: $1.

We wish to acknowledge the receipt of this book and to say that it will be of supreme usefulness to anyone concerned with a debate upon its subject. However, the QUARTERLY JOURNAL has such a task on its hands in keeping up with books in its already broad field that it cannot engage to review those upon specific public questions.

H. H. H.

Contemporary Speeches

[Contributions for this department should be sent to V. E. Simrell, Dartmouth College.]

ORATORY OF THE 1928 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

In looking over Al Smith's speeches—a very interesting antiquarian research—one finds two conspicuous errors. The first is the frequent prophecy of an overwhelming Democratic victory on November 6. The second is the repeated declaration that a campaign is a debate. Mr. Smith did his best to make both errors turn out to be truths, but Mr. Hoover was too much for him. Mr. Hoover would not debate and would not be beaten.

One is tempted immediately to suggest that one reason Mr. Hoover was not beaten was that he would not debate. The value of vagueness, the persuasiveness of generalities, the certainty that specific arguments, such as make up the bulk of Mr. Smith's speeches, are going to alienate large numbers of voters who could be held by "moral committals": these have all been discussed at length by political observers. There remains the fact that a poker face doesn't deserve much credit for winning with a royal flush. Mr. Hoover had the cards from the beginning, and the mere victory does not prove the skill of his game. It is true that the first Republican president was the last Republican president to carry on a campaign at all resembling a debate, and that his successors have gone far to identify effective campaigning with grandiloquent generalities. But it is also true that the Democrats have usually followed the same method and lost. Smith's style of campaigning is as far from Bryan's as Hoover's is from Lincoln's; but though establishing a precedent equally new to both winners and losers (or perhaps reviving a precedent which has been forgotten since Lincoln) Smith won more votes than any previous Democrat and influenced more votes than any politician in history.

The will to vote, whether for him or against him, was Smith's real accomplishment. For the first time in a number of years vot-

ing was not a duty but a pleasure, and if one may assume that where a man's talk is there will his vote be also, it seems probable that Smith determined most of the votes. Considering the number of new voters in this campaign, and the enormous proportion of the adult citizenry who do not ordinarily vote, we may question whether the ability to *interest* people is not, for the present and future, a much more important factor in a presidential campaign than has been generally supposed.

A democracy might now be called a tyranny of radio loudspeakers. A larger public is brought into contact with the campaign, but not only the public, the political orators, too, are subject to the new despotism. Tiresome speeches are likely to be turned off for a more entertaining program; slogans or arguments repeated are devitalized; emotional appeals may overcome reason, but reason reenforced by static decimates their power; there are no psychological crowds, and persuasion is rendered immeasurably more difficult when the immediate persuader is a mechanical instrument. Attention is the prime necessity, not only for the single speech but for the whole campaign. The campaign becomes less a series of speeches, more a single speech in installments. The speech that fails to interest its audience reduces in advance the audience of the next speech by that candidate. On the other hand, vote-getting is made more dependent upon cumulative and indirect influences. If any one would realize more clearly the two methods which modern political oratory must more and more abandon, and which Hoover and Smith both, with increasing success as the campaign progressed, tended to avoid, he should compare the speeches of the candidates with the keynote speeches of the party conventions. The Republican speech is insufferably dull. Any candidate who tried to carry on a presidential campaign of such speeches would almost immediately lose an overwhelming majority of his radio audience, some fourteen or fifteen million potential votes. The Democratic keynote is fascinating, thrilling, and absurd. With its immediate audience it was a tremendous success, but over the radio it sounded curiously anachronistic, already a selection from some anthology of orations. Its rodomontades start shivers in the spine, but no convictions in the head.

A contemporary political scientist has defined political oratory as the "dramatic expression of the sentiment or interest of large

groups of voters . . . fusing a logical formula, an economic interest and a social habit or predisposition in a personality." Persuasion is noticeably neglected in this definition, and with good reason, for as every one knows it is a rare thing for a voter to make up his ballot on the basis of the speeches he has heard. Indeed, if we were to take the last words of the two candidates at their face value, neither Hoover nor Smith wanted to influence anybody's choice. The substance of their final prayer to The People was "Thy will not mine be done."

Theoretically, vote-getting in a democracy should depend upon the candidates's ability to discover the will of the majority and his willingness and ability to execute it. But if the majority does not express its will, either through failure to vote or failure to study the issues which it is to decide, it is because the majority is not interested in the election and its issues. Then the candidate's success depends upon his ability to divide the interested minority in his favor. The larger part of the interested minority can be depended upon to support the *status quo,* since they are the people who established the *status quo* or continued it at the last previous election. A change generally depends upon interesting new voters, not converting old ones but drawing new recruits from the uninterested majority. The candidate of the "Ins" may hold his majority of the minority by vagueness, by "moral committals" to carry on. Alienation of his supporters is the chief danger, a danger he is likely to incur if he tries to interest new voters. The candidate of the "Outs," on the other hand, needs to interest the uninterested majority even at the cost of alienating many of his own supporters. Then his success depends, first, upon such "dramatic expression" of logical formulae, economic interests, and social habits as will arouse the public from indifference, and second, his ability to foresee which way the majority of the newly aroused public is going to react to any particular fusion of formulae, interests, and habits. The latter is the candidate's function as a politician, the former his function as a political orator. Whether Smith foresaw the public reaction or not, there can be no doubt that he did arouse a new electorate.

There were complicating factors in the campaign which should be recognized in this connection. Hoover had several very able campaigners who could stir up new business for him while he con-

served what he already had. Borah talked to the farmers, Hughes to the cities, Mrs. Willebrandt to the women and preachers. Borah and Hughes and Mrs. Willebrandt could take the subjects most likely to interest their respective audiences and treat them as definitely and clearly and dramatically as they wished. If their treatment was received with favor, there might be more votes for Hoover. If it was not pleasing, why Hoover didn't make those speeches! What man or woman in his senses would vote *against* Hoover because of something Mrs. Willebrandt had said? But Smith did most of his own campaigning, and every speech he made risked the alienation of *a priori* supporters and the provocation of new enemies in order to win the interest of new voters.

Hoover's personal record, moreover, doubtless interested a great many new voters whom his speeches would never have touched.

On the other hand, it is hard to say how many people were drawn by Smith's eloquence and how many by his showmanship. He frequently had difficulty in keeping the enthusiasm of his audiencies from passing the listening point. There were probably many others who were aroused less by Smith's speeches than by his record as Governor of New York, his religion, his opposition to Prohibition.

There were plenty of people who voted for the first time and irregular voters who voted in this election for other reasons than the candidates' speeches. But when all these reservations are made, the campaign of 1928 remains largely significant for its demonstration of the increasing importance of speeches by the candidates and the power of a sort of campaign oratory altogether different from the campaign oratory of recent years.

No president, since it became proper for a presidential candidate to campaign for himself, has ever won an election with as few speeches as Mr. Hoover made in this campaign. But that means anything but the decreasing importance of campaign speeches. It means that, with the help of Mr. Hoover's opponent, in respect to the number of listeners, the effect on the electorate, and the thoroughness of the discussion of issues, six or seven speeches in this campaign did the work, and more, of several times that number in previous campaigns. No presidential candidate, successful or unsuccessful, has ever presented as complete and definite and

universally intelligible and interesting analysis of as many complex issues as Mr. Smith presented in this campaign. His failure in spite of that fact does not mean that his sort of campaign oratory is ineffective. It means that campaign speeches may arouse an indifferent public to take an active interest in the election, but that once that interest is aroused the choice of candidates depends less on the speeches than on the influences of social and economic environment.

V. E. S.

CLARENCE DARROW vs. RABBI M. M. FEUERLICHT: *Debate, Is Man a Machine?* Cadle Tabernacle, Indianapolis, October 17, 1928.

A controversy, centuries old, which first flared disturbingly in the Age of Reason—which was argued brilliantly and sometimes bitterly by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Lamettrie—is here carried to a popular assembly by two well-known men of our time.

It was more than a debate. It was a conflict between two opposing philosophies. Therefore, unlike a skillful debate upon an ordinary, narrow, and precisely defined question, there was but little direct clash of evidence and of minor argument; but few attempts at *coup de main;* and no challenges by question. Instead, here was the slow, ponderous, but powerful attack of one whole philosophy against another.

Darrow opened the case and moved at once to the issue at stake: *Is man different from all other animals of the universe, or is he kin?* Then, with an inductive, "this-or-nothing" argument, he unfolded his pessimistic and fatalistic philosophy:

> 1. Man comes from two cells; every single step of the development from these two cells unto the whole man can be measured. Therein is found no evidence of a soul.
> 2. Man in his activities, performs as any other machine—he converts fuel into energy; we can measure from fuel consumed the amount that goes into waste and into labor—even unto weighing the force of our thoughts. This is also true of trees, vegetables, and cows. In all, when you stop the fuel, you stop the organism.
> 3. In the evolution of this earth, life began with a single cell and developed into complex organism; there is no break between organic and inorganic life; the chain is continuous from lowest to highest, with no resting place, with nothing

that exists in man not also existing in other life—even the so-called "thinking," which appears in both plants and lower animals. All can be measured and weighed.
Q. E. D. Man is a machine.

Rabbi Feuerlicht marshalled the force of an opposing philosophy against this fatalism. It was not the answer of Religion versus Reason, but of Religion *and* Reason. If in it one hears the overtones of Kant, Huxley, and of James, nevertheless it bears the intensely personal stamp of the speaker:

1. The theory of Mr. Darrow is old. It assumes that God, in an idle moment, flung out the universe—and now lets it spin without hindrance, control, or reason for its spinning. A strange assumption!

2. If man is a machine, he is a poor one. By no means is he the equal, as a machine, of other machines of his own creation—the televox comtometer, etc. Yet man not only invented, but must also direct, these machines. Plainly, a machine lacks something which a man possesses.

3. The attributes of man transcend those of any machine. He possesses a consciousness, a moral right to self determination, a will, courage, imagination, purpose, soul. The achievements of a Byrd, of a Lindbergh, cannot be explained by a mechanistic theory but only by acknowledging man to be possessed of attributes found in no other machine.

Darrow was equally at home in the use either of scientific or theological data. Feuerlicht, on the other hand, while he seemed well versed in the scientific data which he touched on—yet made no attack whatever upon the scientific foundation of Darrow's argument, although it seemed to the reviewer to invite a most obvious assault against its whole foundation.

Highlights of effective phrases, question, or good-natured humor were:

DARROW: Where did the soul come from? From the Mother's cell? Then there were 10,000 cells and 10,000 souls. Where did the rest go? From the Father's cell? There were a million cells and a million souls; think of the dead souls it took to make you. From the union of the two cells. Then a hen's egg would have a soul.

He says a man has "free will." How does he get that way? What woman wants to be over 18 years old? Why doesn't she stay that age, if she has free will? That kind of free will means that I am free to get anything I want—if I don't want anything I can't get.

Our earth is so small in this great universe that if a man ever got off of it, he could never find it to get on again. Yet we humans think we are the perfect center of the universe. This is not thinking—it is only *proudflesh*.

FEUERLICHT: In beginning this debate, I feel as the man who read the advertisement, "Wanted: Man to sell live-wire products. Profits guaranteed to the *undertaker*." But remembering Mr. Darrow's record of depriving many an undertaker of many a well-earned victim, I proceed in confidence.

(Referring to Darrow's hoarse voice) The machine squeaks tonight. No doubt it needs oiling.

The mechanists' theory is easy on the conscience. It allows us to lay our personal faults on our grandmother's mechanism.

Six thousand people came, heard, applauded, and left with unaltered convictions.

WILLIAM NORWOOD BRIGANCE, *Wabash College*

Graduate Study and Research

[Contributions and suggestions for this department should be sent to Charles H. Woolbert, University of Iowa.]

The Content of the Teaching of Speech in the American College Before 1850: With Special Reference to its Influence on Present-Day Theories. By CHARLES A. FRITZ. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. New York University. 1928.

The problem undertaken in this dissertation was two-fold: (1) to discover what training in speech was given in the early colleges of this country and the content of the teaching, (2) to show the relation of our present teaching to the theories of the early period. The work thus divides itself into two parts.

Part I

The catalogues of twenty-two early colleges were examined to find what work in speech was given and what texts were used. Additional information was secured from literature pertaining to the period, from the rules and statutes of the early colleges, and from various documents. All of the texts and sources of subject matter used in the colleges were thoroughly analysed as to content. All but one of the early texts were available and through their study the writer was able to trace the development of the theories of elocution and rhetoric. Much of Part I is concerned with the evolution of the theories of speech—particularly the rise of English elocutionary theories.

Only the broader aspects of the findings can be indicated here. Speech training held a very important place in the early colleges of this country, in fact every college of the Eighteenth Century made provision for training in public address. Until the middle of the Eighteenth Century all forensic exercises were carried on in Latin and Greek and the study of Aristotle, Cicero, Longinus and Quintilian was required of every student. After the middle of the century, however, students began delivering their declamations and

debates in English. These exercises were an important part of every course of study.

The most popular texts on elocution in the early years were those of Thomas Sheridan and John Walker. These men were pioneers in the study of elocution and their work is interesting for that reason, particularly that of Walker. Their theories were carried forward in the colleges through the texts of various American writers until Dr. James Rush's *Philosophy of the Human Voice* was published in 1827. This was the first scientific treatment of the nature and function of the vocal mechanism. This together with Austin's *Chironomia* (1806), the first exhaustive treatment of action, changed the whole teaching of elocution, for most of the texts in the latter part of our period were based upon these books.

Rhetoric was separated from elocution in the early colleges and was the more important of the two studies. Rhetoric of course connoted oral composition, for it was not until the latter part of our period that any considerable instruction in writing was given. The works of the ancient rhetoricians gave way to English texts which followed the ancients closely, but adapted their principles to changed conditions. The most popular of these were the works of Stirling, Blair, Campbell and Whately. One chapter of the thesis is given to the theories of the various writers on rhetoric.

Part II

For the consideration of our present teaching and its relation to the early period it was necessary first to make an exhaustive study of the work given in the colleges today. By means of information secured through an examination of the courses of study of sixty-five colleges and through questionnaires, a survey was made of the organization of speech courses at the present time. This shows the great multiplicity of courses in contrast to the two courses of the early period, the subdivision of the field of speech into various specialized fields, the lack of agreement as to what should be taught in any course and even as to what courses should be given.

Through the study of modern speech literature an attempt was made to trace the relation of present theories to those of the early period. For various principles of both elocution and rhetoric, it was shown that we depend closely upon the early writers. Particularly is this seen in the influence of Dr. Rush.

The outstanding developments in the present-day teaching of speech are: (1) the modern conception of the purpose and method of speech training in its dependence upon behavioristic psychology and involving the idea of training in speech as training in personality; (2) the newer tendencies in the teaching of delivery, with their emphasis upon the more natural style both in voice and action; (3) the insistence upon the adaptation of the speech to the audience in language, in defining of purpose, in appeal to fundamental interests, and in gaining and holding the hearers' attention; (4) the changed conception of persuasion as considered in the light of later psychological principles.

While the writer has limited the study to the colleges, he does not mean to minimize the work done by the early secondary schools. The part played by these schools in the training of speakers was very important and should furnish a fruitful source for future investigations. Many of them gave more intensive training in speech than did the colleges, and when the higher institutions after the middle of the Nineteenth Century refused to recognize speech training as an academic subject, it was the secondary schools which carried on the work.

An Introductory Study in the History of the Teaching of Public Speaking in the United States. By ANTHONY F. BLANKS. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Stanford University. 1928.

In dealing with the history of the teaching of speech in the United States from 1636 to the present the hypothesis maintained is two-fold. First, it is maintained that there is a well-defined, unbroken educational tradition involved, and that this tradition was imported with the classics direct from the English Universities that had inherited it from the older Continental Universities, and that in its ultimate analysis this tradition was Greek in origin. Second, it is maintained that ths tradition has been upheld by instructors of academic standing, many of them men of very great reputation in this and in closely allied fields of scholarly and public activity; that their instruction has been built upon experimentation and research that has been fully abreast of each period concerned and has constantly manifested itself by the publication of textbooks in this field which have kept pace with the advancement

of human knowledge and have met the changing demands of a more and more complex civilization.

In presenting the first point a detailed inspection has been made of such original documents as faculty reports, trustees' reports, private correspondence, diaries, broadsides, memoirs, and catalogues which throw light upon the courses, texts, instructors, classroom methods and student attitude toward speech instruction since 1636.

In support of the second point more than eighty texts have been critically examined, some dating from the middle of the sixteenth century. The texts antedating the founding of Harvard (1636) were a necessary link in the chain as they were the educational inheritance brought from England into the Colonies by President Dunster and became the basis upon which the curriculum of every American educational institution was founded.

The eighty texts in themselves furnish a fascinating story of the progress of speech instruction since 1551 in England, and since 1636 in America. It has been the purpose of the dissertation to weave the story of these texts into a unified narrative, almost in their own language, enabling the reader to talk almost face to face with these old-time schoolmasters as they hand down the rhetorical traditions of their ancestors, adding there to their own accretions of experience and experiment.

From time to time these text books summarize in an amazing way the progress of speech instruction. They tell how the systems of Aristotle, Quintilian and Cicero have always been the criteria of speech; how there grew up a demand for somewhat more practical and accurate application of the classic ideals to the needs of mid-eighteenth century England, and how Sheridan, Walker, Steele and Austin wrote to supply this need; how the English curriculum of Cambridge and Oxford was transplanted to the Colonies; how in their rapidly expanding life, a pioneer people rewrote these texts; how, after Walker and Austin, many systems of notations sprang up in the teaching of speech which led to the school described as "Mechanical"; how in 1827, due to the research of James Rush and the advancement in the physiology and the philosophy of voice, leadership passes from England to America; how the scientific work of Rush was adapted to various conditions by scores of teachers; how the "Imitative" schools developed; how the influ-

ence of Delsarte manifested itself in the synthetic voice philosophies of Moses True Brown and Fulton and Trueblood; how S. S. Curry moulded the inspirational teaching systems of the last quarter of the nineteenth century; how readily speech instruction accepted the modern laboratory and psychological methods; how Departments of Speech have been established in all leading schools; how widely the field of speech instruction has been extended; how it has responded to all the practical as well as cultural needs of a vast population; how it has always shown itself an active influence in the training of men and women for duties of citizenship; how its curricula have been enlarged and enriched until it stands upon a par in degree-granting power with coordinate departments in many universities.

Along with the foregoing narrative has been carried the collateral story of the evolution of the general college curriculum since 1636. This narrative shows that speech instruction has been an integral part of this college curriculum and that it has immediately responded to the same influences that have changed the general curriculum.

Among the important educational documents that have been closely examined, especially as they related to speech instruction, are the Laws of President Henry Dunster of Harvard in 1642; The Program of the First Provost of the University of Pennsylvania in 1756; The Yale Faculty Report of 1827-8; The First General Announcement of Cornell University, 1867; The Harvard College Reforms of 1869-70.

The examination of these documents with the very detailed information afforded by other college documents and publications, ties the history of speech instruction up inseparably with the common course of cultural education in the colleges and universities of the United States, and shows that that is where it indubitably belongs and not in the misty purlieus of charlatans and professorial pretenders where a conspiracy of misunderstanding and misrepresentation once tended to force it.

Thomas Wilson's "Arte of Rhetorique." By R. H. WAGNER. Abstract of a dissertation presented at Cornell University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

The dissertation reperesented by this abstract is a critical study of Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique.* It is found to be

neither a 'system of criticism', as Warton has called it, nor a work on style deserving only of antiquarian interest, as Mair, editor of the only reprint since 1585, regards it, but the first adequate treatise designed to make available to Englishmen the suggestions on public speaking of classical rhetoric. It is part of that cultural movement by which sixteenth century England recaptured and adapted for its own use the ideas of antiquity.

Wilson's interest in rhetoric, and particularly in the production of an English treatise on the art, is to be explained partly by the traditional emphasis on rhetoric in the education of the time, partly by the influence of his teachers at Cambridge, and partly by the traditional emphasis on rhetoric in the education of the time, partly by the influence of his teachers at Cambridge, and partly by the needs of the age. Throughout the work Wilson shows great interest in ecclesiastical rhetoric, drawing freely on the art of preaching to be found in Erasmus.

Wilson's own definition of rhetoric as an art of discourse is the only proper key to the nature of his subject. In the main his interest is in oral discourse. He deliberately avoids any statements which would reduce rhetoric to style and ornamentation of language, which it had meant, on the whole, in England up to his time, and which was the meaning he in effect had given it in his earlier *Arte of Logike*. Poetics and rhetoric are carefully kept distinct. He is not, however, always careful to discriminate between oral and written discourse. In the first book especially, he shows the influence of the *ars dictaminis* of the later Middle Ages.

We miss in Wilson a number of conceptions of classical rhetoric, notably the ethical and the logical means of persuasion. Pathetic proof is given an important place, but is kept secondary to amplification, which Wilson felt to be one of the most valuable lessons he could impart.

The basis of Wilson's structure is Latin rhetorical theory; he adopts the classical division of speeches by kinds. In respect of the demonstrative and judicial types he differs little from his classical sources. The deliberative speech, however, did not mean to him legislative or political oratory.

The fivefold classification by process dominant in Cicero and Quintilian, rather than the kinds, afforded Wilson a framework for the whole treatise. Invention is the subject of the first book and meant to him, as to the ancients, the finding of the topics of places

Disposition in the broad classical sense of adaptation of matter to particular situations, is the subject of the second book, although it is discussed under that name in but a few pages at the end.

Style *(elocutio)* is divided into the qualities of plainness, aptness, composition and ornamentation *(exornatio,)* which are probably adapted from Cicero or the treatise *Ad Herennium*. For his treatment of memory, Wilson paraphrases and adapts a system of training found in the treatise *Ad Herennium*. The discussion of delivery *(pronuntiatio)* is brief and perfunctory.

Wilson was indebted for most of his ideas to Cicero, Quintilian, the *Auctor ad Herennium* and Erasmus. From Cicero he took his general conception and the materials for the extended sections on humor and on figures. The debt to Quintilian is relatively small and confined mainly to unimportant items. To the *Ad Herennium* and Erasmus he owed far more than has been supposed. From the former work, which he no doubt thought to be Cicero's, he took the discussion of judicial oratory, the introduction (entrance), memory and many smaller sections.

To Erasmus he owed not only the bodies of theody used in deliberative oratory and amplification, but a variety of allusions and illustrations throughout. His remarks on poetics and literary criticism, and his comments on the Patriotic writers, which are generally suposed to be original, and the views on poetry attributed to Plutarch and St. Basil, are all taken from Erasmus. Most important, however, his own method of amplification and use of examples he caught from Erasmus' *De Copia Verborum, De Conscribendis Epistolis* and *De Ratione Concionandi.*

Among other writers whom Wilson used was Cox, the author of the *Arte or Crafte of Rhethoryke*, the first (though quite inadequate) work of its type in English. He quotes from Livy, Ovid, Horace, Pliny the Younger, Valerius Maximus and Aulus Gellius among the ancients, Heywood and Udall among the Renaissance writers. Besides these the Bible and the apocryphal scriptures furnish countless *sententiae* and brief examples.

Wilson is eclectic in his use of sources. He is also mainly selective and guarded in his use of material. He usually takes what he desires, or what is immediately essential and does not include unnecessary matter.

Complete collation of all the texts has not been possible; but

examination of the Newberry Library's copy of the edition of 1553 shows that the changes in the edition of 1560 (which Mair presumes to be extensive and important) were actually few and insignificant. Wilson confined himself to adding examples which total approximately four pages. The only other changes are subtractions and additions in the Index. In a large number of cases the readings of the edition of 1553 clarify the text as presented by Wilson, and these have been collected in an appendix. A recent acquisition of the Cornell University Library adds another to the eight editions previously known: the title page is lost, but an examination and comparison show that it is of a different printing from any of the foliated editions.

Burke's Reading. By ARTHUR L. WOEHL. Abstract of a dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Cornell University, 1928.

The dissertation which this abstract represents deals with the direct evidence as to Burke's reading. That evidence is found in the curricula of the school and college he attended, in his references in works and letters, and in the memoirs of those who knew him. In the main, inferences as to Burke's reading, based on the popularity of a given work in his time, are avoided.

It is found that Burke was early and specially familiar with the Bible and the classics. His formal education included some study of logic and the philosophical works of Locke, some acquaintance with physics and astronomy, but not much with mathematics. In his youth he was fond of romances: *Don Bellianis of Greece, Palmerin of England, Don Quixote.* In college he read, privately, much history, including that of "his own poor country." His familiarity with the ancient historians is evinced by numerous references in his earliest published writing. He read much in plays, especially Shakespeare, Jonson, and the Restoration dramatists.

Burke's reading in Greek included Homer, from whom he quotes most freely, Sophocles and Euripides, the latter of whom he prefers, Theocritus, Pindar, Musaeus. Plato apparently was read less than Aristotle. To Herodotus there is no clear reference; of the other historians and biographers, Xenophon and Plutarch are oftenest referred to. Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Isocrates he

had read. Isaeus he came to know as late as 1779. Longinus he refers to or quotes at various periods in his life. References are found to Julian, Epictetus, Lucian, John of Damascus, Aesop. A reference to Pausanias, on inspection, reflects Burke's familiarity with Addison.

Of Latin writers, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Lucretius, and Cicero were most in Burke's mind. Terence was probably read entire; Plautus is less frequently mentioned; the fragments of Publilius Syrus were admired. Lucan and Juvenal are more often referred to than Martial or Persius. Tacitus was a permanent possession, but numerous references indicate a wide familiarity with the other historians. Burke alludes at least once to Petronius, Vitruvius, Seneca, Augustine, Celsus, Paulus, Callistratus, Aulus Gellius.

Burke knew the works of Alfred and of Bede, especially the latter's *Ecclesiastical History* and the *De Rerum Natura*. There is no indication that he read Chaucer; his reading in the Middle English period seems to have been confined to historians and historical documents. Spenser he approved as giving "a strong hold of the English language." From Spenser on, his reading in English literature follows the main current: Shakespeare, Jonson, Bacon, Milton, Dryden, Pope, Addison. Evidence is not lacking, however, of diversified reading among the minor authors: Daniel, Drummond of Hawthornden, Buchanan, Cowley, Roscommon, Bolingbroke. Burke was well read in the history of the English Church, particularly in the divines of the seventeenth century. Berkeley and Hume he had read. Novels he had read: Fielding, Smollet, Richardson, and especially Fanny Burney.

French was the only modern foreign language Burke knew. The authors who had most of his attention were Corneille, Montaigne, Molière, Boileau, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Encyclopaedists. He displays some familiarity with Froissart, Rollin, Rapin, and Maimbourg. He was much interested in the French writers of memoirs. He knew the works of Bocaccio, Ariosto, Guicciardini, Machiavelli, but not of Dante. There is indirect evidence that he knew the *Adages* of Erasmus.

He was acquainted with the important legal works and decisions from the Code of Justinian down to his own day. The references to legal treatises are contained for the most part in the *English History* and in a Committee Report for the Hastings trial. He

had some knowledge of the ancient Brehon law of Ireland. He has innumerable reference to the statutes, records, decisions, and legal treatises of England. Bacon, Coke, Clarendon, and Blackstone are often used. Vattel, Puffendorf, Grotius, Suarez, with a variety of other writers on law, were at his command.

An examination of Burke's poetical quotation shows that the Bible, Virgil, Horace, Shakespeare, and Milton chiefly occupied his mind. It is interesting to notice that he had virtually memorized the second book of *Paradise Lost* while in college, and that his quotations from Milton are often from that book.

NEWS AND NOTES

[Items intended for this department should be sent to Miss Lousene Rousseau, 30 Clinton Street, Brooklyn, New York.]

The Chicago Convention of THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS OF SPEECH had a greater attendance than any previous meeting; the round-table method of conducting the special sessions made the meetings livelier; and the organization of various affiliated interests promises to stimulate an even more rapid growth in the future. Professor Frank Rarig, of the University of Minnesota, succeeds Professor J. P. Ryan, of Grinnell, as President. The size and complexity of the annual meetings now makes it impossible to prepare the Association News and Secretary's Minutes for publication in February. They will appear in April.

The Eastern Public Speaking Conference will be held at Princeton Friday and Saturday, April 5 and 6. Professor Hoyt Hudson is President of the Conference this year. A special invitation is being sent to teachers in secondary schools, and a sectional meeting is being provided under the chairmanship of Professor J. Walter Reeves, of Peddie Institute.

The International Society of Experimental Phonetics founded on April 11, 1928, at The Hague, has for its purpose the promotion of scientific research in experimental phonetics. All persons interested in this branch of science, also Universities, Learned Societies, Libraries, etc., are eligible for membership.

Applications with the initial fee of $1.25 are to be sent to the President. Bulletins will be published from time to time and sent to members without charge.

President: Prof. Dr. E. W. Scripture, Strudelhofgasse 4, Vienna, Austria.

Vice-President: Dr. E. A. Meyer, Stockholm.

Regional Delegates: Dr. A. Abas, Amsterdam; Dr. A. Aimä, Helsingfors; Prof. Titys Benni, Warsaw; Prof. V. A. Bogoroditzkij, Kasan; Dr. T. Dunajewski, Charkow; Prof. M. Gramont, Montpellier; Prof. A. Gregoire, Liege; Prof. L. Grootaers, Louvain; Prof. P. Menzerath, Bonn; Prof. M. E. Metfessel, Iowa City; Prof. I. Popovici, Cluij; Prof. A. Rosetti, Bucharest; Prof. L. Scerba, Leningrad; Prof. E. W. Selmer, Oslo; Prof. T. Navarro Tomas, Madrid.

Honorary members: Prof. A. Meillet, Paris; Prof. H. Zwaardemaker, Utrecht.

The following report of the first session of the Linguistic Institute of America was sent in by Miss Elizabeth Avery of Smith College, and is reprinted here in its entirety:

The first session of the Linguistic Institute of America, which was held for six weeks last summer under the auspices of Yale University, was a new and delightful venture in education. It grew out of the feeling that the annual meeting of the Linguistic Society of America does not afford sufficient opportunity for informal discussion, and its main purpose was not the purveying of information but the interchange of ideas. Professor Sturtevant of Yale, to whose warm and generous spirit much of the atmosphere of the session was due, was almost morbidly opposed to the use of the terms *faculty* and *student*. All the classes were informal; some were in reality small groups of scholars carrying on investigations together under the leadership of one of their number, who was probably the most distinguished authority on the subject in the country—perhaps in the world. This unique state of affairs was fostered by the facts that over half the membership consisted of doctors of philosophy and that it was not a case of money on the one hand nor of university credit on the other.

Of the thirty-five courses given, those of most general interest to teachers of speech were the following: American English, by Professor Louise Pound of the University of Nebraska; Experimental Phonetics, and Philological Phonetics, both by Professor G. Oscar Russell of Ohio State University; History of the English Language, by Professor Kemp Malone of Johns Hopkins University; Introduction to Linguistic Science, by Professor Edward Prokosch of New York University; and Some Recent Theories of Linguistic Science, by Dr. Karl Reuning of the University of Breslau, Germany.

In addition to the regular courses, general lectures were given on Tuesday and Friday evenings on such subjects as The Fallacy of the Vowel Triangle, the Problem of Standard Speech, and the History of Ideas and Changes in Vocabulary. These were followed by discussions that sometimes came to an end only out of consideration for the janitor, and were resumed whenever two or three were gathered together in dining room or lounge or the generous shade of a surviving elm. As a result of such vigorous yet tolerant exchange of ideas, it is doubtful if a single person left the Institute without some modification of point of view in regard to particular theories and a strengthening of the attitude of mind which is humanistic in the true sense.

In appraising the total experience the present reporter feels that while the courses taken were far beyond her expectation, an almost equal gain came from the increasing sense of the vitality and integrity of language and its value as the chief instrument in the growth and preservation of civilization.

In somewhat this same field, the following program of the Conference on Speech Pathology and Experimental Phonetics, held at the

University of Iowa in October, will be of interest to many members of the Association:

FRIDAY MORNING—OCTOBER 26

Edward C. Mabie, University of Iowa, Presiding

1. An Experimental Approach to the Nature of Stuttering, Lee Edward Travis, University of Iowa.

2. Phenomenology of Stuttering, Erich Lindemann, University of Iowa.

3. Hysterical Aphonia, Robert West, University of Wisconsin.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON

Lee Edward Travis, Presiding

1. Next Experiments in the Study of the Voice, Milton Metfessel, University of Iowa.

2. Difficulties of Classification of Speech Sounds, John H. Muyskens, University of Michigan.

3. The Physical Characteristics of Inflection in English Speech, Mark H. Liddell, Purdue University.

4. A Study of Inflection Discrimination and Control, Giles W. Gray, University of Iowa.

5. Conference on the Question for Debate in the Iowa High-School League: Resolved: That the United States Should Cease to Protect by Armed Forces American Capital Invested in Latin America Except After Formal Declaration of War.

The Protection of Investments in Latin America, Kirk H. Porter, University of Iowa.

Our Intervention Policy in Latin America, Ivan H. Pollock, University of Iowa.

6. Conference dinner, Iowa Memorial Union—

E. C. Mabie, Presiding

Discussion: Critical Issues in the Approach to the Experimental Study of Speech, led by Carl E. Seashore, University of Iowa.

SATURDAY MORNING

Milton Metfessel, Presiding

1. Variations in the Vowel ē, George W. Stewart, University of Iowa.

2. Eliminating Monotone in Speech, G. Oscar Russell, Ohio State University.

3. Class Room Application of Materials in Voice Science and Phonetics, Alice M. Mills, University of Iowa.

The speakers on these programs represented departments of Speech, Speech Pathology, Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology, Experimental Phonetics, English, Political Science, Physics, Romance Languages, and the Graduate School.

The Speech section of the State Teachers Association of Iowa will henceforth be considered a regional meeting of the National Association of Teachers of Speech. For this reason the name of the organization has now become the Iowa Association of Teachers of Speech. The new

officers are Pearl Hausem, North High School, Des Moines, President; Earl S. Kalp, Newton, Vice President; and W. Earl Beem, Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Secretary-Treasurer. The program of the October meeting was as follows:

FIRST SESSION

President, R. S. Cartwright, Thomas Jefferson High School, Council Bluffs.

Secretary, Miss Leila Hughes, Webster City.

1. Should the Curriculum Include in its English Course One Semester of Debate? Earl S. Kalp, Newton.
2. Play Production, Fred Morrow, Creighton University.
3. Extempore Speaking and its Value, Professor Carrothers, Drake University.
4. Getting the Interest of the Public in Forensics, Hon. J. B. Weaver, Des Moines.

SECOND SESSION

1. The Training of an Orator, W. A. Brindley, Iowa State Teachers College, Cedar Falls.
2. Story Telling.
3. Debate, A. Craig Baird, University of Iowa.
4. Round Table Discussion of present methods of handling debate and declamatory work.

The newly organized Department of Speech of Louisiana State University now has producing quarters in the new armory gymnasium, which contains a beautiful and adequate stage with modern light control devices, including inter-locking switchboard, and modern mechanical equipment. The University producing group, the Louisiana Players Guild, dedicated the building early in December with a performance of *Beggar on Horseback*, by Kaufman and Connelly. In a separate building the Players Guild has also a workshop theatre which seats 300 people and is well equipped in every way. This Little Theatre was recently opened with a production of *The Valiant*, by Middlemass and Hall. This will shortly be followed by the premier production of Percy Mackaye's new one-act play, *The Sphinx*.

C. L. Shaver, formerly of Teachers College of Kirksville, Missouri, has joined the Speech faculty there and will have charge of work in debate and in Stage Craft. He will also operate the Stage-Craft Shop, a large woodwork plant containing power machinery and other facilities for building and construction work. As announced in the last issue of the QUARTERLY, C. M. Wise, also from the Kirksville State Teachers College, is the new chairman of the Department. E. B. Flower of Baton Rouge is the third member of the staff. The new department has a well rounded curriculum and is beginning a series of campus palys and readings, play writing, debate, and extension service.

Under the direction of H. L. Ewbank and Miss Gladys Borchers at the University of Wisconsin a number of new activities are being or-

ganized for the freshmen. These include contests in debating, interpretative reading, extemporary speaking, and declamation. This department is also sponsoring a weekly reading hour, which is offered to the general public. At these meetings students and faculty members furnish the programs. In addition a series of programs by outside readers is being given during the winter. These will include Dean Ralph Dennis of Northwestern University, R. A. Tallcott of the Ithaca Conservatory, Davis Edwards of the University of Chicago, and Lucine Finch, the famous story teller.

The School of Speech of Northwestern University reports that thirty-eight graduate students are enrolled for full or part-time graduate work this year. This number includes two, John Casteel and James Carrell, who are now in the second year of work towards their doctorates.

The Department of Speech of the Washington State College at Pullman has just moved into new quarters in Van Doren Hall, which has been remodelled to meet the needs of the Speech and Music departments. One of the new features is an excellent Laboratory Theatre which has a completely equipped stage with every facility for class and production work.

Illinois Woman's College, at Jacksonville, offers a major in Speech and Dramatic Art toward the A.B. degree. Ten courses are included in the curriculum, and private lessons are required for the major. The Dramatic Club and the Class in Acting have recently presented the following plays: *Dolls*, by Louise Van Voorhis Armstrong; *The Dear Little Wife* by Gerald Dunn; and *And He Came Unto His Father*, by Erna Kruckemeyer. Miss Ida B. Davis is in charge of the department.

At the Warrensburg, Missouri, State Teachers College, play-writing has been added to the work of the course in Interpretation of Drama, conducted by Ben R. Craig. One of his pupils, Miss Peterson, has already had a play, *Confetti*, published by Row, Peterson and Co. in the *Gateway Series of Tested Plays*, edited by C. M. Wise.

DEBATING

Questions being debated in American colleges and universities this year are widely varied, and will be of interest to many readers of the QUARTERLY. The Pi Kappa Delta question, always a popular one, is, Resolved: That a substitute for trial by jury should be adopted. This proposition is also serving the men of the Michigan Debate League, while the women are debating the question, Resolved: That installment buying should be drastically curtailed. The Midwest Debate Conference, the Illinois College League, and Illinois Wesleyan University are working on the proposition, Resolved: That the public should retain the ownership of and develop the principal sources of hydro-electric power in the

United States. The newly organized Western Conference, which corresponds closely to the Big Ten Football Conference, and includes the Universities of Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Purdue, and Northwestern, has chosen the proposition, Resolved: That the Senate of the United States should ratify the Paris Pact without reservations. A number of Pennsylvania colleges are debating the question, Resolved: That the representative arts, literature, and drama should be exempt from censorship. The Pacific Forensic League has chosen two propositions: The Russian plan of total disarmament proposed at the Geneva Conference should be adopted by all nations; and, This house regards with disfavor any curtailment of the free expression of ideas.

One of the exceptionally interesting fall debates was that between the University of California at Los Angeles and the University of Sydney, Australia, on the proposition that the world would be better off without the movies, the American team upholding the negative of the question. They were assisted by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences and by many prominent motion picture stars and producers.

Other teams from abroad have engaged in many debates with American colleges and Universities. Besides the team from the University of Sydney, which debated mainly west of the Mississippi, there is an Oxford team in the East; a National Union of women, mainly in the East; a team from Canada, mostly in the border states; and a team from Porto Rico. The wide variety of questions they debated is shown by the three lists which follow, the first being those proposed by the Australian team:

Scientists should take a ten-year holiday.

This house disapproves of patriotism (or nationalism).

Parliamentary government is superior to the presidential form.

The emergence of women from the home is a depressing feature of modern life.

The tyranny of convention is to be deplored.

Emotion has done more for the world than intellect.

The presence of the veteran is a regrettable feature in modern life.

The world would be better off without the movies.

The modern woman is unwomanly.

The Oxford team announced the following subjects:

This house believes in duties rather than rights.

America should join the League of Nations.

This house believes that the best life is a public life.

Governments should adopt a system of compulsory arbitration for the settlement of international disputes.

The British Universities Union was prepared to defend the following subjects:

The popular reading of psychology is undermining morality.

Democratic governments must depend upon an appeal to prejudice rather than to reason.

Centralization of government destroys the political sense of the people.

The disadvantages of coeducation outweigh the advantages.

It would be desirable to have an international language.

The popularity of high-school debate leagues, often state-wide, makes the matter of high-school debate questions both interesting and important. Below are listed some of the questions being debated in such leagues this year.

The English cabinet form of government is preferable to the presidential form of the United States. (Kansas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, Nebraska, Alabama).

The federal subsidy for the development of an American merchant marine is unwise (Michigan).

The recent policy of the United States of military and diplomatic intervention in Latin-America should be condemned (Colorado).

The United States should cease to protect property located on foreign soil (Kentucky).

The United States should construct an all-American Great Lakes-Atlantic waterway rather than cooperate with Canada in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence project (Minnesota).

A new national political party is desirable (North Dakota).

The federal government should not protect by force of arms American property in foreign lands, except after a formal declaration of war (Ohio and South Dakota).

The counties of Virginia should adopt the county manager form of government (Virginia).

The Constitution of the United States should be amended to provide for the installation of the newly elected legislative and executive officers within six weeks after the November elections (West Virginia).

Installment buying as a means of exchange is economically desirable, (provided that the term does not include the purchase of homes, investment securities, or insurance). (Washington).

The third annual convention of the Missouri and Kansas Debating Associations was held at the Kansas City Athletic Club late in September, and the following program was presented:

FRIDAY MORNING—SEPTEMBER 28

Fellowship Hour.

Address—Presiding Officer, George R. R. Pflaum, State Teachers College, Emporia.

Address—New Experiments in Debate, J. H. Lawrence, College of Emporia.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON

Address—Methods of Debate Research and Scientific Methods of Compiling Debate Bibliographies, Forrest H. Rose, Park College.

Address—Could Debate Trips Include Other Forensic Contests? J. R. Pelsma, State Teachers College, Pittsburgh, Kansas.

Address—Teaching the College Student to Find Independently the Ultimate Issue of a Case, Franc L. McCluer, Westminister College.

Suggested Possibilities for Debating Association Advancement, Ira G. Morrison, President Missouri Debating Association.

Scheduling of debates.

Meeting of Pi Kappa Delta Schools.

SATURDAY MORNING—SEPTEMBER 29

Address—Educational Value of Extemporaneous Debates, P. Casper Harvey, William Jewell College.

Address—Determining Factors in the Decision of the Critic Judge, Arthur J. Graber, Bethel College.

Open Forum. Leader, H. B. Summers, Kansas State Agricultural College.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON

Address—Logic and American Debating, V. E. Phillips, Kansas City School of Law.

Address—The Counter Plan and the Negative Teams, Floyd L. Sampson, Friends' University.

Sectional Business Meeting.

Interest in debating at New York University is growing steadily, as is indicated by the schedule of debates for the current year, which includes forty debates. The debate squad has grown from eight, four years ago, twelve, three years ago, twenty-four, two years ago, to forty-five, this year. Plans for the year involve intra-mural debating between various colleges and schools of the university and participation in programs of clubs in the city. These debates will be no-decision affairs. Charles A. Dwyer is the head coach of debating at the university.

DRAMATICS

Dramatic activities at the School of Speech, Northwestern University, have been many and varied since the opening of the present school year. Six active producing units now comprise the Northwestern University Theatre: Campus Players, which performed Flavin's *Children of the Moon* in November; Prentice Players; The School of Speech and Theatre Arts; The Playshop, which this year has Mrs. Charlotte Chorpenning in charge of all of its productions—which, by the way, are entirely original; The Children's Theatre, under the direction of Winifred Ward, and supported by the School Board and the Parent-Teachers Association of Evanston; and The Repertory Theatre, which presents one outstanding play each month, retaining the casts and settings for the purpose of taking its plays into various neighboring towns. The Children's Theatre begin its fourth year with the production of *The Wizard of Oz*, which, like all productions of this group, had four performances. A new course offered during the last summer session by Miss Ward and Dean Farnsworth, in creative dramatics for children and in children's theatres, attracted students from thirty-two states and Canada.

In addition to these groups, an experimental theatre is being planned by Mr. Leverton and Mr. Farnsworth. It will appear only once or twice each year, but its appearance will be devoted entirely to the experimenting with various ideas in directing, lighting, and staging. The first "experiment," in January, was a performance of O'Neill's *The Emperor Jones.*

Another dramatic innovation this year at Northwestern is the performance of two plays, one each semester, by entirely freshman casts. These plays are under the supervision of graduate studnts and the department of dramatic production. The first performance, in November, was *Merton of the Movies.*

The School of Speech and Theatre Arts, after the production of Molnar's *Liliom*, staged a dramatic event of some importance in January, when they produced a play owned by the New York Theatre Guild and called B. A. B. A. Black Sheep. It was written by a Professor of French in Columbia University, and is concerned with "debunking" the American college. Rights to the play were obtained through Barrett H. Clark, who, together with the author, was present at the performance —the first, by the way, ever given of the play.

A one-act play produced last year in the Northwestern Playshop is meeting with success on the Keith circuit. The cast, made up of Northwestern players, faculty and students, has been on the road since June and has played from coast to coast. The play, *The Undercurrent*, was written by Mrs. Fay Ehlert of the playwriting class. Theodore Hinckley is in charge of the play-writing classes.

An important December event at Northwestern was the appearance of Mr. Bridges Adams, director of the Stratford-on-Avon Company which Morris Gest brought to the United States for a short tour in Shakesperian repertory. Mr. Adams spoke and conducted discussion on the "Particular Requirements of a Shakesperian Director."

Dramatic activities at the University of Wisconsin during the first semester were started with the production of Capek's *R. U. R.*, late in September. The play was produced in an ultra-modernistic manner, the staging being done by an Austrian scene designer, Molnar Gyula, who planned it to represent the best of Austrian radicalism. The production aroused a great deal of discussion and controversy, and increased interest in the work of the Bascom Theatre. In November, Shaw's *The Devil's Disciple* was presented, and a bit later Martinez Sierra's *The Cradle Song*, which has been one of the most successful of the plays of Eva La Gallienne's Civic Repertory Theatre. Outside attractions brought to Madison by the Theatre were *Three Wise Fools*, *Pigs*, and a lecture-recital by E. H. Sothern.

The first major dramatic productions at the State College of Washington this year were Channing Pollock's *The Enemy*, directed by E. Cynthia Larry, and Molnar's *The Swan*, directed by Maynard Lee Daggy.

The Dramatic Company of the Brooklyn Little Theatre, which is directed by Randolph Sommerville of New York University, has been made the fortunate recipient of some of the personal effects of the late Louis Calvert. Among these souvenirs are several valuable prompt books of plays which Mr. Somerville plans to produce at the theatre. One of them is the director's copy of *You Never Can Tell*, from the original production at the Court Theatre, London, performed under the eye of Shaw himself. Many of the items were placed on display at the theatre at the time of the company's opening performance, in November, of Milne's *Belinda*.

Productions of the Cornell Summer Theatre included *A Question of Principle*, by Martin Flavin; *Nevertheless*, by Stuart Walker; *The Daily Doesn't*, by Charles Knox; *The Drawback*, by Maurice Baring; *The Green Scarf*, by Kenneth Goodman Sawyer; *Etiquette*, by Paul Halevy; *Release*, by E. H. Smith; *A Matter of Husbands*, by Ferenc Molnar; *Spring*, by Colin Campbell Clements; *Rehearsal*, by Christopher Morley; *Shall We Join the Ladies?* by J. M. Barrie; *The Man in the Bowler Hat*, by A. A. Milne; *The Eldest*, by Edna Ferber; *Double Demon*, by A. P. Herbert; *A Man Should Have a Wife*, by Elizabeth Raushenbush; *Will o' the Wisp*, by Doris Halman; *Saved*, by J. W. Rogers, Jr.; *Gloria Mundi*, by Patricia Brown; *Crabbed Youth and Age*, by Lennox Robinson; *Two Slatterns and a King*, by Edna St. Vincent Millay; *Episode*, by Arthur Schnitzler; and *The Emperor Jones*, by Eugene O'Neill.

The Senior Class of Emerson College of Oratory chose *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, by Thomas Heyward, for its annual presentation of an Old English drama this year. It was presented at the Fine Arts Theatre early in December under the direction of Mr. Forrect, head of the Dramatic department. So far as is known, this was its first performance in America.

The fourth annual dramatic contest for secondary schools held under the auspices of New York University will take place on Saturday, March 9, at the University Playhouse. It is planned to select eight schools from among the applicants to represent various parts of the country—Northern and Southern New Jersey, Westchester County, Connecticut, Greater New York, Long Island, and Rhode Island. As in other years, a silver trophy will be presented to the winning school by the Washington Square Players. Between the afternoon and evening sessions a meeting will be held to form a permanent association of directors of dramatic activities.

The Children's Theatre of Emerson College of Oratory plans to present seven plays during the year: *Cinderella*, *Master Skylark*, *Fra Angelico*, *Jack and the Beanstalk*, *The Pied Piper*, *The Little Lame Prince*, and *Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves*.

The fourth annual competition for the Cumnock Cup and the $250.00 prize will be held at the Northwestern University School of Speech in April. From present indications, the contest bids fair to be more popular and more successful than ever before.

The Pacific Little Theatre, of the College of the Pacific at Stockton, California, under the direction of DeMarcus Brown, has announced six major productions for the year: *Kindling*, by Charles Kenyon; *The Poor Nut*, by J. S. Nugent; *A Kiss for Cinderella*, by J. M. Barrie; *Lilies of the Field*, by Turner; *Tommy*, by Lindsay and Robinson; and *Twelfth Night*, by Shakespeare.

Several recent Dramatic Art students of Washington State College are now filling positions on the professional stage. Miss Clelah Cooper, instructor in speech during the last year, is playing leads with the Maylon Players in Spokane. Arthur Siegrist has been with the Maylons for two years. Leah Stiefel, after a year with this same company, is in pictures in Hollywood. Leonne Webber is with the Toby Comedians in Seattle. Laurence Berg is with Burton James Little Theatre in Seattle. Tad Richards is with the Moroni Olsen Players Circuit Repertory Company.

Galsworthy's *Loyalties* was performed by Boar's Head Dramatic Society of Syracuse University a few weeks ago. The next play to be presented will be *The Romantic Young Lady*, by G. Martinez-Sierra.

PERSONALS

A number of changes are reported in the faculty of the School of Speech at Northwestern University. David Owen has designed to devote his entire time to the North Shore Theatre Guild, a producing organization covering North Shore communities from Evanston to Lake Forest. Howard Berolzheimer has been granted a year's leave of absence for graduate study at Yale University. Miss Belle Kennedy of London, England, is now a member of the Speech faculty, being associated with Dr. C. T. Simon in the work of the Speech Clinic opened last September. C. D. Hardy has added to his activities the presidency of the Evanston Chamber of Commerce. He is the first campus man to hold this position in Evanston. Garrett Leverton, for the past few years in charge of dramatics at Lake Forest College, Illinois, is now in charge of the University and Repertoire Theatre of the School of Speech.

Dr. Robert Hannah has resigned his position at the University of Michigan and has been spending the first semester completing a book.

Miss Marie Marion Barnett has become profesional director of the Corpus Christi Players, Corpus Christi, Texas.

Herbert C. Rahe, formerly of the University of Maine, is now instructor in Speech at Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana.

W. A. Dahlberg has been granted leave of absence from the State Agricultural College of Oregon for graduate study at Northwestern University, where he has been awarded a fellowship.

Dr. Leo G. Gosser has taken over the direction of work in Drama at Alabama Polytechnic Institute, at Auburn.

Dr. Robert West of the University of Wisconsin will teach this coming summer at the University of Michigan, while Dr. John H. Muyskens of the latter institution will go to Wisconsin for the session.

Because of ill health Earl Fleischman is on leave of absence from the University of Michigan, and his classes in dramatics are being conducted by Valentine Windt, formerly of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh.

R. D. T. Hollister was also on leave of absence from the University of Michigan during the first semester, devoting his time to writing at his home in Ann Arbor.

B. F. Folsom, formerly of Missouri Wesleyan College, is now head of the Department of Speech at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Vernon Utzinger has been granted leave of absence from the Elgin, Illinois, High School, and is working on a fellowship at Northwestern University.

Miss Ida Lou Anderson has returned to her position as instructor in Speech at Washington State College, after a year of graduate study at Northwestern University.

Two recent graduates of the State Teachers College of Kalamazoo, Michigan, are now teaching at that institution. J. Richard Bietry, who taught in Los Angeles last year, is in charge of the work in speech in the Normal High School, and Arthur Secord is in charge of the speech work in one of the Training Schools, Paw Paw High School.

F. B. McKay of Michigan State Normal College, Ypsilanti, is spending a year's leave of absence in study at the University of Michigan.

Gus W. Campbell, formerly of the State Teachers College at Oshkosh, Wisconsin, is now a member of the English department at Northern Illinois Teachers College, De Kalb.

Forest A. Roberts, formerly at Graceland College, Lamoni, Iowa, is now at the Northern State Teachers College, Marquette, Michigan.

Miss Ella Braunlich is reopening her School for Lip Reading and Speech Correction at 154 East 79th Street, New York City.

Miss Ruth Peters, a graduate of the Central School of Speech Training, London, is organizing a Speech Department at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She is one of the latest subscribers to the QUARTERLY.

Miss Edna M. McCord is president of the Speech Improvement Teachers Association of New York City, and Miss Eleanor A. Farrell is secretary.

Homer Abegglen, who received his Master's degree at the Yale School of Drama last June has joined the faculty of the Public Speaking Department in Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.

Elwood Murray and Emerson Lull, of Purdue University, engaged in three public debates prior to election day on the question: "Resolved: that a practicable solution of the liquor problem is more likely to be secured by the election of Al Smith than of Herbert Hoover."

A. M. Drummond, of Cornell, will give courses in drama at the University of California next summer.

H. A. Wichelns, of Cornell, will offer work in rhetoric in the graduate school of the University of Wisconsin in the next summer session.

E. L. Hunt, of Swarthmore, will give a course for teachers and will present a series of lectures on rhetoric and public opinion at the summer session of the University of Colorado.

H. H. Hudson, of Princeton, will give courses in English literature in the Cornell summer session.

Harry Caplan, of Cornell, who is in Europe studying medieval rhetoric as a Guggenheim Fellow, sends interesting accounts of debating at Cambridge and Oxford. He may be addressed in care of the American University Union, Paris.

ROBERT McLEAN CUMNOCK

On November 28th, in the eighty-eighth year of his life, Dr. Robert Cumnock passed away.

Educated at Wilbraham Academy and at Connecticut Wesleyan, Dr. Cumnock came to Northwestern University in 1868 and there he taught till 1913, in which year he retired from active work. It was his gentle boast that he had never missed a class in the forty-five years of his teaching.

In 1878 he organized his School of Oratory as a part of Northwestern University. In 1894 he solicited funds and erected the present home of the now School of Speech, Annie May Swift Hall. Teaching in the College of Liberal Arts and in Garrett Theological School as well as in his own department, many thousands of students passed under his instruction. All will regret his death. An artist, a teacher, a friend has passed.

Writing of him, Paul Pearson, a former student and instructor in the School, says, "He was not a contemporary. He mingled little with others. We might call him "Cummie" among ourselves, but nobody ever addressed him except by his title and by his full name. He was not interested in and had no part in our present day political and social institutions. He was a heroic figure from an earlier age, an age which expressed itself in a scrupulous devotion to duty (to one's work) and to maintaining inviolate the integrity of character inherited from a high Scotch tradition, an age that expressed itself in a formal and noble literature.

He was fastidious, in dress, in all living habits, and in speech. How he abhorred slovenly speech!

His life was expressed in intense singleness of purpose, and that purpose was to teach men and women to speak accurately and nobly. To this end he gave his life with complete devotion, patient persistence and unflagging enthusiasm. He was proud of his cause and had faith enough in it to believe that it would be recognized."

RALPH DENNIS, *Northwestern University*